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ABSTRACT 
This study conducts transgender readings of literary 
and visual texts by female writers and artists from the 
modernist period. It analyses works by Romaine Brooks, 
Gertrude Stein, Radclyffe Hall, and Virginia Woolf in a 
cultural and historical context and from a contemporary 
theoretical perspective. The selected works, which all 
entered the public sphere during the 1920s, are: 
Romaine Brooks's portraits Renata Borgatti au Piano (c. 
1920), Peter (A Young English Girl) (1923-24), Self- 
Portrait (1923), and Una, Lady Troubridge (1924); 
Gertrude Stein's The Making of Americans (1925); 
Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness (1928); and 
Virginia Woolf's Orlando (1928). 
My survey of a range of discourses and non- 
fictional materials from the period demonstrates a 
growing public interest in the concept of sex and 
gender changes. Each chapter provides some discussion 
of the writer or artist's interest in or enactment of 
some form of unconventional self-fashioning. Close 
readings of the selected texts against these cultural 
and biographical backgrounds, but also alongside 
transgender narratives and visual representations from 
the second half of the twentieth century, explore the 
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relationship of each text to an incipient transgender 
consciousness. 
The introduction conducts a brief review of the 
critical field and a longer discussion of the 
historical and political development of transgender 
identities. Some cultural and historical context is 
provided, including a detailed consideration of the 
"masculine woman". Sexual discourses of the period and 
the radical journal Urania are also examined. Chapter 1 
uses sexological theories of inversion from the late- 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries to foreground 
transgender elements of Hall's representation of the 
"mannish woman" in The Well of Loneliness. Chapter 2 
compares the dissonant visual effects of Romaine 
Brooks's portraits of cross-dressed women with those of 
the 1990s self-portraits of transsexual photographer 
Loren Cameron. Chapter 3 considers public and private 
narratives of identity through a discussion of the 
biographical and fantastical elements of Woolf's 
Orlando and twentieth-century transgender 
autobiographies. Chapter 4 examines the ways in which 
Stein's experimental prose fiction The Making of 
Americans challenges representations of identity 
through its verbal and grammatical innovations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Gender ... is the far more elaborated, more 
fully and rigidly dichotomized social 
production and reproduction of male and 
female identities and behaviors-of male and 
female persons-in a cultural system for which 
"male/female" functions as a primary and 
perhaps model binarism affecting the 
structure and meaning of many, many other 
binarisms whose apparent connection to 
chromosomal sex will often be exiguous or 
nonexistent. 
-Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the 
Closet (27-28) 
My thesis identifies a transgender presence in some of 
the key literary and visual texts from the 1920s by 
female modernists. The selected texts are: Romaine 
Brooks's portraits Renata Borgatti au Piano (c. 1920), 
Peter (A Young English Girl) (1923-24), Self-Portrait 
(1923), and Una, Lady Troubridge (1924); Gertrude 
Stein's The Making of Americans (1925); Radclyffe 
Hall's The Well of Loneliness (1928); and Virginia 
Woolf's Orlando (1928). Taken together, these works are 
shown to enact a founding principle of transgender 
C 
politics in their questioning of the linguistic and 
cultural enforcement of naturalising concepts of 
identity. My analysis of the individual works and their 
effects identifies themes and tensions that are often 
present in transgender representations and discourses. 
Most notably these are: a link between the processes of 
self-creation and the practices of art, a co-existence 
of opposing reactionary and radical forces, and a 
foundational intransigence of sex and gender binaries. 
In its cultural context, each of the selected 
texts can be seen to stand outside of or position 
itself against the gendered aesthetics of "Modernism", 
in particular, what Peter Nicholls in Modernisms: A 
Literary Guide calls "the absolute fixing of sexual 
difference, which is seen as the condition of the 
self's autonomy" (194). In my study, the sexed and 
gendered binaries which construct that "difference" are 
shown to be unsettled by narratives and images of 
sartorial and somatic transformations, and more 
radically opposed through writing strategies which seek 
to replace representation with a linguistic 
materiality. Hall's novel and Brooks's portraits of 
cross-dressed women fashion different styles and poses 
of masculinity. In Woolf's Orlando a fluidity of 
identity, manifested in various playful sex- and 
gender-crossings, sets the agency of personal 
narratives against the public authority of official 
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narratives of medicine, science and law. Stein's 
experimental text The Making of Americans challenges 
representational notions of identity through its verbal 
and grammatical innovations. 
It would be conceptually dangerous to argue that 
any of these women are expressing notions of 
transgender in a late-twentieth-century sense in their 
writing or painting. Nevertheless, in their works and 
lives they all evince a preoccupation with dissident 
identities and undertake some form of unconventional 
self-fashioning. Although these women are commonly 
identified as either lesbian or, in the case of Woolf, 
as having lesbian desires, in each case it is 
trangressions of gender as much as sexuality that 
appear to form the basis of their interests and self- 
representations. To some degree this can be understood 
as a culturally enforced displacement from the 
forbidden area of same-sex desire to a more acceptable 
aspect of personal identity, especially as female 
masculinity had become something of a fashion statement 
during the 1920s. Even with that pressure, the apparent 
desire to breach or evade binary gender codes produces 
its own distinct effects. Gender cannot be considered 
in pure isolation from the other main poles of identity 
(sexuality, race, class), but if it is taken as the 
primary focus of analysis, rather than as a subsidiary 
to sexual desire, different interpretative 
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possibilities arise. Furthermore, an examination of the 
gendered elements of the works I have chosen for 
discussion, both in their cultural and historical 
context and from a contemporary theoretical 
perspective, demonstrates a forceful rationale for this 
revisionary project. 
In a survey of a range of non-fictional materials 
from the period-including sexological works, the 
journal Urania, and life-narratives-I will identify a 
growing awareness of the phenomenon of sex and gender 
changes in both public and private discourses. By 
considering the selected texts alongside transgender 
representations from the second half of the twentieth 
century, and in light of queer theory's concept of 
gender performativity, I will show this development to 
be a significant phase in the prehistory of an evolving 
transgender consciousness. 
Feminist revisions 
Over the past twenty years female modernists have been 
the subject of major cultural and literary studies. 
Women writers and artists from the opening decades of 
the twentieth century have been considered both singly 
and as a diverse but distinct group. Most scholarly 
works have directed attention to the relationships 
between these women's lives and works, frequently 
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drawing on biographical and literary resources in equal 
measure for their observations on the various 
intersections of experiences of class, gender identity 
and sexuality. Many of the women discussed are from 
financially privileged or educated backgrounds, and 
this is usually recognised as an important factor in 
their artistic production and achievements. Some degree 
of social independence is an important issue at a time 
when women still struggled to find publishers and, in 
some instances, chose to set up their own publishing 
houses or to distribute their work privately. In 
addition, women who were publicly identified as both 
upper class and "artistic" tended to enjoy a degree of 
protection from censure of both their lifestyles and 
works. Such tolerance had its legal limits, as 
Radclyffe Hall was to discover when her novel The Well 
of Loneliness was successfully prosecuted as an obscene 
publication in 1928. The cross-dressing of some 
modernist women has been understood as a coded 
expression of their same-sex desires; it has also been 
viewed in the context of a relaxation of sartorial and 
social rules amongst middle- and upper-class women 
following the First World War. In their expressions of 
same-sex desires, both private and public, coded and 
overt, the works and lives of modernist women have been 
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revisioned by some critics as a "Sapphic modernism". 1 
Of these rich and varied feminist revisions of 
modernism, a key text to have appeared in the past 
decade is the critical anthology The Gender of 
Modernism (1990), edited by Bonnie Kime Scott. 
Importantly, the anthology does not seek to replace a 
white Anglo-American male canon with a similarly 
restricted female version, but instead represents 
writings by women and some men from a wide range of 
cultural origins including African-American writers. In 
this respect, it challenges definitions of modernism on 
the basis of both gender and race. Scott has also 
produced an influential two-volume study, Re-figuring 
Modernism (1995). In Volume 1, The Women of 1928, Scott 
adopts "the web" as an enabling metaphor in an 
examination of the lives and works of Virginia Woolf, 
Rebecca West, and Djuna Barnes. Volume 2, Postmodern 
Feminist Readings of Woolf, West and Barnes, analyses 
some of these women's major works in light of 
developments in contemporary feminist theory. 
Shari Benstock's Women of the Left Bank: Paris 
1900-1940 (1986) and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's 
three-volume critique of women and modernism, No Man's 
Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth 
Century (published between 1988 and 1994), have also 
1 See Shari Benstock's essay "Expatriate Sapphic Modernism: 
Entering Literary History" for a fuller discussion of the origins 
of this term and its conceptual difficulties. 
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made important contributions to the field. Benstock's 
comprehensive survey examines modernist women writers 
and artists in the context of the artistic and cultural 
communities of Paris. Benstock explains in the text's 
preface that her project aims to trace "differences 
between and within literary practices and lived 
circumstances of this period", rather than "write 
literary history" from the single perspective of gender 
or define a "Modernist feminist poetics" (n. p. ). In 
terms of my own study, one of the more problematic 
elements of Benstock's feminist critique has been her 
reductive response to cross-dressing women from the 
middle and upper classes, who tend to be viewed purely 
in terms of the reactionary and misogynist practices 
they are deemed to be upholding. Benstock argues that: 
"Although female cross-dressing of this type was an 
antisocial act that called attention to societal 
definitions of female homosexuals as `inverts' and 
`perverts, ' it nonetheless was not a sign of liberation 
from heterosexual norms or patriarchal domination" 
(181). My discussion allows for a greater degree of 
ambivalence in the effects of that appropriation. 
Gilbert and Gubar's epic work covers a vast 
selection of material from the 1880s to the 1930s and 
examines a range of gender issues. In Volume 2, 
Sexchanges (1989), the primary focus is "changing 
definitions of sex and sex roles" culminating in "the 
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virtually apocalyptic engendering of the new for both 
literary men and literary women" (xii). The section on 
"Reinventing Gender", particularly the chapter "Cross- 
Dressing and Re-Dressing: Transvestism as Metaphor", 
has some parallels with my own work in terms of its 
analysis of what they call "the trope of transvestism 
and transsexualism" (326) in literary and visual texts. 
Gilbert and Gubar's citing of these distinct cultural 
identities as a "trope" (not even two separate tropes) 
reflects a common critical practice of employing 
transgender identities for their figurative, rather 
than literal, potential. There is a further 
reductiveness evident in the gender-bias of such 
observations as: "where male modernist costume imagery 
is profoundly conservative, feminist modernist costume 
imagery is radically revisionary" (332). In this 
respect, I share Bonnie Kime Scott's reservations, 
voiced in The Women of 1928, about the "self-serving 
selectivity" of "the all too neat division they 
[Gilbert and Gubar) often make between failed male and 
superior female modernists" (xxxvi). In Women Writers 
and Artists: Modernist (Im)positionings, Bridget 
Elliott and Jo-Ann Wallace also take issue with Gilbert 
and Gubar's methodology and its tendency to flatten out 
"important differences ... between women active in 
the field of modernism" (13). 
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Women Writers and Artists (1994) is another 
authoritative text in terms of its feminist revisioning 
of the cultural history of modernism. Elliott and 
Wallace adopt a cross-disciplinary approach for their 
re-evaluation of canonical and noncanonical modernist 
women in the context of issues of cultural production 
and critical reception. A chapter on Romaine Brooks and 
Natalie Barney, "Fleur du Mal or Second-hand Roses? ", 
questions critical responses to Brooks's work that have 
read its "derivative" elements as evidence of a 
"second-rate" art form and the product of conservative 
and patriarchal impulses. They challenge the 
traditional notions of "originality" which underpin 
those interpretations and question why 
poststructuralism's dismantling of the original/copy 
binary is only felt to be applicable to visual works of 
recent production. In the chapter "The Making of 
Genius", Elliott and Wallace compare Gertrude Stein's 
artistic self-representation with that of the artist 
Marie Laurencin. Stein's identification as a "male 
genius" is viewed in terms of its relationship to the 
dominant discourse of creative (gendered) genius at the 
time, and Elliott and Wallace's discussion raises 
important issues of identity and representation. 
My decision to focus on works by female modernists 
has a historical and thematic rationale. The texts I 
discuss all enter the public sphere during the 1920s, 
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although Stein's The Making of Americans was completed 
in 1911. Historically, the first two decades of the 
twentieth century have been identified as being an 
especially productive period for creative women. Martha 
Vicinus's essay on the roots of modern lesbian identity 
states that during the 1910s and 1920s "lesbians" were 
making a "self-conscious effort to create a new sexual 
language for themselves that included not only words 
but also gestures, costume, and behavior" (487). 
However, in terms of the focus of my study, a more 
comprehensive analysis of an evolving transgender 
consciousness in the modernist period could range more 
widely in its time span and could include works by men, 
as well as other female writers and artists. George 
Moore's short story "Albert Nobbs", published in his 
anthology Celibate Lives in 1927, might be compared 
with D. H. Lawrence's novella "The Fox" (first 
published in 1923) for their different representations 
of masculine women. 2 Texts in which gender 
transgression is represented as "monstrous" and 
"dysfunctional" can be as valid to a study of a 
developing transgender consciousness as those texts 
which adopt a more playful or reverent approach; but 
that is not to suggest any clear and consistent divide 
2 "Albert Nobbs" was originally privately published in A Story- 
Teller's Holiday in 1918. A shorter version of "The Fox" was 
published in July 1919 in Hutchinson's Story Magazine (The 
Complete Short Novels 11). "Albert Nobbs" and "The Fox" are 
compared by Gilbert and Gubar for their negative representations 
of "transvestism" (Sexchanges 336-338). 
17 
between female and male modernists' treatment of 
gender. Ronald Firbank's novels have received queer 
critical approval for their exploration of "exotic 
effeminacy" through "a protesting effeminate style that 
constantly displaced an inability to speak for itself 
on to other perverse formations, such as lesbianism" 
(Bristow, Effeminate England 120). D. H. Lawrence 
evinces a clear discomfort with notions of gender 
travesties in some of his unsympathetic 
characterisations of feminine men and masculine women, 
but those representations are seldom wholly unequivocal 
in their condemnation and the sexually ambiguous 
characters can be objects of repressed desire for the 
"real men" of his stories. 3 Equally, many texts by 
female modernist writers display a degree of 
ambivalence towards their gender-variant characters. In 
Rosamond Lehmann's Dusty Answer (1927), whilst the 
novel's representation of the erotic friendship between 
Judith Earle and Jennifer Baird departs from dominant 
heterosexual models of same-sex desire, its 
characterisation of the interloper to this 
relationship, the masculine (and racially "other") 
Geraldine Manners, vilifies the "mannish lesbian" by 
portraying her as a dangerously seductive and 
3 In Women in Love (1921), for example, Gerald Crich is apparently 
repelled and aroused by the effeminate men he encounters in the 
bars of London and in the hotel in Switzerland. 
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ultimately destructive figure. 4 Similarly, one of the 
most common criticisms of Radclyffe Hall's The Well of 
Loneliness concerns the abject depiction of its 
tortured "masculine" protagonist, Stephen Gordon. 
Where my own study differs from previous writing 
on the works of female modernists is in its 
identification and foregrounding of transgender 
effects. My revisioning of texts by female modernists 
must position itself partly within the critical field 
of feminist and lesbian remappings of modernism; but my 
approach can be seen to set my research outside of (and 
for some critics almost certainly against) this 
project. The readings I present respond to current 
developments in histories and theories of sexuality, in 
particular, the emergence of "transgender" as a 
culturally specific although diversely experienced 
identity, a site of ideological debate, and an area of 
academic study. 
Transgender 
It was only during the second half of the twentieth 
century that at first transsexual and latterly, and 
more inclusively, transgender subjects began to gain 
recognition as distinct identities both in medical 
4 For an interesting discussion of Lehmann's novel, see Andrea 
Lewis's "`Glorious Pagan That I Adore': Resisting the National 
Reproductive Imperative in Rosamond Lehmann's Dusty Answer". 
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terms and to an increasing extent culturally and 
politically. Use of the term "transsexual" to describe 
an experience of cross-gender identification first 
appears in an article by D. 0. Cauldwell, "Psychopathia 
Transexualis" (single s in original), published in an 
American medical journal in December 1949. The 
development of "transsexualism" as a medical theory and 
its association with "sex-change" surgery are generally 
linked to the work of American endocrinologist Harry 
Benjamin in the early 1950s. Dave King's essay "Gender 
Blending: Medical Perspectives and Technology" provides 
a useful account of the medical history of 
transsexuality from the 1950s to the 1990s. Key 
developments in that history include coinage of the 
diagnostic label "gender dysphoria" in the early 1970s, 
and in 1980 the entry of "transsexualism" in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
as a "gender identity disorder". 
On the basis of its entry into public 
consciousness as a medical condition, some feminist and 
cultural critics represent transsexuality as a product 
of that intervention. Janice Raymond's hostile polemic 
The Transsexual Empire (1979) argues that transsexuals 
are the victims of a misogynist and homophobic medical 
conspiracy. Raymond uses the terms "female-to- 
constructed-male" and "male-to-constructed-female" to 
highlight her view of transsexuals as surgically (and 
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culturally) engineered subjects. Bernice L. Hausman's 
Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and The Idea 
of Gender (1995) presents a more balanced view in its 
examination of the role of medical technology in the 
development of transsexual subjectivity. Hausman's 
argument that technology not only "makes transsexualism 
possible" but also provides a discursive frame within 
which "the idea of the transsexual becomes conceptually 
possible" (117) is persuasive. But her own discussion 
of sexological literature and theories implies the 
existence of a more complex history and prehistory than 
her main thesis allows. 
Judith Halberstam, in Female Masculinity (1998), 
challenges those critics who would simplify what she 
sees as a knot of shared and conflicting 
identifications and desires to favour the interests of 
one particular theory or identity group. Halberstam 
states: 
Future studies of transsexuality and of 
lesbianism must attempt to account for 
historical moments when the difference 
between gender deviance and sexual deviance 
is hard to discern. The history of inversion 
and of people who identified as inverts ... 
still represents a tangle of cross- 
identification and sexual preference that is 
neither easily separated nor comfortably 
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accounted for under the heading of "lesbian. " 
There is not, furthermore, one history to be 
told here (the history of medical technology) 
about one subject (the transsexual). (161) 
The complexities surrounding the "history of inversion" 
will be considered in a more detailed discussion of 
sexological discourses. What is significant here is 
that the disputed territory which Halberstam's comments 
identify cannot simply be assigned as either lesbian or 
transsexual. On this subject, Halberstam's study of 
female masculinity and Gayle Rubin's "Of Catamites and 
Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender and Boundaries" 
(1992) have been influential in their discussions of 
transgender and lesbian identities and the contested 
site of masculine identification. Halberstam's work 
seeks to uphold a diversity of female masculinity by 
demonstrating a two-hundred-year tradition of masculine 
women. Rubin's essay identifies a wide spectrum of 
gender and sexual identities between the contemporary 
categories of butch lesbian and transsexual man. She 
argues that although "important discontinuities 
separate lesbian butch experience and female-to-male 
experience, there are also significant points of 
connection" (473). Rubin's essay also describes an 
antipathy that many lesbians feel towards transsexuals. 
In spite of "the overlap and kinship between some areas 
of lesbian and transsexual experience", transsexuals 
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are seen as "treasonous deserters"; as a group they are 
"commonly perceived and described in contemptuous 
stereotypes: unhealthy, deluded, self-hating, enslaved 
to patriarchal gender roles, sick, antifeminist, 
antiwoman, and self-mutilating" (474). The kind of 
hostility Rubin describes is also directed at 
transsexual women in Janice Raymond's Transsexual 
Empire and Sheila Jeffreys's "Transgender Activism: A 
Lesbian Feminist Perspective". 
The emergence of "transgenderism" began to counter 
those constructions of transsexuality that relied upon 
essentialist notions of sex and gender and medical 
intervention for their validity. Leslie Feinberg's 
Transgender Warriors attributes the first use of the 
term "transgenderist" to "trans warrior" Virginia 
Prince. In conversation with Feinberg, Prince explains: 
"'I coined the noun transgenderist in 1987 or '88. 
There had to be some name for people like myself who 
trans the gender barrier-meaning somebody who lives 
full time in the gender opposite to their anatomy. I 
have not transed the sex barrier'" (x). Feinberg's own 
distinction between transsexual and transgender adopts 
this fundamental difference: "Transsexual men and women 
traverse the boundary of the sex they were assigned at 
birth", whereas "[t]ransgender people traverse, bridge, 
or blur the boundary of the gender expression they were 
assigned at birth" (x). Feinberg modifies this clear 
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division with the observation that neither category is 
definitive: "not all transsexuals choose surgery or 
hormones; some transgender people do" (x). 
During the 1990s some transgender subjects sought 
to distance themselves from the more conservative 
aspects of transsexual identities, presenting their own 
gender transgressions as radical and culturally 
subversive challenges to dominant binary models of 
identity. A link between transgender and queer theory 
was forged, primarily by Judith Butler's writing on 
gender performativity in Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity (1990). Butler's evocation 
of the figure of the drag artist as a principal 
metaphorical device had an unintended effect in that it 
appeared to represent the "transgendered subject" as a 
gender outlaw, capable of parodic subversion through 
repeated crossings of gender boundaries. In Bodies That 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of `Sex' (1993) Butler 
contradicts this reading of her work with the 
statement: "I want to underscore that there is no 
necessary relation between drag and subversion, and 
that drag may well be used in the service of both the 
denaturalization and reidealization of hyperbolic 
heterosexual gender norms" (125). Nevertheless, a view 
of "transgender" as politically radical contributes to 
some poststructuralist constructions of transsexual 
subjects as gender reactionaries who uncritically 
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exchange one gender role for another in their fixed 
trajectory from "male to female" or "female to male". 
Jay Prosser's Second Skins: The Body Narratives of 
Transsexuality (1998) challenges constructionist 
readings of transsexuality, such as Hausman's, which 
"fail to examine how transsexuals are constructing 
subjects" (8). He also questions poststructuralism's 
conceptualisation of transsexuals as either 
"deliteralizing" and therefore subversive, or 
"literalizing" and therefore hegemonic. Prosser argues: 
"In readings that embrace the transsexual as 
deliteralizing as much as those that condemn the 
transsexual as literalizing, the referential 
transsexual subject can frighteningly disappear in 
his/her very invocation" (14). Prosser acknowledges the 
productive force of Judith Butler's work both in terms 
of the emergence of transgender studies and as an 
enabling strategy for his own reading of transsexual 
narratives: "transgender would not be of the moment if 
not for the queer moment" (6). At the same time, he 
wants to recuperate transsexuals from their elided 
position in queer theory's performative account of 
gender by privileging the material, bodily effects of 
their transitions: "It is imperative to read 
transsexual accounts now in order to flesh out the 
transgendered figure that queer theory has made 
prominent" (6) . 
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Second Skins is a more recent addition to a 
growing body of formative works by transsexual and 
transgender critics. In terms of transgender agency 
this is a crucial development; the direction in which 
that subjectivity should proceed-what it should look 
like and how it should present itself-is a contentious 
and disputed issue. Where Prosser analyses transsexual 
narratives to demonstrate the "active subjectivity" of 
transsexuality (10), Sandy Stone's polemical essay "The 
Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto" 
(1991) challenges the usefulness of many of those same 
narratives. Prosser argues that the "gendered UNIVERSITY 
coherence" of transsexual autobiography is OF YORK 
LIBRARY 
"inextricable from the narrative coherence of the 
genre" (116); Stone's essay calls for a move towards 
narratives which more accurately reflect and disclose 
the complexities and ambiguities between and within 
transsexual subjects' personal histories. Kate 
Bornstein's Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women and the Rest 
of Us (1994) is similarly provocative in its desire to 
dismantle paradigmatic narratives of transsexual 
experience. Bornstein conducts her project critically 
and structurally; Prosser describes Gender Outlaw as 
opposing "transsexuality's telic narrative structure 
(that it has a gendered outcome) precisely as it 
rewrites the telic structure of conventional 
autobiographical narrative" (174). And yet, as a genre, 
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transsexual autobiography continues to uphold the 
dominant conceptual model, and such "populist" 
narratives are central to an understanding of some of 
the material differences between transgender and queer, 
and within transgender itself. 
The field of transgender studies has also received 
not always welcome contributions from non-transgender 
cultural critics. Works include Marjorie Garber's 
Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety 
(1992); Pat Califia's Sex Changes: The Politics of 
Transgenderism (1997) ;5 and many of the essays 
collected in the anthologies Body Guards: The Cultural 
Politics of Gender Ambiguity (1991), edited by Julia 
Epstein and Kristina Straub, and Blending Genders: 
Social Aspects of Cross-Dressing and Sex-Changing 
(1996), edited by Richard Ekins and Dave King. Over the 
last ten years there has been an increasing number of 
biographies of transgender figures who traditionally 
have been seen by the lesbian community as part of 
their historical lineage. New readings of people such 
as Jack Bee Garland, Joe Carstairs and Billy Tipton 
either locate their subjects in transgender frames or 
acknowledge the more ambiguous elements of those 
5Since writing this book Califia has self-identified as a 
transgender man. 
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"lesbian" identities. 6 The most recent subject to have 
been "claimed" by both transgender and lesbian 
communities is Brandon Teena, a young transgender man 
who was raped and murdered in Nebraska, USA in December 
1993. Critical and biographical accounts of Teena's 
life include the Kimberley Peirce film Boys Don't Cry 
(2000). Transgender subjects, both living and 
imaginary, have also been the inspiration for novels 
such as Rose Tremain's Sacred Country (1992), Jackie 
Kay's Trumpet (1998), Patricia Duncker's James Miranda 
Barry (1999) and David Ebershoff's The Danish Girl 
(2000) 
. 
The increasing availability of and demand for such 
critical, biographical and fictional studies reflects a 
corresponding growth in transgender as a cultural 
phenomenon. It can also be seen to derive from and 
encourage a popular fascination with gender 
transgression that extends beyond its more usual comic 
manifestations epitomised by the "Drag Queen" and the 
"Pantomime Dame". 
At the turn of the twentieth-first century, the 
terms "transgender" and "transsexual" are often used 
interchangeably; "transgender" also often functions as 
an umbrella term for a diverse range of transgressive 
gender and sexual identities, which may include pre-, 
6 See Louis Sullivan's From Female to Male: The Life of Jack Bee 
Garland (1990); Kate Summerscale's study of Joe Carstairs, The 
Queen of Whale Cay (1997); and Diane Wood Middlebrook's Suits Me: 
The Double Life of Billy Tipton (1998). 
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post- and non-operative transsexuals. Despite this 
apparent movement towards a more inclusive, unified 
community, important historical and ideological 
distinctions remain. The differences between and within 
transsexual and transgender subjects are more complex 
and numerous than this brief account can hope to 
describe adequately. 
In light of these ambiguities, my own choice of 
terms needs some clarification. Where I use 
"transgender", I am employing the term in its wider, 
collective sense; "transsexual" will be utilised where 
the subjects being discussed make this distinction 
themselves, or where the cultural specificity of the 
term is more applicable. My use of "transsexual" as an 
adjective rather than a noun, most notably in my 
reference to transsexual subjects, avoids the more 
cumbersome and increasingly outdated terms "female-to- 
male" and "male-to-female". In a project of this kind, 
where texts from a specific historical period are being 
viewed from a present-day perspective, questions of 
language use are not purely limited to whether I favour 
"transgender" to "transsexual" in my discussion; they 
must also embrace how such vocabulary can be employed 
meaningfully. In this respect, my analysis aims to 
sustain the distinctness of cultural identities from 
different periods. More generally, my use of the 
conventional binaries of gender-marked language- 
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male/female, man/woman, feminine/masculine, he/she- 
recognises both the provisionality and changing nuances 
of such terms. 
The readings I present of texts from the 1920s 
clearly rely upon specific ideas of gender identities 
that have materialised during the second half of the 
twentieth century. However, developing concepts of 
transgender draw upon discourses and cultural practices 
from the past. My own historical survey of the 1920s 
enables me to locate my readings in the context of what 
might now be recognised as an incipient transgender 
consciousness. A key element in that process of 
disclosure has been the critical examining of 
sexological discourses of the period.? 
Sexological discourses 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, 
sexological discourses categorised and defined variant 
sex and gender practices against a dominant paradigm of 
heterosexuality and strict binary codes of difference. 
Virginia Woolf's Orlando characterises the nineteenth 
century as a period when: "The sexes drew further and 
7 Sexology in Culture: Labelling Bodies and Desires, edited by 
Lucy Bland and Laura Doan, brings together essays by cultural and 
literary critics on a range of issues relating to sexological 
writings and theories. Bland and Doan have also published Sexology 
Uncensored: the Documents of Sexual Science, a companion volume of 
primary materials. Also see George Chauncey's "From Sexual 
Inversion to Homosexuality: the Changing Medical Conceptualization 
of Female `Deviance"'. 
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further apart" (219). As part of this process, same-sex 
desire was no longer viewed as a deviation from a 
perceived norm of sexual behaviour, but was recast as 
part of a pathological or congenital identity. 
Inversion theory became the major sexological 
explanation for this emerging model of homosexuality, 
according to which "perverse" erotic practices and 
identifications were attributed to "inverted" sexual 
instincts. A range of sexual experiences and behaviours 
were labelled using this guiding principle; research, 
often of a highly pseudo-scientific kind, was conducted 
and presented in case studies and a new sexual 
vocabulary was formed. Sexologists variously wrote of 
Uranians and Urnings, sexual inverts, mannish women and 
effeminate men, and intermediate types. The terms 
homosexuality and heterosexuality also entered the 
public domain for the first time. 8 
Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, Carl Westphal and Richard 
von Krafft-Ebing are three of the more influential 
sexologists working in Austria and Germany during the 
late 1800s. Krafft-Ebing's Psychopathia Sexualis: A 
Medico Forensic Study (1892) is one of the most 
important studies of sexual "perversions" of the 
period, a fact perhaps marked by the recent publication 
8 Joseph Bristow cites an entry in the supplement to the OED which 
records that these terms were introduced into the English language 
in an 1892 translation of Krafft-Ebing's Psychopathia Sexualis 
(Sexuality 4). The term "lesbian" was not adopted by the 
sexologists or Freud; it also rarely appears in other narratives 
of the period. 
31 
of a new translation. 9 British sexologists include 
Havelock Ellis and Edward Carpenter. Ellis's Studies in 
the Psychology of Sex, which includes a case study of 
his wife, runs to seven volumes. The second volume, 
Sexual Inversion, produced in 1897 with the help of the 
poet and critic John Addington Symonds, is Ellis's best 
known work. Carpenter, a liberal sexual reformer and 
theorist, presents his ideas on "intermediate types" in 
The Intermediate Sex: A Studv of Some Transitional 
Types of Men and Women (1908). 10 
Inversion theory, then, conceptualises homosexual 
desire as a form of psychical and, in some instances, 
physical hermaphrodism. It reflects the view that same- 
sex desire is caused by a reversal of the "normal" 
sexual instincts, since the "natural" object of desire 
will always be a person of the opposite biological sex. 
According to this theory, the inversion of a person's 
sexual instincts indicates an inversion of their 
gender; hence the homosexual is represented as a man or 
woman who has the wrong soul for their body. Ulrichs 
introduces this notion in the 1860s, adopting the 
concept of Uranian love (from Uranos in Plato's 
9 The translator's unqualified use of current sexual terminology 
for the various case studies, including the term "transsexual", 
may produce a more accessible text for readers but is reductive in 
terms of historical and cultural accuracy. 
lo Of the few women working in the field of sexology at this time, 
Marie Stopes and Stella Browne are probably the most prominent 
figures. See Lesley A. Hall's "Feminist Reconfigurations of 
Heterosexuality in the 1920s" for a discussion of their work. 
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Symposium) for his theory of male same-sex desire as a 
female soul inhabiting a male body, " but it has perhaps 
its most vibrant expression in Krafft-Ebing's metaphor 
for the female invert as a "masculine soul, heaving in 
the female bosom" (399). The parallel with popular 
explanations of transsexuality using a similar, 
although less melodramatically worded, analogy is 
unmistakable and significant. The shift of emphasis 
from the soul to the body as the erroneous factor 
reflects developments in sex-reassignment surgery that 
allow the body to be hormonally and surgically altered. 
Some transsexual and transgender critics challenge this 
"wrong body" narrative as pathologising and, therefore, 
contrary to transgender agency. Kate Bornstein argues: 
"It's time for transgendered people to look for new 
metaphors-new ways of communicating our lives to people 
who are traditionally gendered" (66). 
My discussion here and in my first chapter 
contributes to a transgender discourse which seeks to 
uphold the historical and cultural distinctiveness of 
the "invert" as an identity which conflates same-sex 
desire and cross-gender identification. Recent 
discussions of sexology in relation to The Well of 
Loneliness appear in Halberstam's Female Masculinit 
(75-110) and Prosser's Second Skins (135-170). As I 
11 For a fuller discussion of Ulrichs's model of Uranian desire see 
Bristow (Sexuality 20-24). 
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have already observed, sexologists believed that the 
reason a person is attracted to the same sex is that 
she or he in fact belongs psychically, and to an extent 
physically, to the opposite sex. If an inverted man or 
woman expresses any experience of cross-gender desire 
or identification this just proves the sexologists' 
point irrefutably, as does the presence of secondary 
sexual characteristics: the "masculine distribution of 
hair" in the female invert, for example (Ellis, Sexual 
Inversion 253). A close examination of sexological case 
studies, however, particularly those which include 
first person narratives, demonstrates the diverse range 
of erotic and gendered experiences and behaviours being 
accounted for by inversion theory. In this respect, as 
other critics have argued, the figure of the invert 
does not translate simply to lesbian and gay or, 
indeed, transsexual or transgender. Instead, 
"inversion" can be seen as a repository for overlapping 
histories and narratives of dissident sexual and gender 
identities. 
Critical arguments that subjects of the 
sexologists' case studies are simply reciting the 
medical narrative available to them oversimplify what 
is clearly a complex and uncertain area. 12 The view 
proposed by Lillian Faderman in Surpassing the Love of 
12 As already noted, similar concerns have been expressed about the 
reliability of transsexual narratives, in some instances by 
transsexual writers themselves. See Sandy Stone's "The Empire 
Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto" (290-293). 
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Men that the "mannish lesbian" is a product of the 
sexologists' theories is curious. Faderman's argument, 
briefly summarised, is that the sexological 
construction of "lesbian morbidity" stigmatises many 
romantic, but sexless, friendships between women. 
Faderman speculates as to "how many romantic friends, 
who had felt themselves to be perfectly healthy before, 
suddenly saw themselves as sick, even though their 
behavior had in no way changed, as a result of the 
sexologists' formulations" (244). Yet her own text 
cites historical and fictional accounts of female 
masculinity dating back to the thirteenth century. Her 
discussion of what she terms "transvestite lesbians" 
includes a case from the early-sixteenth century of a 
French woman who, disguised as a male, is employed as a 
stable boy and then a vineyard master and marries a 
woman. After living together for two years, the dildo 
that the young woman uses to "counterfeit the office of 
a husband" was discovered (51). She was arrested and, 
following her confession, burned alive. In this and 
other instances Faderman gives it seems it is the 
woman's transgression of gender or biological rules, 
rather than erotic ones, that is considered to be the 
more heinous crime. In this light, the morbidification 
of "masculine" women by nineteenth-century sexologists 
can be seen to have a historical precedence, and even 
today female masculinity continues to be a particular 
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source of cultural and political anxiety. The 
sexologists may have pathologised masculine women but 
that does not mean they invented them. 
Faderman's view can be contrasted with Emily 
Hamer's argument in Britannia's Glory that "the history 
of sexology has only an extremely tangential relevance 
to the lives and the history of British lesbians" (11). 
In seeking to sustain a narrative of lesbian identity 
which predates the sexologists, Hamer is in danger of 
over-minimising the pervasive influence of their 
theories. Cross-gender identification and same-sex 
desire continued to be viewed as related signs of 
homosexuality in both men and women until the early 
1950s, and images of the butch lesbian and the 
effeminate gay man still function as stereotypes (as 
well as being lived identities) in some sections of 
Western cultural and media representations. The medico- 
scientific concept of inversion which informed and, to 
an extent, validated those identities filtered its way 
into some of the literary texts and visual images of 
the 1920s in their depictions of "mannish women" and 
"effeminate men". The Well of Loneliness and the 
cartoonists' representations of its author, Radclyffe 
Hall, following the novel's censorship, are the most 
obvious examples from the period. As will be seen in my 
discussion of the publication Urania, there is also 
evidence in newspaper reports from around the world of 
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gender-crossings and sex changes that can be seen as 
being contemporaneous with rather than the product of 
these theories. 
Judith Halberstam responds to critics like Sheila 
Jeffreys (and by inference Faderman) who see 
butch/femme roles as the invention of sexologists, 13 by 
arguing that theories of inversion "were wholly 
dependent on, and interactive with, a plethora of 
complex self-definitions circulating within emergent 
communities of inverts and their lovers" (130). To 
suggest that theories of inversion were "wholly 
dependent on" existing self-definitions imparts a 
neutrality to the sexologists' work that is doubtful 
given the highly subjective nature of much of their 
rhetoric: Halberstam's idea of a reciprocal 
communication between the sexologists and the subjects 
of their case studies as the basis for the theories 
that emerge depicts a more likely scenario. 
Hamer's view that sexological theory had little to 
do with the experiences of "British lesbians" is 
ultimately as constrained as Faderman's argument that 
the sexologists invented a sexual identity for female 
same-sex relationships. The first view credits the 
sexologists with too little influence, the second view 
with too much, and both views tend to disregard the 
13 See Jeffreys's The Lesbian Heresy: A Feminist Perspective on the 
Lesbian Revolution, especially Chapter 1, "The Creation of Sexual 
Difference" (1-19). 
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complex interplay between official and personal 
discourses in the history of subcultural groups and 
formation of public identities. Critical responses 
which simply attribute accounts of cross-gender 
identification to the sexologists also fall prey to a 
weakness of sexological practice itself in that they 
fail to address the range of experiences related. 
Furthermore, sweeping observations about sexological 
theory overlook subtle but important differences in the 
views and approaches of its various practitioners (and 
contradictions within the theories of individual 
sexologists). 
Havelock Ellis, in particular, is keen to distance 
himself from some of the less scientific pronouncements 
of his contemporaries and, in this respect, his work is 
closer in character to Freud's psychoanalytic theories. 
In Sexual Inversion Ellis dismisses Ulrichs's 
explanation of inversion as the co-existence of "a male 
body ... with a female soul" as 
little more than an 
aphoristic device, stating: "It merely crystallizes 
into an epigram the superficial impression of the 
matter" (310). In its place Ellis attempts to construct 
a more scientifically orientated theory, basing his 
speculations on a combination of "the latent organic 
bisexuality in each sex" and the "complex interaction 
of the glandular internal secretions" (316). Ellis 
rejects as "absurd" the idea that an "inverted sexual 
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instinct 
... is developed in early embryonic life", 
arguing that a "predisposition" to homosexuality forms 
"at an early stage of development" (317). This move 
towards a construction of homosexuality in which a 
homosexual propensity derives from a bisexuality common 
to all human subjects has clear affiliations with 
aspects of Freud's theories . 
14 
On the basis of this model, Ellis argues against 
ideas that associate homosexual desires with the 
presence of physical signs of gender inversion. Ellis 
observes that although inverted women may "convey an 
impression of mannishness or boyishness, there are no 
invariable anatomical characteristics associated with 
this impression" (251). This position seems to be 
contradicted by Ellis's case studies, which devote a 
considerable amount of discussion to examples of 
unconventional physical sexual characteristics in 
inverted females. Describing a Miss M., Ellis notes: 
"with arms, palms up, extended in front of her with 
inner sides of hands touching, she cannot bring the 
inner sides of forearms together, as nearly every woman 
can, showing that the feminine angle of arm is lost" 
(229). At other points in his studies Ellis remarks 
14 Although theories of bisexuality are popularly linked to Freud, 
it appears that Ellis is one of a number of sexologists writing at 
the time to employ this model as an explanation of inversion. 
Other writers on the subject, referenced in a footnote to Freud's 
"Three Essays on Sexuality", include: E. Gley who is thought to 
have introduced the theory in 1884, Krafft-Ebing, Wilhelm Fliess 
and Otto Weininger (54-55). 
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that inverted women frequently have a "masculine 
distribution of hair" (253) and a "certain tonicity of 
the muscles" (255) . 
Setting aside these apparent inconsistencies in 
theory and practice, Ellis's desire to distinguish 
between notions of sexual inversion and gender 
inversion results in the development of a theory of 
"aesthetic inversion" or "eonism" in his later work. 15 
In Eonism and Other Supplementary Studies (1928), the 
seventh volume of Studies in the Psychology of Sex, he 
defines the aesthetic invert according to two sub- 
types: 
the most common kind, in which the inversion 
is mainly confined to the sphere of clothing 
and another, less common but more complete, 
in which cross-dressing is regarded with 
comparative indifference but the subject so 
identifies himself with those of his physical 
and psychic traits which recall the opposite 
sex that he feels really to belong to that 
sex .... 
(36) 
The parallel with present day distinctions between 
transvestism and transsexuality is striking here. 16 
15 The term "eonism" derives from the case of the Chevalier d'Eon, 
a French diplomat who lived as a woman during his life in England 
in the eighteenth century. See Gary Kates's essay "D'Eon Returns 
to France: Gender and Power in 1777". 
16 Dave King also notes this resemblance in "Gender Blending: 
medical perspectives and technology" (82). 
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Ellis's theory of aesthetic inversion has two important 
implications: first, it begins to dismantle the "wrong 
soul" model of homosexuality; second, it positions 
gender, rather than sexual desire, as the primary focus 
of study and thus begins to formulate non-erotic 
explanations for gender inversion. 
Like Ellis, Sigmund Freud's writings and theories 
also challenge some of the prevailing notions of 
inversion. This aspect of Freud's work is important to 
my discussion both in terms of its historical 
contemporaneity and, more generally, its profound 
influence on Western discourses of sexuality and gender 
during the twentieth century. What follows does not 
represent the career-long developments in Freud's 
theorisations of sexuality, but instead highlights some 
of the important ways in which his ideas build on and 
distinguish themselves from other sexological theories 
of the period. 
Freud's psychoanalytic theories of sexuality draw 
on published research of a range of sexologists. In a 
footnote to "The Sexual Aberrations", the first essay 
in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), 
Freud references his sources as the "well-known 
writings" of sexologists including Krafft-Ebing and 
Havelock Ellis. 17 A further note added in 1910 states: 
17 Bristow observes that Krafft-Ebing was a colleague of Freud's at 
the University of Vienna (Sexuality 26). 
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"The data obtained from the psychoanalytic 
investigation of inverts are based upon material 
supplied to me by I. Sadger and upon my own findings" 
(45). On the subject of homosexuality, Freud's research 
leads him increasingly to challenge traditional 
explanations of inversion; in particular, he questions 
the popular view of inversion as a form of "psychical 
hermaphrodism". In "The Psychogenesis of a Case of 
Homosexuality in a Woman" (1920) he states: 
The mystery of homosexuality is therefore by 
no means so simple as it is commonly depicted 
in popular expositions-"a feminine mind, 
bound therefore to love a man, but unhappily 
attached to a masculine body; a masculine 
mind, irresistibly attracted to women, but, 
alas! imprisoned in a feminine body". (398) 
Freud's rhetoric displays, with apparently conscious 
irony, a hyperbole reminiscent of Krafft-Ebing's 
analogising of the female invert as "[t]he masculine 
soul, heaving in the female bosom" (399). The theories 
of homosexuality Freud presents in "The Sexual 
Aberrations" are derived from ideas of human 
bisexuality first suggested in the 1880s, and identify 
constitutional and social factors as related 
determining causes. Sexologists had tended to 
categorise inversion as either "innate" or "acquired". 
According to Freud's model, inversion is the product of 
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a "bisexual disposition" in combination with 
"disturbances that affect the sexual instinct in the 
course of its development" (55). On the matter of what 
form that "disposition" might take Freud, like Ellis, 
is undecided, but he rejects the notion that it is 
expressed physiologically. The visible signs of 
inversion, which are the object of such obsessive 
interest and rigorous investigation in many of the 
sexological case studies, are described as a common 
feature of human anatomy and quite independent of a 
person's sexual instincts (53). Freud finds that "a 
large proportion of male inverts retain the mental 
quality of masculinity" and ""possess relatively few of 
the secondary characters of the opposite sex" (55). His 
comments about female inverts display less consistency, 
attributing "masculine characteristics, both physical 
and mental" to the "active inverts" (57). This 
divergence of views in part reflects the generally 
disproportionate attention given to the subject of 
female inversion. Both Krafft-Ebing and Ellis comment 
on the scarcity of recorded cases of female inversion, 
and Ellis cites men's general indifference to female 
homosexuality as one reason for the lack of 
investigation into this area (Sexual Inversion 203). 
Another obstacle to research was the widespread 
cultural view of women's essential passivity and 
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ignorance in sexual matters. In Sex, Politics and 
Society Jeffrey Weeks observes: 
The prevailing definitions of female 
sexuality in terms of the "maternal 
instinct", or as necessarily responsive to 
the stimulation of the male, were 
overwhelming barriers in attempts to 
conceptualise the subject. (116) 
Freud, in relation to his own remarks, acknowledges 
that further study into this area "might reveal greater 
variety" (57), but reference to his later work reveals 
an enduring association of female homosexuality with 
"masculinity". 
Unlike the sexologists before him, Freud uses the 
terms "masculine" and "feminine" to represent different 
stages of an individual's sexual development, rather 
than biologically determined physical and mental 
attributes. When he describes the behaviour and 
attitude of a female as "masculine", he is referring to 
what he has theorised as the "active" pre-Oedipal stage 
of childhood development. Freud argues that the 
"masculinity complex" experienced by female infants in 
response to and denial of the experience of "female 
castration" is returned to in adulthood by the female 
homosexual. Freud's essay "Femininity" (1933) proposes 
two reasons for this "regression": the disappointments 
attributed to the father during the Oedipal phase; and 
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a "constitutional factor, a greater amount of activity, 
such as is ordinarily characteristic of a male" (164). 18 
In continuing to use terms which identify "activity" 
with maleness and masculinity, and in defining these 
qualities as an innate feature of female homosexuality, 
Freud's psychoanalytic theories fail to shrug off 
entirely sexological notions of gender inversion. They 
also demonstrate the continuing influence of late- 
Victorian views of active (sex) drives as "basically 
male in character, with the female conceived of as a 
passive instinct" (Weeks, Against Nature 23). In his 
theorising of female homosexuality Freud, like the 
sexologists before him, appears to be unable to break 
free from a conceptual framework in which an active 
female sexuality can only be construed in male terms. 
These cultural prejudices obfuscate further the already 
conceptually ambiguous figure of the female invert. 
Sexological theories of inversion, especially 
those of Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis, 
have a direct bearing on my discussion of Radclyffe 
Hall's The Well of Loneliness as will be clear in that 
chapter. Hall's interest in the figure of the "invert" 
is evident in her characterisation of Stephen Gordon, 
but she also depicts dissident sex and gender 
identities which do not rigidly adhere to theories of 
18 This essay summarises and reworks ideas originally presented in 
"Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between 
the Sexes" (1925). 
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inversion. Although Brooks's representations of female 
masculinity co-exist with the sexological invert, her 
portraits do not represent a type of "masculine woman"; 
instead, through various adaptations of the style and 
pose of the "dandy", each subject's individual version 
of masculinity is disclosed and celebrated. Woolf's 
Orlando mocks the biological determinism of scientific 
and legal approaches to identity; at the same time, its 
representation of sex- and gender-crossings has 
interesting correspondences to some of the more radical 
theories of sexological discourse. For example, in 
Psychology of Sex (1933) Havelock Ellis observes: 
We may not know exactly what sex is; but we 
do know that it is mutable, with the 
possibility of one sex being changed into the 
other sex, that its frontiers are often 
uncertain, and that there are many stages 
between a complete male and a complete 
female. (194) 19 
Orlando's transformations can also be viewed alongside 
some of the non-fictional "sex-change" narratives of 
the period which will be discussed here and in Chapter 
3. Gertrude Stein studied under the psychologist 
William James at Harvard, and was familiar with Otto 
Weininger's account of sexual difference, Sex and 
19 This quote provides one of the epigraphs for Gilbert and Gubar's 
Sexchanges. 
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Character (1903). There are no direct allusions to 
either man's work in The Making of Americans, 20 but 
there is something reminiscent of the sexologists' 
methods apparent in this book's purposeful attempt to 
organise human beings into an ever increasing litany of 
types and sub-types. There is an equally purposeful 
force at work in the text's grammatical and verbal 
eccentricities, which reveal such efforts to represent 
identity as absurd and futile. 
The models of identity that these texts construct, 
with the exception of Stein's The Making of Americans, 
invoke experiences of gender and sexual difference that 
can be shown to exist in sexological case studies and 
first-person narratives of the period. The cross- 
dressing of Hall's and Woolf's novels and Brooks's 
portraits also reflect a cultural reality in the 
sartorial choices and, in some instances, 
unconventional self-fashionings of a highly visible 
section of middle- and upper-middle-class society. 
Masculine fashions 
Both Hall and, to a lesser extent, Brooks adopt 
masculine poses and styles; the model for Woolf's 
Orlando is another inveterate cross-dresser of the 
20 Lisa Ruddick's discussion of The Making of Americans argues that 
James's influence is displaced by themes and strategies more 
resonant of Freudian thinking (92-104). 
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period, the aristocrat and writer Vita Sackville-West. 
In the 1920s public expressions of female masculinity 
became a far more common and generally more tolerated 
cultural phenomenon. As photographs and cartoon images 
from the period demonstrate, the wearing of mannish 
attire by women after the First World War was something 
of a fashion statement amongst young, financially 
secure women. During the war women from a variety of 
social backgrounds were working in jobs which required 
practical clothing such as breeches and uniforms; the 
close-cropped hairstyles and tailored clothing of 1920s 
fashions, although more class-specific, might be viewed 
as products of this enforced relaxation of sartorial 
codes. They also represent a visible break with the 
oppressive strictures of nineteenth-century female 
dress. The following passage from Woolf's Orlando 
constructs the crinoline as a symbol of the physically 
and emotionally debilitating effects of the Victorian 
period on women: 
So she stood mournfully at the drawing-room 
window ... dragged down by the weight of 
the crinoline which she had submissively 
adopted. It was heavier and more drab than 
any dress she had yet worn. None had ever so 
impeded her movement. No longer could she 
stride through the garden with her dogs or 
run lightly to the high mound and fling 
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herself beneath the oak tree. Her skirts 
collected damp leaves and straw. (233-34) 
In 1928, when Orlando's story ends and the book is 
published, we are told that she changes from her skirt 
into "a pair of whipcord breeches and leather jacket" 
(301); she smokes and drinks, runs up and down stairs, 
strides along corridors, and is a published and 
recently acclaimed writer. 
Laura Doan's comprehensive account of female 
masculinities in the 1920s provides evidence of 
considerable public interest in the boyish woman. Doan 
includes a number of cartoons from editions of Punch in 
1927 and 1928 which display the cultural markers of the 
"Boyette": the long, slim body shape, cropped hair, 
cigarette, tailored clothes, and monocle. In the 
cartoons Doan discusses any suggestion of sexual 
transgression is dispelled by captions which intimate 
the masculine woman's underlying femininity and 
heterosexuality. This contrasts sharply with the 
sexological figure of the "invert" whose masculine 
appearance is generally taken to be a visible sign of 
her deviant sexual desires. 
Doan's essay also quotes extracts from a Daily 
Mail report from 1927 which include the following 
benevolent observations: 
The Boyette not only crops her hair close 
like a boy but she dresses in every way as a 
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boy .... In age she appears to be in the 
last years of flapperdom and her ambition is 
to look as much like a boy as possible; but 
little feminine mannerisms disclose her sex 
and show her ... amusing herself by 
masquerade that is harmless enough, though 
some people may disapprove of it as ultra- 
tomboyish. ... A point of interest to the 
eugenists is that the Boyette has a finer 
physique than the average boy of her age. One 
thing that betrays her is that she cannot 
manage her cigarette like a boy. (qtd. in 
Doan 673) 
The condescending, avuncular tones of the writer's 
comments neutralise any threat that these masculine 
women pose to social and sexual norms. Cross-dressing 
is presented here as an innocent diversion practised, 
not entirely successfully, by young healthy women 
unable to conceal their "feminine" identities from the 
(male) observer. 
Setting aside the cultural policing apparent in 
this report, there is a clear distinction to be made 
between its representation of the "dressing-up games" 
of the "Boyette" and the studied masculine image and 
demeanour of Radclyffe Hall, who was by then in her 
late forties. Undoubtedly, the fashions of the time 
provided a degree of camouflage for aristocratic women 
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like Hall, for whom masculinity was, more than just an 
accessory or pose, a way of life. In the public arena 
these more extreme displays of female masculinity might 
cause heads to turn. Doan describes the dissonant 
effects produced by the English painter Gluck's 
masculine appearance, explaining that: "Gluck took 
exceptional offense that some of the double takes she 
received on the street came from so-called Modern 
girls" (690). Yet these women were still being viewed 
in some quarters of the press as ultra-modern even 
after The Well of Loneliness became the target of James 
Douglas's poisonous attacks in the Sunday Express. A 
report from the Newcastle Daily Journal and North Star 
of August 1928 praises Hall's masculine style of dress 
and hairstyle and pronounces them to be the essence of 
"high-brow modernism" (quoted in Doan 57). As this 
comment appears a few days after the infamous Sunday 
Express attack on Hall's novel which includes a 
photograph of Hall in particularly masculine attire, 21 
it can be assumed that the public association of 
"mannish" women with "deviant" sexuality took some time 
to filter through to all sections of society. 
The practice of adopting masculine signs as a code 
for same-sex desire in subcultural circles of the 
period has been well-documented by cultural critics. 
21 Douglas's report includes the frequently quoted comment: "I 
would rather give a healthy boy or a healthy girl a phial of 
prussic acid than this novel" (qtd. in Souhami, The Trials 178). 
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The possibility that this self-fashioning might be a 
sign of a gender identification as much as an erotic 
one has been a neglected area of discussion, and this 
is a matter of central concern in my first two 
chapters. 
A quite different source of insight to some of the 
ways in which gender changes were being thought about 
and represented at the time is provided by the early- 
twentieth-century journal Urania. 
Urania 
Emily Hamer gives a useful account of Urania's history 
in Britannia's Glory: A History of Twentieth-Century 
Lesbians (67-73). 22 The publication was founded in 1915 
by Thomas Baty, a London lawyer, who joined forces with 
Esther Roper and Eva Gore-Booth, both key figures in 
trade union, suffrage and internationalist pacifist 
movements. According to the listing for Baty in Who's 
Who 1951-1960, the entry for recreational interests 
includes the comment: "extreme feminist, would abolish 
all sex distinctions" (qtd. in Hamer 67). Prior to 
launching Urania, he had been involved in the Aethenic 
Union, a group working for the elimination of gender 
distinctions. Baty failed to get any public support for 
22 Although I draw on Hamer's book for my discussion of the history 
of Urania, I researched a sample of editions from 1919-1940 held 
at the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the 
London School of Economic and Political Science. 
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the group despite letters to Millicent Fawcett, a 
leading member of the National Union of Women's 
Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), and The Freewoman, a 
feminist journal. The Aethenic Union lasted only a few 
months, but Baty was to have more success with his next 
venture. Urania was published and privately distributed 
six times a year until 1920, and then three times a 
year until its final edition in 1940. 
Urania's political and philosophical aims appear 
on the first page of each issue in the following form: 
TO OUR FRIENDS 
Urania denotes the company of those who are 
firmly determined to ignore the dual 
organisation of humanity in all its 
manifestations. 
They are convinced that this duality has 
resulted in the formation of two warped and 
imperfect types. They are further convinced 
that in order to get rid of this state of 
things no measures of "emancipation" or 
"equality" will suffice, which do not begin 
by a complete refusal to recognise or 
tolerate the duality itself. 
If the world is to see sweetness and 
independence combined in the same individual, 
all recognition of that duality must be given 
up. For it inevitably brings in its train the 
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suggestion of the conventional distortions of 
character which are based on it. 
There are no "men" or "women" in Urania. 
The views expressed here are extreme for the time but 
fairly straightforward: the binary concepts around 
which identity is organised (sex and gender) are 
artificial and antipathetic to individual human 
experience. By denying the duality of sexed and 
gendered difference this statement also, inferentially, 
challenges the normative status of heterosexuality. As 
Hamer extrapolates: "when women and men became people 
and escaped the limits of gender, heterosexual 
relationships would no longer be prioritized over same- 
sex relationships" (69). Despite the unequivocal nature 
of Urania's political and philosophical aims, a close 
study of the publication's contents reveals accounts of 
sex- and gender-crossings which appear to uphold rather 
than oppose binary concepts of identity. 
Each edition of Urania includes a number of media 
reports from both national and international sources 
which detail instances of gender-crossings and sex 
changes from across the globe. 23 Many of the stories 
record deliberate acts of masquerade undertaken for 
23 In the editions I researched there tended to be a higher 
incidence of reports from south-east Asian sources. This has 
certain resonances in terms of present-day cultural associations 
of male transvestism and "sex-change" surgery with countries such 
as Singapore and Thailand. It could also reflect the Western 
"Orientalist" fantasy of the East as a place of liminality and 
transgression. 
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pragmatic reasons. The Spring edition of 1921 includes 
a report from the Daily Chronicle with the tabloid- 
style headline: "Girl who became `boy'". The subject of 
the report, a fourteen-year-old girl, tells the 
newspaper that she had run away from home and adopted 
male attire "in order to be able to earn my living" (25 
and 26, January-April 1921,4). An article from the 
Japan Advertiser, headlined "Tokio Men Waitresses", 
reports on a "curious fad" amongst Japanese men for 
passing as women in order to get employment as 
waitresses. The writer explains that job shortages have 
forced these men "to assume the role of women for their 
daily bread" (73 and 74, January-April 1929,4). 
Various scientific reports describe instances of 
sex changes amongst species ranging from oysters to 
guinea pigs. Such reports are the inspiration for a 
rare editorial intervention in a 1921 edition of 
Urania. Under the heading "Science Confirms Intuition", 
the writers present the following observations: 
Some seven years ago Eva Gore-Booth 
formulated a concise statement which we have 
adopted ever since as the neatest and 
clearest expression of our views. It declared 
that sex was an accident and formed no 
essential part of an individual's nature. 
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And now comes science with the most 
astonishing proofs, calculated to convince 
the most sceptical of its truth. 
Dr. Tocqueville's saying that the 
British Parliament "can do everything except 
make a man a woman or a woman a man" may at 
no distant date require revision by the 
omission of the exception. (29 and 30, 
September-December 1921,1) 
In light of evidence of "metamorphosis" within "the 
ranks of far higher organisms" (the article refers to 
guinea pigs), the writers claim: "the impossible 
barrier has dropped". The editorial concludes: "Poets 
and thinkers have realized instinctively that `sex is 
no essential distinction'", and expresses the hope that 
"the so-called "practical people'" can set aside their 
preconceived notions about sex (1). In an edition of 
Urania from 1924, a lecture by a Dr. F. A. E. Crew to 
the Toyal Institution on "the laws of sex" recounts 
various "sex-transformations" amongst animal species, 
and expresses the categorical view that: 
There are human intersexes which are neither 
male nor female, but definitely intermediate, 
and it is a mistake to label them as either 
male or female, for they belong to a third 
sexual category. (47 and 48, September- 
December 1924,7) 
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Although it is impossible to ascertain the validity of 
many of the sources on which such comments are based, 
the comments themselves are evidence of a growing 
interest in the possibility of sex and gender changes. 
Editions from the mid-1930s onwards begin to include 
reports of male and female subjects who have changed 
their sex either by some form of, often unspecified, 
surgical procedure or, in a number of instances, what 
would appear to be an intervention of a more miraculous 
kind. 24 A newspaper report in the Spring edition of 1934 
under the headline "Another Case of Sex Change" 
describes a Margaret Hutchison who entered a medical 
institution in Scotland after becoming ill. The report 
states: "There, an amazing sex change took place, 
resulting in the patient being discharged with all the 
characteristics of a male" (103 and 104, January-April 
1934,6) . 
Alison Oram's examination of Urania as a radical 
sexual discourse views such stories as evidence of the 
journal's "refusal of the essentialist construction of 
the body itself". Oram concludes: "The sexed body was 
no more stable than the social category of gender" 
(215). Although Oram does not refer to Judith Butler in 
24 Other sources from this period include a 1931 article by Dr. 
Felix Abraham, giving a detailed account of the genital surgery 
carried out on two "transvesite men" in Germany with photographs 
illustrating the main stages of the surgical construction of a 
vagina, and Man Into Woman, edited by Niels Hoyer, the partly 
autobiographical account of Lili Elbe's reassignment surgery in 
1933, which included castration and the implantation of ovaries. 
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her essay, her comments echo Butler's constructionist 
account of the sexed body itself as a cultural sign in 
Gender Trouble. Butler argues: 
gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; 
gender is also the discursive/cultural means 
by which "sexed nature" or "a natural sex" is 
produced and established as "prediscursive, " 
prior to culture, a politically neutral 
surface on which culture acts. (7) 
Oram's argument that Urania foregrounds "the liminality 
of gender, sexuality and the body" is underpinned by a 
view of transgender as deliteralising. What this 
reading tends to gloss over is the obvious dependence 
on more material, binary concepts of identity in many 
of the accounts of sex and gender changes. 
The range of stories represented in the pages of 
Urania suggests that the interest in transformations of 
identity is not confined purely to scientists and 
doctors, but is in fact part of a more pervasive 
consciousness which is taking shape through a range of 
written sources. Of particular interest to my study are 
examples from three editions of Urania in 1929 which 
concern fictional and non-fictional accounts of female 
masculinity. 
In an original review of The Well of Loneliness in 
the Summer edition of 1929, Radclyffe Hall is upbraided 
for her depiction of female same-sex desire in terms of 
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a masculine/feminine binary. Although the reviewer's 
identity is unstated, it would seem that the views 
expressed are those of the editors: 
There is no attraction for anybody in 
mannishness or effeminacy. It was a 
gratuitous concession to popular foolishness 
on Radclyffe Hall's part to make her heroine 
a little mannish. (75 and 76, May-Aug 1929, 
1) 
This unequivocal censure of transgressions which uphold 
gender distinctions is to be expected in a publication 
committed to the elimination of those differences (a 
point Hamer also observes). What is less easy to 
explain is the review's concluding remark: "We think 
Sapphism contemptible: but we find `The Well of 
Loneliness' a triumph of art and delicacy" (1). Hamer 
suggests that the writers may be using the term 
"Sapphism" ironically here to evoke a specific notion 
of lesbianism (72). There is little evidence of ironic 
tendencies in the writing style, but any other 
explanation is hard to accommodate within a reading 
that insists on the publication's promotion of same-sex 
desire. Hamer's argument that the writers may be 
mindful of the public prosecution of Hall's novel for 
obscenity seems similarly constrained given that Urania 
was only ever privately distributed. 
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What is perhaps more surprising is that so many of 
the reports of sex- and gender-crossings in Urania 
describe individuals who display either "mannishness" 
or "effeminacy". With regard to the review of Hall's 
novel, a particularly pertinent example is that of 
Captain Barker whose story appears in the Spring 
edition of 1929 (73 and 74, January-April). Doan's 
essay on female masculinities includes a discussion of 
Barker's perjury trial in March 1929. She cites a 
comment by Radclyffe Hall, quoted from correspondence 
from Hall to her literary agent, which condemns Barker 
as a "mad pervert of the most undesirable type" (663). 
Given Hall's range of prejudices, it is hard to know 
whether this comment derives from homophobia, 
transphobia or an inflated sense of moral superiority. 
The difference of emphasis between Hall and Barker is 
important; although Hall adopts a masculine image she 
does not try to pass as a man (and neither does her 
fictional creation, Stephen Gordon). Barker has crossed 
over the invisible boundary and it is that 
transgression which may well be a primary cause of 
Hall's censure. 
In Urania a report from New York World describes a 
"lady who for six years posed successfully as `Captain' 
or `Colonel' or `Sir Victor Barker'" (73 and 74, 
January-April 1929,4). A brief editorial comment 
remarks: "some episodes of her earlier life indicate 
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the masculine role was not a disagreeable one" (4). In 
its suggestion of a degree of transgender agency this 
observation sets the story apart from the more 
objectifying accounts of cross-dressing waitresses and 
sex-changing oysters. Other aspects of the article 
contribute to this effect. At a particular point in the 
account of Barker's life the writer starts to use the 
male pronoun unambiguously. In the following extract, 
which discusses events following the discovery of 
Barker's "secret", the continued use of the male 
pronoun has additional resonances: 
After his exposure, many people found they 
had been suspicious of him all the time. But 
though no man may be a hero to his valet, 
less subtle impositions are possible, for B. 
Wrigley, Captain Barker's valet, never 
suspected that his master was not a man. (6) 
Despite the degree of flippancy here, this apparent 
acceptance of Barker's chosen gender expression has an 
affirmative quality which present-day media reports 
often lack. With respect to its opening statement, the 
claim by non-transgender subjects to be able to "read" 
a transgender person's anomalous identity is a familiar 
narrative; or as Stephen Whittle in his discussion of 
"gender fucking" puts it: "once we know-won't we always 
know, and always have known" (212). In conflict with 
this general consensus, the anecdote about the valet 
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suggests that Barker was able to pass successfully as a 
man in the most private dimensions of his life, as well 
as publicly. This view is further endorsed by a quoted 
comment from Barker's wife: "`I never for one moment 
imagined that my husband was anything but the person he 
always appeared to be, " (5). Such protestations are 
recognised as familiar stock responses to the exposure 
of such "illicit" and "perverse" relationships and as 
such are often greeted with a degree of cynicism. What 
might be ascertained from the privileging of this 
first-person narrative and the article as a whole is a 
collective willingness to sustain a narrative of gender 
experience at odds with dominant narratives of 
identity. 
In the edition of Urania which follows The Well of 
Loneliness review, four reports of stories similar to 
that of Colonel Barker's are reproduced. The case of 
Peter Stratford refers to "packets of letters, a 
marriage certificate and other papers" which "revealed 
the determination of a woman, apparently possessed of 
all the mental attributes of the opposite sex, to 
become a man" (77 and 78, September-December 1929,9). 
William Sidney Holton is described as "the third `man- 
woman' discovered in England within a few weeks" (10). 
In this instance the reporter adopts the standard 
practice of many present-day journalists, placing 
inverted commas around the male pronoun and the word 
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"husband". But as in the case of Colonel Barker, 
Holton's ability to pass successfully as a man during 
his life is unquestioned, both by the people who knew 
him most personally and the writer of the report. 
Holton's wife claims never to have suspected her 
husband to have been anything but the father of her 
children, and "intimate friends" assert that he "had 
never given them any reason to doubt that he was a 
strong hardworking man" (9). The report states that it 
was only on admission to hospital for enteric fever 
that Holton's female sex was discovered. 
A common feature of narratives of passing men and 
women is the disclosure of the person's "true identity" 
by a doctor or surgeon, either during illness or on the 
person's death. Accounts of the Chevalier d'Eon's life 
as a woman in eighteenth-century England describe the 
attending physician's report after death as final and 
conclusive proof of the Chevalier's "male" identity. 
More recently, the autopsy report in 1989 on the 
American jazz musician Billy Tipton, who had lived as a 
man for over fifty years, records the "fact" of 
Tipton's female identity. 25 The continuing reliance on 
anatomical evidence in the process of attributing 
identity at birth and death, regardless of lived 
experience, is perhaps the last and most obdurate 
25 See Diane Wood Middlebrook's biography for a detailed account of 
private and public responses to the revelation of Tipton's "true" 
identity. 
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barrier to transgender subjectivity. The primacy of 
biological determinism in matters of identity and its 
relationship to cultural influences and essentialising 
notions of the "self" are important issues in my 
discussion of Virginia Woolf's Orlando. 
It is difficult to know how stories like that of 
Colonel Barker might be viewed by the journal's 
editors, although their inclusion implies a degree of 
endorsement. And although it might be argued that such 
gender-crossings reinstate gender duality rather than 
transcend it, stories of females who successfully pass 
as men in all areas of their lives might be used to 
illustrate the extent to which masculinity and 
femininity are roles which anyone can adopt regardless 
of their sexed bodies. 
Although Hamer's discussion of the contents of 
Urania refers to articles on "cross-dressing, life-long 
transvestism, passing women, hermaphrodites, 
transsexualism" (70), she does not dwell on this aspect 
of the publication. Given that Hamer's book focuses on 
lesbian history, her interest is clearly in the 
journal's significance in terms of its lesbian 
associations; she claims that Urania is "'[o]ne of the 
clearest cases of lesbian and gay unity in the early 
part of the century" (67). Her account of Thomas Baty, 
the journal's founder, includes a discussion of his 
possible authorship of a lesbian novel, Beatrice the 
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Sixteenth (1909), under the pseudonym "Irene Clyde". 
Hamer speculates on whether Baty "was acting as an 
intermediary for a lesbian, perhaps Esther Roper", and 
concludes that regardless of whether he was the author 
of the novel "he certainly had an intimate relationship 
with `Miss Clyde' and her work, and agreed with her 
views on gender, feminism, sexuality and vegetarianism" 
(68). Alison Oram draws on the work of Daphne Patai and 
Angela Ingram to represent Baty's relationship to 
"Irene Clyde" in a significantly different light. Oram 
argues that Baty is "living out his transgendered 
persona in print" through the pseudonym, which also 
allows him to develop "his gender theories at length in 
his fiction and non-fiction ... as well as 
in Urania" 
(216). Oram cites a review by "Irene Clyde" of Winifred 
Holtby's Women, which appears in the Spring 1935 
edition of the journal. The review refers to the 
"emancipated exhilaration" of discarding "the idea of 
sex", and asserts the view: "We have only to refuse to 
wear the shackles of sex" (109 and 110, January-April 
1935 qtd. in Oram 218). Patai and Ingram's discussion 
of Beatrice the Sixteenth describes the novel's 
feminist vision and its use of gender-neutral language: 
"From beginning to end, the narrator eschews gendered 
nouns and the generic `he' and instead refers to 
characters as `figure,, 'person, ' and `personage, " 
(266). As I will show in my conclusion, this reading of 
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the text presents it as more radical and consistent in 
its treatment of gender than it actually proves to be. 
Nevertheless, the revelation that "Irene Clyde" and 
Thomas Baty are the same person offers an intriguing 
insight into one of the guiding forces behind Urania, 
and suggests more complex influences at work than 
Hamer's focus would allow. 
On the matter of the relationship between Eva 
Gore-Booth and Esther Roper, Hamer asserts: "their 
[lesbian] sexuality could not be clearer" (73). Of the 
publication itself, she observes that the term 
"Uranfan" was "widely known to be a synonym for 
homosexuality by the early years of the twentieth 
century" (72). Although Hamer's comments have a certain 
authority, her argument does not address the cultural 
and historical distinctiveness of that early-twentieth- 
century concept of homosexuality. The term "Uranian", 
which Hamer accepts to have been in common usage by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, had been part of a 
sexological vocabulary, as my earlier discussion has 
shown. Sexological discourses of the period have clear 
implications for an understanding of Urania's 
significance and, more specifically, for a reading of 
what is an important, if at times rather incredible, 
perspective of sex and gender changes from the period. 
It would be wrong to over-emphasise the public 
impact of Urania, but its influence as a private 
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publication should not be underestimated. Displaying a 
wry self-referentiality, the back page of one issue 
includes the comment: 
The statement ... that the periodical is 
`published for private circulation' seems to 
the Editor to be self-contradictory, as when 
a thing is made public it evidently ceases to 
be private. It would be interesting to have 
counsel's opinion on the point: but it is 
cheaper and easier to admit that the privacy 
is public. (89 and 90, September-December 
1931, n. p. ) 
It is a shame, although hardly surprising, that no 
mailing list exists. Oram's essay states that the 
journal was "sent free to anyone expressing an interest 
in its ideals", and "claimed a circulation of between 
200 and 250 throughout its period of publication" 
(216). Because of Urania's radical aims, the 
transgressive nature of its content and the public 
prominence of the figures involved in its founding and 
circulation, it could be assumed to have had some 
subscribers within avant-garde literary and social 
circles. The existence of such publications raises an 
important question as to how non-fictional transgender 
narratives might have influenced contemporaneous 
fictional representations. Urania itself also 
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constitutes an invaluable resource for transgender 
historical archives. 
The interdisciplinary nature of my thesis is 
evident from the range of materials introduced so far 
and the combination of methodological approaches 
adopted here and throughout the thesis as a whole. 
Historical and cultural surveys and archival research 
provide a frame of reference for the close textual 
readings that are a major focus of each of my four 
chapters. 
Transgender readings 
The first two chapters focus on representations of 
masculine women. Chapter 1 examines Stephen Gordon, the 
protagonist of Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness, 
in light of her sexological archetype the female 
invert. Through analysis of sexological discourse, and 
particular attention to case studies of female 
inversion, I interrogate the construction of 
homosexuality which informs Hall's characterisation and 
which continues to influence lesbian/feminist critical 
responses. I revisit aspects of Stephen's character 
usually read as signs of a lesbian sexuality and 
foreground the transgender elements of that 
representation. My reading considers aspects of the 
character's gendered embodiment in a queer context and 
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is especially concerned with notions of gender 
performance and drag. I also examine Stephen's 
"difference" in the context of the novel's 
representation of multiple models of female inversion. 
In proposing another way in which the masculinity of 
Hall's character might be read, I contribute to an 
emerging body of scholarship that addresses the 
complexities of the historical model of sexuality upon 
which the novel draws. 
Chapter 2 considers the masculine poses and styles 
of Romaine Brooks's portraits of cross-dressed women. 
It compares the 1920s female masculinities of Brooks's 
portraits with the 1990s transsexual masculinities of 
Loren Cameron's photographic self-portraits and 
proposes certain visual and cultural affiliations 
between those representations. Through close analysis 
of these works I identify shared tensions in their 
reworking of traditional genres and poses, use of 
visual dissonances, and organisation of space and gaze. 
In particular, my reading draws parallels between 
Brooks's image of the dandy and Cameron's adoption of 
the look and poses of the bodybuilder. Whilst mindful 
of the cultural and historical specificities of these 
figures, I highlight a shared theatricality, an 
emphasis on show and surface and a certain "drag" 
quality to that performance. Such areas of 
correspondence are presented as evidence of the extent 
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to which the body, rather than clothing, has become the 
site of difference in images of transgender masculinity 
during the twentieth century. My consideration of 
Brooks's and Cameron's work aims to highlight the 
changes in artistic and scientific technologies that 
have contributed to those changes in transgender visual 
representations. It questions how the contradictions 
and tensions generated by those visual representations 
might be seen to underpin the formation of other 
masculinities, and asks to what extent constructions of 
transgender masculinities as "real" can be said to 
enact a revisioning of conventional concepts of 
"maleness" and "manliness". 
In Chapter 3 my discussion turns to Virginia 
Woolf's Orlando, a text in which the sexed body and 
gender of the title character undergo magical, protean 
changes. My reading of Woolf's novel centres on the 
biographical and fantastical aspects of its 
representation of narratives of identity. The opening 
section highlights aspects of Woolf's life drawing on 
biographical material, including diaries and letters, 
which suggest that her writing constitutes a form of 
unconventional self-fashioning. That proposed 
relationship between story-telling and the processes of 
re-invention is then considered in my analysis of 
Woolf's mock biography, Orlando, and a range of 
twentieth-century transgender autobiographies. My 
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interest lies in the particular tensions and 
ambiguities between public and private identity 
narratives which these texts display. Although clear 
differences of tone and style are made evident in my 
discussion, I identify a common concern to represent a 
particular experience of identity that disputes 
dominant concepts of biological sex and gender. Shared 
effects of this representation include a revisioning of 
biographical truth which privileges the realities of 
the "inner life" over official models of identity. A 
section on the relationship between textual evidence 
and photographs in life-writing compares the relative 
authenticity of these biographical devices in Orlando 
and the transsexual autobiography, The Renee Richards 
Story: Second Serve. My reading of Orlando identifies 
specific ways in which Woolf's text challenges 
conventions of genre and gender; the reading also 
demonstrates that transgender autobiographies 
frequently evince similar effects. I argue that Woolf's 
representation of a range of sex- and gender-crossings 
evokes a relationship between fantasy, life-writing and 
identity construction which is central to transgender 
narratives from the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
My final chapter shifts the critical focus more 
radically from representations of variant gender 
identities to the issue of representation itself. My 
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reading of Gertrude Stein's The Making of Americans as 
a "poetics of difference" moves the site of 
confrontation from the material body to materiality of 
language. In doing so, my discussion of the 
performative qualities of Stein's text addresses a 
question that has ideological and practical 
implications for the whole thesis: that is, to what 
extent can a text be said to be challenging binary 
models of identity when it relies upon those 
conventions for its meaning? My analysis of Stein's 
text examines the extent to which its formal 
eccentricities-the monotonous textual rhythms and 
absurd verbal patterns-might evoke a culturally 
alternative subject position: one which has a material 
rather than linguistic reality and which might 
therefore transcend the foundational binaries of 
conventional models of identity. My discussion focuses 
on aspects of the text's anti-narrative techniques and 
includes a consideration of its resistance to 
principles of origin and closure, its punning, and its 
highly self-referential narrative voice. The effects of 
these unorthodox writing strategies are considered 
alongside the text's more conventional representations 
of identity to examine the destabilising potential of 
that juxtaposition. A narrative preoccupation with 
notions of "sameness" and "difference" is one of a 
number of themes which is considered in this frame. 
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Another important area of my analysis looks at the 
narrator's disintegrating subject position in the 
context of queer notions of identity as derivative and 
illusory. The revisionary potential implied by this 
reading is offset by a consideration of the semantic 
problems of such innovative writing practices, 
including a section on the troubled publishing history 
of The Making of Americans and Stein's works more 
generally. 
The ordering of my chapters does not present the 
works according to production or publication dates. In 
particular, my decision to place Stein's text at the 
end of my thesis privileges the coherence of my 
argument over the more pragmatic issues of chronology. 
Hence, the thesis looks first at differing 
representations of sex and gender changes that both 
challenge and, with varying degrees of ambiguity, 
continue to uphold binary models of identity, and 
concludes with a work which to some extent critiques 
that paradoxical effect through a self-conscious 
dismantling of its own and (by inference) other texts' 
linguistic processes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
"The masculine soul heaving in the female bosom": 
Theories of inversion and The Well of Loneliness 
Ever since I can remember anything at all I 
could never think of myself as a girl and I 
was in perpetual trouble, with this as the 
real reason. When I was 5 or 6 years old I 
began to say to myself that, whatever anyone 
said, if I was not a boy at any rate I was not 
a girl. This has been my unchanged conviction 
all through my life. 
Miss D. of History XXXIX in Havelock Ellis's 
Sexual Inversion (235) 
All my life I've never felt like a woman, and 
you know it .... I don't know what I am; no 
one's ever told me that I'm different and yet 
I know that I'm different .... 
-Stephen Gordon in Radclyffe Hall's The Well 
of Loneliness (204) 
If the sexologists put the "mannish woman" into sexual 
discourse, Radclyffe Hall gives her what is probably her 
most famous, and certainly most controversial, literary 
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representation. Hall's The Well of Loneliness (1928) 
takes this paradoxical figure out of the relative 
obscurity of the medico-scientific textbooks, and 
inscribes her in the popular imagination in a manner 
which far outreaches the influences of the sexological 
theorists. The publicity the novel received from its 
successful prosecution by the British authorities as an 
obscene publication in 1928 has clearly been 
instrumental in the popularisation and, for some lesbian 
readers, the iconisation of Hall's masculine female 
protagonist, Stephen Gordon. 
Until recently, most interpretations of the novel 
have focused on the sexual identity of the character, 
which has been read as lesbian, whilst her masculine 
identification has been understood as a physical sign of 
that sexuality. As such, Stephen Gordon has been cast as 
the "classic Mannish Lesbian" (Smith-Rosenberg 290). It 
is understandable that publicly circulated "lesbian 
responses" to the text tend not to foreground the 
confusion and disturbance that surrounds Stephen's 
gender. In constructing The Well as the lesbian novel 
and claiming its protagonist as lesbianism's prime 
fictional icon, it was politically expedient that her 
masculinity should be side-lined. This is not to suggest 
that the transgender aspects of Stephen's character have 
not been focused on by readers of the novel, but points 
rather to the way in which critical readings have chosen 
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to present her. Esther Newton's influential and much 
cited essay "The Mythic Mannish Lesbian: Radclyffe Hall 
and the New Woman" interprets Stephen's masculine gender 
as symbolic, but also considers its literal significance 
as a form of gender dysphoria. She explains: "Hall and 
the sexologists were describing something real. Some 
people, then and now, experience `gender dysphoria, ' a 
strong feeling that one's assigned gender as a man or a 
woman does not agree with one's sense of self" (292). In 
an endnote, Newton disassociates her own use of the term 
"gender dysphoria" from any connection with 
"transsexualism", and argues that Stephen's "acceptance 
of homosexual identity" clearly distinguishes her 
experience from that of a transsexual man (540). 
The question of the political correctness of butch 
identities has been troubling lesbian feminists for 
three decades now, and the link between masculinity and 
lesbianism that Hall apparently endorses and makes 
public through her creation of Stephen Gordon has 
fuelled lively and frequently bitterly divided opinion. 
Some critics have condemned Hall's characterisation for 
generating butch/femme stereotypes. Lillian Faderman, in 
Surpassing the Love of Men, describes Hall's use of 
sexology as perpetuating "congenitalists' theories" of 
lesbianism, and thus promoting a heterosexual model of 
same-sex desire. Faderman observes: "if some lesbian 
relationships were based on such patterns it was because 
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women were emulating the only examples of domestic 
situations available to them in a patriarchal culture" 
(323). Sheila Jeffreys represents The Well in terms of 
its failure "to provide the next generation with a 
`sexual vocabulary"' (The Lesbian Heresy 9). Jeffreys 
dismisses Newton's belief in the "essential and 
inevitable quality of lesbian `masculinity"' as a 
complete antithesis of the social constructionism of 
contemporary lesbian feminist theory (13). 
Other critics have read Stephen Gordon's masculine 
identity as central to the novel's political design. 
Sonia Ruehl is one of a number of critics who discuss 
The Well in terms of its effects as a "reverse 
discourse". Drawing on Foucault's constructionist 
account of sexual identity, Ruehl states: "Hall's 
intervention can be seen as a step in the process 
whereby women have firstly been able to group under a 
publicly available `lesbian' label and later gone on to 
demand the right to define that category themselves" 
(18). Jean Radford also uses Foucault to argue that 
Hall's novel "adopts terms like `inversion' 
transformatively in order `to demand legitimacy"' (106). 1 
Foucault's theory of a counter discourse has been 
questioned by Judith Butler in her essay "Imitation and 
Gender Insubordination". Butler expresses scepticism 
concerning the extent to which lesbians share a 
1 See also Jonathan Dollimore's discussion of The Well in Sexual 
Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (48-52). 
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"discursive site" with gay men, and compares the 
explicit prohibition of male homosexuality with the 
tacit outlawing of lesbianism. She concludes: "to be 
implicitly proscribed is not even to qualify as an 
object of prohibition" (20). The Well might be viewed as 
an interesting exception to Butler's otherwise 
persuasive argument, in that its representation of 
Stephen Gordon and her relationships with other women 
was explicitly and very publicly prohibited when the 
novel was censored. 
However Hall's fictionalisation of the female 
invert is viewed, it has made an important contribution 
to the establishment of a lesbian literary heritage and 
influenced the development of a visible political 
identity. This incorporation of Stephen Gordon into a 
history of lesbian identity politics makes other 
readings of the character difficult and politically 
sensitive. Now, with queer theory's re-imagining of 
butch and femme identities as potentially destabilising 
enactments of gender performativity (Butler, Gender 
Trouble 122-24), an interpretation of Stephen Gordon 
which shifts the focus of critical interest from the 
character's sexual desire to her gender performance is 
timely. Furthermore, recent interrogations of the 
sexological model of inversion which inspire and inform 
1 See also Jonathan Dollimore's discussion of The Well in Sexual 
Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (48-52). 
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Hall's characterisation of Stephen Gordon not only 
authorise, but irresistibly solicit a transgender 
reading of the text. 
Revisionist readings of The Well which adopt 
similar approaches to my own are conducted by Jay 
Prosser in Second Skins: The Body Narratives of 
Transsexuality (1998) and Judith Halberstam in Female 
Masculinity (1998). Prosser's discussion of inversion 
case histories constructs sexology as a medium which 
enabled the "transgendered subject" to move "through 
narrative-toward transsexuality" (139). When read in 
this light, Prosser argues, Hall's novel assumes a 
foundational importance to the materialisation of 
transsexual subject positions: 
Read in situ, as a fictional consequence of 
inversion's case histories, The Well comes 
into focus as not only not a lesbian novel, 
not only our first and most canonical 
transsexual novel, but a narrative that itself 
contributed to the formalization of 
transsexual subjectivity. (140) 
The Well's critical reputation as a problematic and 
contentious lesbian narrative is offered as further 
justification for this unequivocal recasting of The 
Well as a transsexual novel. Prosser explains: "we can 
see that our dogged attempts to read it as lesbian in 
spite of its narrative have been a case of trying to 
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fit a square peg into a round hole" (168). He concludes 
that it is the novel's very irreconcilability as a 
lesbian text which facilitates its recuperation to a 
transsexual canon: "for it is those narratives that 
don't quite fit, which exceed or resist their location 
that (perhaps like transsexuals themselves) might find 
belonging in a transsexual context" (168). 
My own interest in re-opening discussion about 
Hall's masculine protagonist derives from a personal 
and critical dissatisfaction with conventional 
interpretations. There is something about 
representations of Stephen Gordon as "mannish lesbian" 
which does not feel complete; certain ambiguities which 
surround Hall's representation of her protagonist's 
experience of difference invite further speculation as 
to the real source of Stephen's melancholy. Prosser 
cites an essay by Gayle Rubin, in which Rubin explores 
the shared origins of homosexual and transsexual 
narratives, to argue that: "the writing of transsexual 
history will surely depend upon performing retroactive 
readings of figures and texts that have been central to 
the lesbian and gay canon" (167). It is perhaps because 
of those overlapping histories that I find the terms of 
Prosser's otherwise intellectually astute argument a 
little too emphatic. 
Judith Halberstam's reading of sexological case 
studies stresses the differences between the narratives 
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of female inverts. She argues that quite distinct 
expressions of sexual preference and gender variance 
have been flattened out by their medical categorisation 
and, consequently, overlooked by many critics. Four 
cases taken from Havelock Ellis's work are examined for 
their "remarkable range of sexual expressions and 
female masculinities" (80). A similar diversity is 
identified in other masculine and passing women of the 
period, including Radclyffe Hall and Colonel Barker. 
Halberstam, like Prosser, recognises the common desires 
and identifications of some inverts and some 
transsexuals and makes a direct link between "the 
invention of transsexuality" and the "separating out of 
gender inversion and same-sex desire" (86). At the same 
time, she aims to sustain the historical 
distinctiveness of those categories. In this respect, 
Halberstam rejects the labels of lesbian or 
pretranssexual for those inverts who passed and lived 
as men, describing them instead as "women who wanted to 
be men before the possibility of sex change existed" 
(87). Halberstam stresses the need to understand such 
self-identifications "not as simply transsexual but at 
least as the beginning of the emergence of a 
transsexual identity" (95). Her tentative use of 
historically specific vocabulary, coupled with a 
sensitivity to the complexities of identity formation, 
appears to resist the more singular focus of Prosser's 
81 
project. In the context of a later discussion in Female 
Masculinity, Halberstam asserts: "There is not ... 
one history to be told here (the history of medical 
technology) about one subject (the transsexual)" (161). 
Although Halberstam and Prosser apply different 
terms in their readings of Stephen Gordon, however, 
their arguments derive from similar interpretations of 
the sexological invert. My examination of the links 
between Radclyffe Hall's novel and some of the 
sexological case studies and theories of the time has 
clear areas of overlap with Prosser's and Halberstam's 
work, both in terms of material and argument. In the 
next section I identify ways in which The Well makes 
visible its sources, and demonstrate why readings of 
Stephen Gordon must revisit the figure of the "invert" 
in order to address the contradictions and anomalies 
which undermine the character's usual designation as 
"mannish lesbian". 
Deconstructing Stephen 
A detailed explanation of the sexological model of 
inversion is provided in my Introduction. Here, I will 
focus on specific case studies of female inverts and 
explore the relationship between Hall's novel and 
sexology. 
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To recap briefly, one of the main figures to emerge 
from the theorising of sexologists such as Richard von 
Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis at the end of the 
nineteenth century is the invert. Theories of sexual and 
gender inversion underpin the medical category of 
homosexuality that evolved out of the classification and 
ordering of so-called perverse behaviours. The term 
"invert" reflects the belief that same-sex desire is in 
fact an inversion of the sexual instincts, since the 
"natural" direction of sexual attraction within a 
heterosexual paradigm can only ever be towards a person 
of the "opposite sex". As gender role and behaviour were 
deemed to be the natural consequence of sex, if an 
individual's sexual instincts belong to the opposite sex 
then, it was reasoned, so must her or his gender 
attributes. Hence, if a woman is attracted to another 
woman not only is she conceptualised as male in terms of 
her sexuality, but she is also constructed as having a 
masculine gender and, frequently, male secondary sexual 
characteristics. Krafft-Ebing's representation of the 
female invert as "The masculine soul, heaving in the 
female bosom" (399) provides a vibrant metaphor for this 
congenital identity. 
In considering sexological case studies it is, of 
course, important to be aware of the mediating role of 
the author of the reports. It is frequently difficult 
to distinguish between the reported voice of the 
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subject of the study and the interpreting voice of the 
sexologist. Even where extracts of dialogue, either 
written or spoken, are included it is clear that care 
still needs to be exercised as much can be lost or 
gained in translation. Having said that, many of the 
case studies, particularly those including extracts of 
first-person narratives, seem to suggest that there 
were women and men for whom this "natural" explanation 
of their experiences had some kind of personal meaning 
or "truth". Liz Stanley's essay on lesbian history and 
biography argues that "the idea of inversion offered an 
essentialist framework of understanding for many women 
and men whose experience of themselves accorded with 
it" (208). In an age in which sex and gender have been 
constructed and deconstructed into abstraction, it is 
perhaps necessary to propose that for many of the 
subjects of these case studies their experiences had an 
existence that felt "real". On this point, it is also 
important to highlight the advantages to minoritised 
identities of supporting what Jonathan Dollimore, in 
Sexual Dissidence, calls "essentialist conceptions of 
selfhood" (39). Dollimore comments on the critical role 
that such models have played: 
It would be difficult to overestimate the 
importance in modern Western culture of 
transgression in the name of an essential self 
which is the origin and arbiter of the true, 
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the real (and/or natural), and the moral, 
categories which correspond to the three main 
domains of knowledge in Western culture: the 
epistemological, the ontological, and the 
ethical. In other words the self is conceived 
centrally within those domains. Not 
surprisingly then essentialist conceptions of 
selfhood have been crucial in liberation 
movements and social struggles. (39) 
As Dollimore points out, there were political and 
personal benefits to be derived from being able to 
claim an ontological basis to the "difference" that was 
being used to set some women and men apart from others. 
Whether inversion theory was believed in or not, a 
congenital explanation of variant sex and gender 
behaviours and identifications gave the invert an 
authorised, public status and as such allowed her or 
him to begin to claim rights. 
An examination of the case studies conducted by 
Krafft-Ebing demonstrates that although an explicit 
association is made between the female invert and 
homosexuality, the term is used to cover a range of 
experiences that, in the modern sense, cannot be 
identified unreservedly as lesbian (or transsexual). 
Krafft-Ebing organises females who exhibit what he 
terms an "antipathic sexual instinct" (or same-sex 
desire) into two broad categories: "Homo-Sexual Feeling 
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as an Acquired Manifestation" and "Homo-sexual Feeling 
as an Abnormal Congenital Manifestation". For those 
women who belonged to the first of these categories, 
their condition was frequently deemed to be the result 
of "masturbation" and thus a "temporary aberration" 
(286) that might be corrected. The category is divided 
into four grades or "degrees". Interestingly, the third 
and fourth of these degrees include women who 
experience "the delusion of a transformation of sex" 
(328). Initially this "transformation" was confined to 
the psychical sphere, but ultimately it included 
imagined anatomical changes. Case 130 describes a Mrs 
X. who had enjoyed wearing boys' clothing as a child 
but had exhibited no other signs of a "homo-sexual 
inclination" (324). Krafft-Ebing reports that following 
a long illness caused by an "apoplectic stroke" there 
was "a peculiar change of her psychical and physical 
feelings" (325). The psychical changes described 
include "[s]ensations of possessing a penis and 
scrotum" (327). Such extreme responses are understood 
as being the final stage in the "disease-process" 
(328) . 
In the second category the "homo-sexual feeling" 
is deemed to have a congenital, rather than 
pathological, origin. The first of its grades, labelled 
"Psychico-hermaphrodisic", is unlikely to manifest 
itself in "external appearances nor by mental 
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(masculine) sexual characteristics" (398); the fourth 
and most degenerative grade, "Gynandry", is accompanied 
by the greatest masculinisation of the subject: "The 
woman of this type possesses of the feminine qualities 
only the genital organs; thought, sentiment, action, 
even external appearances are those of the man" (399). 
Krafft-Ebing refers to these cases as "men-women", a 
term also used in a medical pamphlet from 1620 with the 
extraordinary title: Hic Mulier:, or, The Man-Woman: 
Beinq a medicine to cure the coltish disease of the 
Stagcers in the Masculine-Feminines of our times. 
Exprest in a brief declamation. Non omnes possumus 
omnes. Mistris, will you be trim'd or truss'd? 2 
According to this construction of the invert, 
same-sex desire is only one element of an inversion of 
the subject's gender. In a more general observation, 
Krafft-Ebing presents the adoption of masculine costume 
or pursuits as a reliable indicator of a woman's "homo- 
sexuality" or "Uranism": 
Uranism may nearly always be suspected in 
females wearing their hair short, or who dress 
in the fashion of men, or pursue the sports 
and pastimes of their male acquaintances; also 
2 An extract from this text is reproduced in Secret Sexualities: A 
Sourcebook of 17th and 18th Century Writing, edited by Ian 
McCormick (177-79). 
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in opera singers and actresses, who appear in 
male attire on the stage by preference (398). 3 
This statement makes a direct correlation between a 
woman's decision to appropriate masculine cultural 
signs, regardless of the circumstances surrounding that 
decision, and her sexual preferences. 
In the case studies of female inversion conducted 
by Krafft-Ebing, it is those women who are assigned to 
the third (Viraginity) and fourth (Gynandry) grades of 
homosexuality who can be linked most obviously to the 
"mannish lesbian" of modern sexual discourse and to 
Hall's protagonist, Stephen Gordon. The women of these 
studies exhibit what is interpreted both by the 
sexologist and often the "patient" herself as psychical 
and physical traits conventionally ascribed to men. 
For Case 160, who is classified as "Homo-sexuality 
in Transition to Viraginity", selected passages from a 
suicide letter are reproduced. In the following 
extract, Mrs. v. T. attributes her gender inversion to 
a combination of congenital and social influences: 
"I was born a girl, but a misdirected 
education forced my fiery imagination early 
into the wrong direction. At twelve I had a 
mania to pose as a boy and court the attention 
of ladies. I recognised this abnormal impulse 
3 For a discussion of theatrical crossdressing see Terry Castle's 
"Matters Not Fit to be Mentioned: Fielding's The Female Husband" 
and chapters by Kristina Straub in Body Guards (142-166) and Emma 
Donoghue in Passions Between Women (87-108). 
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as a mania, but, like fate, it grew with the 
years ... Nature has made a mistake in the 
choice of my sexuality and I must do a life- 
long penance for it .. . ". (418) 
The choice of language here is significant in what it 
might reveal about the invert's self-construction: 
words such as "mania" and "abnormal impulse" suggest 
either the speaker's familiarity with medico-scientific 
terms, or some element of prompting or editing by the 
sexologist. Other words evoke parallels with the abject 
and self-persecutory language of Stephen Gordon's 
tragic narrative: "misdirected" and "mistake" present 
the invert as a blameless victim doubly punished by her 
circumstances and by "Nature", an effect heightened by 
the martyred tone of the "life-long penance" that must 
be suffered. The highly subjective voice of the 
"object" of this case study is balanced by the pseudo- 
scientific observations of the "professional". Krafft- 
Ebing's notes include the comment: "The physical and 
psychical secondary sexual characteristics were partly 
masculine, partly feminine" (419). The "masculine" 
traits listed include "her gait and carriage, severe 
features, deep voice, robust skeleton, powerful muscles 
and absence of adipose layers" (419). Hall's adoption 
of the narratives and "data" of such case studies of 
inversion will become evident in my analysis of 
Stephen's masculinity in the next section. 
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Other cases under the category "Viraginity" may 
also have been drawn upon by Hall. The subjects of 
these studies all experience feelings of being "like a 
man" or "not being like a woman". Each case concludes 
with a commentary on the "masculine" and "feminine" 
qualities of the woman's external appearance. Of Miss 
N., who dreams "only about females with herself in the 
role of man", Krafft-Ebing observes: "Masculine 
features, deep voice, manly gait, without beard, small 
mammae; cropped her hair short, and made the impression 
of a man in woman's clothes" (420). That Krafft-Ebing 
finds it necessary to mention the woman's beardless 
state reveals the bias of his approach. In some of the 
cases, detailed examinations of the women's anatomies, 
including the genitals, are reported on so that any 
signs of "masculine" bone structures or secondary 
sexual characteristics can be offered as evidence of 
the subject's inversion. Miss 0. is described as: 
"Frame quite feminine; but the feet were exceptionally 
large and more of masculine type" (423-424). 
Although there are clear similarities at a 
physical level between Hall's masculine-featured 
protagonist and the subjects of case studies such as 
those described above, the most direct parallel is 
found under the more extreme category of "Gynandry". 
Case 166 is the only reported example of "Gynandry" in 
Psychopathia Sexualis. In by far the longest and most 
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detailed study in this section, Krafft-Ebing's case 
notes claim to draw on an autobiographical source 
("independently confirmed") to present the history of 
Sarolta, Countess V., or Count Sandor (428). In 
contrast to the previous cases, the construction of 
Sandor as male is overwhelmingly consistent with the 
exception of the sexual organs, which are found to be 
"feminine" but "at the stage of development of those of 
a ten-year-old girl" (437). The case study offers a 
quite startling array of anatomical "evidence" of 
Sandor's "masculinity", from the obscure: "line from 
glabella to occiput, 30 centimetres" (437), to the 
trivial: "Waist wanting" (436). Less pseudo-scientific 
observations include the comment that Sandor 
successfully passes as a man and is even able to 
"deceive" female lovers by the use of an artificial 
penis. In a short piece of first-person narrative 
Sandor expresses "an indescribable aversion for female 
attire, -indeed, for everything feminine, but only in as 
far as it concerned me; for, on the other hand, I was 
all enthusiasm for the beautiful sex" (436). For 
Krafft-Ebing, Sandor's erotic interests and masculine 
identity are related symptoms of a "homo-sexual" 
nature. To conflate sexual desire and gender expression 
in this way is to deny other possible connotations of 
that mannishness, not least that Sandor's 
identification may be male and heterosexual. 
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The father/child relationship described in this 
case study introduces an element of social determinism 
to this primarily congenitalist theory of inversion. 
Krafft-Ebing informs us that the female subject was 
brought up by her father as a boy, called by a boy's 
name, Sandor, and that the father "allowed her to ride, 
drive and hunt, admiring her muscular energy" (42). 
There are obvious similarities between Sandor's 
childhood experiences and those of Hall's Stephen 
Gordon. In The Well, social factors and, specifically, 
parental influence are issues that need to be addressed 
in interpreting Hall's representation of Stephen's 
inversion. Stephen, like Sandor, is given a boy's name 
and encouraged by her father in conventionally 
masculine pursuits. Sir Philip, like Sandor's father, 
takes a pride in Stephen's "muscular energy", 
particularly as it is expressed in her ability to ride 
and hunt. Sandor's aversion for "everything feminine" 
except "beautiful women" who become objects of romantic 
and sexual love is also a prominent feature of 
Stephen's narrative. The social aspect of Stephen's and 
Sandor's constructions as invert is important; it raises 
a question as to how they might have developed if their 
masculine identifications had not been encouraged so 
overtly. By itself, however, it does not explain what 
motivates those identifications and in both instances 
the fathers, like the sexologists, appear to be 
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responding to and directing existing desires and 
behaviours. 
There is an important distinction to be made 
between the narrated experiences of Sandor and Stephen 
Gordon. Whereas Sandor passes as a man, Stephen, 
although her gender is sometimes ambiguously read by 
others, at no time consciously attempts to pass as a 
man either in society or with her lovers. In this 
respect, her attempts to refigure her gender might be 
seen to derive from a masculine identification which 
cannot be expressed by such partial, ultimately 
superficial measures. Hall's moral outrage, discussed 
in the introduction, at what she views as the deceptive 
practices of Colonel Barker may be significant here. 
Barker, who passed as a man, served in the army, and 
married a woman, is condemned by Hall as "a mad pervert 
of the most undesirable type" (qtd. in Doan 663). As 
will become evident from my reading of the novel, 
Stephen, when she masquerades as a man, is still denied 
the moral and legal endorsement of the male identity 
she desires and, for the early part of her narrative, 
expects. A sense of rightful ownership is a crucial 
component of that identity. In Stephen's eyes merely to 
pass as a man only accentuates the gap between gender 
play, which she associates with the dressing-up games 
of her childhood, and gender authenticity, which from 
Stephen's heavily class-influenced and masculinist 
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position is imperative to personal happiness. What is 
made clear from this comparison is that Stephen as 
"invert" does not translate unproblematically to 
Stephen as "lesbian", even if the qualifier "mannish" 
is added. Radclyffe Hall's interest in sexology is 
discussed in Diana Souhami's biography, The Trials of 
Radclyffe Hall. Hall and her partner Una Troubridge 
joined the British Sexological Society in 1920. Souhami 
describes Hall's practice of incorporating material 
into The Well (originally titled "Stephen") directly 
from sexological texts which Troubridge read aloud to 
her (155). These texts include Krafft-Ebing's 
Psychopathia Sexualis and Havelock Ellis's Studies in 
the Psychology of Sex. The Well makes explicit 
reference to Krafft-Ebing and his mentor Karl Ulrichs; 
Stephen's father is secretly studying their books to 
try to explain his daughter's masculine identity. 
Stephen's discovery of the books after her father's 
death leads to her self-identification as an invert. 
Following an acrimonious exchange between Stephen and 
her mother over her relationship with Angela Crossby, 
she is irresistibly drawn to her father's study where 
she peruses the contents of his "special book-case". 
The narrator describes Stephen's selection of a book 
from the back of the shelf: "Krafft Ebing [sic]-she had 
never heard of that author before. All the same she 
opened the battered old book, then she looked more 
94 
closely, for there on its margins were notes in her 
father's small, scholarly hand and she saw that her own 
name appeared in those notes" (207). In this scene Sir 
Philip is cast in the role of amateur sexologist with 
Stephen as the object of his secretly conducted case 
study. 
Although Hall identified as an invert, The Well is 
not an autobiographical novel. Jane Rule argues that 
Stephen is Hall's "idealized mirror" rather than a 
self-portrait (54), and there is certainly something 
romanticised about the tragic, martyred figure. Hall 
would no doubt have drawn on her own experiences for 
the characterisation, but its deliberate promotion of 
theories of congenital inversion had a specific 
purpose. In a letter to Gorham Munson, a friend in the 
States, Hall explains that she has written the novel: 
To encourage inverts to face up to a hostile 
world in their true colours, and this with 
dignity and courage. To spur all classes of 
inverts to make good through hard work, 
faithful and loyal attachments and sober and 
useful living. To bring normal men and women 
of good will to a fuller and more tolerant 
understanding of the inverted. (qtd. in 
Souhami, The Trials 151) 
The sentiments of this letter can be compared with a 
passage from The Well when Stephen has just discovered 
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that she is an invert. Miss Puddleton ("Puddle"), 
Stephen's tutor and companion, advises her to work and 
to "have the courage to make good" for "the sake of the 
others who are like you, but less strong and less 
gifted" (208) . 
Havelock Ellis wrote a preface for the first 
edition of The Well in which he officially approves its 
depiction of female inversion. Ellis writes: "So far as 
I know, it is the first English novel which presents, in 
a completely faithful and uncompromising form, one 
particular aspect of sexual life as it exists among us 
to-day" (qtd. in Brittain 53). Despite this endorsement, 
or perhaps because of it, Hall's argument for the 
naturalness of inversion and hence for the acceptance 
of inverts led to the novel's prosecution shortly after 
publication by Jonathan Cape in July 1928. Not 
surprisingly, in the United States book sales were 
greatly increased by all the publicity: twenty-five 
thousand copies sold in the first week and although in 
1929 American authorities also tried to suppress The 
Well, they were unsuccessful. The ban was not lifted In 
Britain until 1949.4 
At a lecture on the trial of The Well, given in 
January 1929 to the Southend Young Socialists, Hall 
4 For a detailed account of the prosecution see Souhami (The 
Trials 167-232). 
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provides her own colourful account of inversion in 
which she adopts the roles of preacher and scientist: 
Congenital inversion is caused by an actual 
deviation from the usual in the glandular 
secretions of the invert's body. Those 
glandular secretions influence the cells, & 
thus the whole human structure, physical, 
mental & spiritual. You can kill all the 
inverts but while they live you cannot make 
them other than inverted. They are and will 
always remain as God made them, and their 
sexual attractions will be therefore inverted 
as they were in the girl of whom I wrote-the 
unfortunate girl Stephen Gordon. (qtd. in 
Souhami, The Trials 155) 
What is significant in Hall's description is that its 
reference to an inversion of the "sexual attractions" 
makes no mention of the accompanying gender inversion 
which is so apparent in the novel. Given Hall's 
utilisation of sexological theories and material this 
raises a number of questions. Does Hall construct 
Stephen Gordon as what some critics have called the 
"perfect gentleman"5 because the character is sexually 
attracted to women and sexologists construct such 
"perverse" desire in terms of "mannishness"? Does Hall 
present Stephen as "sexually inverted" because that is 
5 See Ruehl (25) and Dollimore (50). 
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the only rhetoric in female sexual discourse available 
to describe cross-gender identification? Or does Hall's 
appropriation of the female invert explore cross-gender 
identification as an aspect of identity that may overlap 
with sexual desire but is, in itself, fundamentally 
different? My consideration later in this chapter of the 
different types of invert represented in the novel 
suggests that there is a singular quality to Stephen 
Gordon's difference which sets her apart form these 
other characters. 
In the introduction, I discussed Havelock Ellis's 
development of a new category of "aesthetic inversion" 
in Volume 7 of Studies in the Psychology of Sex (1928). 
Ellis divides this category into two types which 
parallel present day distinctions between transvestism 
and trans sexuality: 
the most common kind, in which the inversion 
is mainly confined to the sphere of clothing 
and another, less common but more complete, in 
which ... the subject so 
identifies himself 
with those of his physical and psychic traits 
which recall the opposite sex that he feels 
really to belong to that sex (Eonism 360). 
Ellis makes a further distinction between aesthetic and 
sexual inversion by declaring the former a "modification 
of normal hetero-sexuality" (103). To what extent Hall 
might have been aware of this refinement of Ellis's 
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theories during the writing of The Well is unclear; 
Souhami describes Una reading this latest volume to Hall 
on the evening of her forty-eighth birthday, shortly 
after Hall's novel had been published (The Trials 174- 
5). Nevertheless, a question remains as to whether 
Stephen Gordon has turned out to be more of an aesthetic 
invert than a sexual one. 
In order to move an analysis of The Well beyond the 
figure of the invert in whom desire and identification 
are inextricably entangled, it is necessary to tease out 
those aspects of Stephen Gordon's characterisation which 
suggest that whilst her erotic feelings may be directed 
towards females, she most clearly identifies as male and 
heterosexual. In addition, that identity as a 
heterosexual man must be shown to exceed what might be 
ascribed to the unavoidable effects of socialisation. 
For a transgender reading of The Well to work, the 
source of Stephen's rejection of the "feminine" must be 
seen to be more than purely a straightforward 
identification with the dominant beliefs of a society 
that favours the male. A transgender reading must also 
set Stephen's narrative apart from that of the "New 
Woman" whose appropriation of masculine signs is more 
usually interpreted as a politically-motivated act. 6 
6 See Carroll Smith-Rosenberg's chapter "The New Woman as 
Androgyne: Social Disorder and Gender Crisis, 1870-1936" in 
Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian America (245- 
96). 
99 
For these reasons, my analysis of Stephen Gordon 
concentrates on issues surrounding her gendered 
embodiment with particular emphasis on representations 
of somatic unease and transformation, both of which are 
key features of many transgender and particularly 
transsexual narratives. My discussion of Stephen's body 
as the site of her difference includes a consideration 
of the character's relationships to and with other 
female and male characters in the novel. The literal 
expressions of Stephen's bodily discomfort are 
reinforced through the symbolism and imagery of The 
Well, and the relationship between gendered embodiment 
and physical spaces in the novel is an especially 
productive source for my reading of Stephen's exile from 
Morton, her family home. Finally, Stephen's gender 
incoherence is read for its potentially queer effects. 
My analysis begins by examining the implications of some 
of the highly visible examples of Stephen's masculinity. 
Bodily harms 
A first encounter with Stephen Gordon demonstrates how 
blatantly Hall directs the reader to construct the 
character's gender as masculine. The indelicate 
signposting of Stephen's gender inversion can be 
irritating, in that it may appear to modern readers as a 
crude reproduction of the most obvious signs of the 
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pseudo-male female invert. From the most basic physical 
and textual signs, the character's masculine body and 
male name, to those which are only slightly more subtly 
deployed, such as her "gentlemanly" manners and 
deportment, virtually everything in the representation 
of Stephen's gender invites the reader response: "That's 
a man! " Time and again, attention is drawn to the fact 
that Stephen feels like a man, or certainly does not 
feel like a woman; looks like a man, or certainly does 
not look like a woman; wants to be a man, or certainly 
does not want to be a woman; indeed would make a very 
good man, a far better man than a woman. 
My choice of wording seeks to convey an ambiguity 
that informs the representation of Stephen's identity. 
It is a mood that emanates from a tension between the 
character's given identification as female and her 
actual identification which, in the absence of any more 
meaningful alternative, must construct itself as male. 
In the following extract, taken from a tense exchange 
between Stephen and her mother, that conflict between 
material and inner reality is forcefully articulated: 
"All my life I've never felt like a woman, and 
you know it you say you've always disliked me, 
that you've always felt a strange physical 
repulsion. ... [ellipses in original] i 
don't know what I am; no one's ever told me 
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that I'm different and yet I know that I'm 
different ... ." (204) 
This "absence of a feeling, rather than its presence" is 
something to which transgender artist Kate Bornstein 
refers in describing her own experience of gender in 
Gender Outlaw (24). For Bornstein it was her unwavering 
conviction that she was not a boy or a man, rather than 
an absolute belief that she was a girl or a woman which, 
in her words, "convinced me to change my gender" (24). 
If that change of gender is to be recognised by others 
it needs to be embodied and Bornstein hormonally and 
surgically transfigured her male body. Similarly, for 
Stephen Gordon the source of her sense of unbelonging, 
and therefore the key to achieving some kind of gendered 
coherence, is sited primarily in the body. 
Hall's deployment of conventionally masculine 
characteristics in the delineation of Stephen's body is 
seen by Esther Newton to assign the character an 
illegitimate, between gender status: "Her body is not 
and cannot be male; yet it is not traditionally female" 
(289). Although Newton provides a literal interpretation 
of Stephen's somatic dis-ease as the "gender dysphoria" 
experienced by some lesbians, she also presents it as a 
symbolic representation of the "'inverted' sexuality 
Stephen can neither disavow nor satisfy" (289). What 
Newton's discussion positively resists is the 
possibility that Stephen's bodily ambiguity might derive 
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from an identification that could now be described as 
transsexual. 
The masculinisation of Stephen's body is probably 
the weakest aspect of Hall's depiction of the female 
invert. The repeated references to Stephen's "broad 
shoulders", "narrow hips" and "heavy face" seem to be a 
clumsy and obvious statement of the physical signs of 
Stephen's inversion. On the other hand, perhaps it is 
rather too easy to attribute the more exaggerated 
aspects of Stephen's maleness to a lack of authorial 
finesse, or slavish adherence to textbook examples of 
female inverts. As Martha Vicinus observes in her essay 
on the origins of the modern lesbian identity, Radclyffe 
Hall is aware of multiple models of unconventional 
sexual and gender identities both from the social 
circles she frequents and from the women she chooses as 
lovers. Vicinus offers the examples of "Barney's 
hedonistic lesbianism, Vivien's self-created tragedy, 
Colette's theatrical affair with the marquise, and the 
many less colorful monogamous couples in Paris's 
literary world" (488). There is clear evidence in The 
Well that Hall has no wish to confine herself to the 
archetype of the "mannish invert" and her "feminine" 
object choice. Indeed, of the Parisian community of 
inverts of which Stephen becomes a reluctant member we 
are told: "the grades were so numerous and so fine that 
they often defied the most careful observation" (356). 
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Hall depicts a sex and gender subculture in The Well and 
the implications of that diversity of representation are 
important to a reading of Stephen Gordon seeking to 
emphasise the singularity of her particular experience 
of difference. 
Consequently, despite the apparently heavy-handed 
approach towards Stephen's physical appearance, the 
visible signs of her maleness might be seen to provide a 
clear, if rather unsophisticated statement of the root 
of Stephen's problem: the incongruous relationship that 
is felt to exist between her sexed body and her 
experienced, rather than given, gender. Newton suggests 
that "Her body is not and cannot be male" (289), but a 
more accurate expression of Stephen's confusion and 
frustration as she grows up may lie in the fact that 
"her body is not [regarded as] and cannot be male". 
Clearly there are other tensions operating within 
the novel that contribute to Stephen's sense of 
estrangement. One of the most obvious conflicts arises 
from the character's loyalty to her class origins and 
her unqualified veneration of the patriarchal values by 
which she is outlawed. Stephen's class prejudice and 
sense of moral superiority are related factors in her 
personal isolation in the novel, in that they inform the 
particular model of male masculinity with which she most 
closely identifies, that of her father, Sir Philip 
Gordon. Hence, Stephen's class only makes sense to her 
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if it is read in the context of a "masculine" gender 
necessarily located in a heterosexual frame. Stephen's 
distaste for male characters, such as Jonathan 
Brockett, who display effeminate behaviour and physical 
traits can be read in the context of this rigid notion 
of an authentic masculinity. 
The incoherent relationship between Stephen's sexed 
body and her gender becomes a source of discomfort and 
shame, both to her and to others, from an early point in 
the narrative. At a very obvious level we are invited to 
read Stephen's lack of co-ordination and clumsiness when 
she is forced to perform in the feminine arena: she 
treads on her dress, knocks into tables, and lacks the 
dexterity to manage small buttons on her dresses. In 
pronounced contrast, we are shown Stephen's "natural" 
grace, strength and skills when she is involved in 
conventionally masculine activities such as throwing a 
ball, riding and fencing. We are also repeatedly made 
aware of the incongruous effect created by the 
juxtaposition of feminine clothing and Stephen's body. 
The development of Stephen's awareness of her 
difference and the increasing association of that 
feeling with the body can be plotted. In childhood there 
is a vague sense of frustration, a consciousness of 
"feeling all wrong" (17). Her strongest identifications 
are with men, notably her father Sir Philip, and as a 
young child she adopts the persona of the "young Nelson" 
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depicted in one of the paintings in the house. Role- 
playing quickly loses its appeal as Stephen's desire for 
an "authentic" (male) gender asserts itself: "she so 
longed to be someone quite real, instead of just Stephen 
pretending to be Nelson" (17). As Stephen's social world 
widens, this frustration is joined by a self-persecutory 
fear and acute self-consciousness: she feels that others 
are laughing at her or talking about her. When Stephen 
enters puberty the tangible evidence of the biological 
functions of the female body brings with it increasing 
feelings of self-abasement and uncomprehending angst. 
Typically, menstruation is a particular source of 
torment: "To see Stephen Gordon's expression of horror 
if one so much as threw out a hint on the subject, was 
to feel that the thing must in some way be shameful, a 
kind of disgrace, a humiliation! " (74). 
As her identification as male is subjected to 
increasing prohibition and contradiction from external 
sources her body, which seems to promise so much when 
she first discovers its potential strength and 
athleticism, becomes a visible sign of her oppression 
and something that she wants to punish. This self- 
destructive feeling is at its most violent when Stephen 
is obliged to adopt a feminine gender role and 
consequently made most keenly aware of her gendered 
incongruity: "She wrenched off the dress and hurled it 
from her, longing intensely to rend it, to hurt it, 
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longing to hurt herself in the process, yet filled all 
the while with that sense of injustice" (71-2). Jay 
Prosser's analysis of this sentence notes the way in 
which the object of Stephen's violent desires changes 
from the dress to "herself", and concludes that "the 
dress symptomizes her desire to rend or hurt her own 
body" (Second Skins 162). Stephen's harmful urges 
towards her female body, here partly displaced to the 
hateful feminine dress, are more clearly disclosed at a 
later point in the novel. In a scene frequently analysed 
in critiques of The Well, Stephen's ambivalent response 
to the mirrored image of her naked body can be read as a 
rare moment of narrative subtlety: "She longed to maim 
it, for it made her feel cruel; it was so white, so 
strong and so self-sufficient; yet withal so poor and 
unhappy a thing that her eyes filled with tears and her 
hate turned to pity" (188). 
Teresa de Lauretis's feminist revision of Freud for 
her reading of the "mirror scene" subordinates Stephen's 
narrative of masculine identification to an 
interpretation of these self-destructive drives as the 
desire for a female body, rather than a male one. As 
Halberstam explains, de Lauretis's intention is to 
foreground the feminine lesbian who has been forgotten 
or inadequately accounted for by Freudian theory (102- 
103). Although this is an important project, Stephen 
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Gordon would seem to be a particularly unproductive 
subject for such a revision. 
An unreconstructed Freudian reading might 
understand the conflicting impulses of Stephen's reading 
of her own body as a response to the loss of something 
that was never owned and which can never be possessed. 
Stephen exhibits the classic features of Freud's 
melancholic: dejection, self-persecution and self- 
revilement, a lack of self-regard, and as a culmination 
of these feelings, "a delusional expectation of 
punishment" ("Mourning" 252). In the essay "Mourning and 
Melancholia" (1917), Freud explains that melancholia, 
like mourning, may be the reaction to the loss of a 
"loved object", but the former is related to "an object- 
loss which is withdrawn from consciousness" (254). For 
Stephen the "loved object" is the male body, a desire 
represented primarily by Stephen's identification with 
her father and her friend, and ultimate rival, Martin 
Hallam. As Stephen grows up she has to relinquish her 
love of the male body, a process marked at a narrative 
level by the rift with Martin when he tries to sexualise 
their friendship and the sudden and tragic death of 
Stephen's father. Increasingly the jilted love for this 
object takes refuge in what Freud calls "narcissistic 
identification" (260) and Stephen substitutes her own 
female-sexed body for the male body that has been 
"lost". At this stage, according to Freud's essay, "the 
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hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, 
abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving 
sadistic satisfaction from its suffering" (260). In 
Stephen's case, it is her body that in psychological 
terms is subjected to a complex mix of self-destructive 
and self-loving drives. 
The "mirror scene" can be read as a defining moment 
in the character's self-persecution. Rebecca O'Rourke 
identifies Stephen's paranoia, born out of her 
inability to "name herself or her condition" (4), as a 
contributing factor in that behaviour. For O'Rourke, 
the missing ingredient is Stephen's "lesbianism"; but 
if it were as simple as this, surely the feelings of 
paranoia would begin to subside once Stephen becomes 
aware of the medical explanation of her "condition" and 
is introduced to the inverted community in Paris. 
Instead, in the company of inverts Stephen's self- 
hatred and feelings of persecution seem to intensify. 
On their first meeting, Stephen's reading of Valerie 
Seymour's reaction to her is dominated by the language 
and imagery of Christ's crucifixion: 
Valerie Seymour was secretly approving, not 
because her guest was a decent human being 
with a will to work, with a well-trained 
brain ... but rather because she was seeing 
before her all the outward stigmata of the 
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abnormal verily the wounds of One nailed to a 
cross. (247) 
This passage is typical in that it presents Stephen's 
perception of her difference as being something that is 
inscribed on her body and so always there to be read by 
others. Earlier, when Stephen first learns about 
"inversion" from her father's books, she imagines 
herself as Cain-like with her sin marked clearly for 
the world to see. These signs are the chimerical 
materialisation of Stephen's feelings of dis-ease and 
it is significant that they are translated to the 
surface of her body. 
At a physical level, Stephen tries to transform her 
female-sexed body externally through costume. For 
Newton, "Stephen's cross-dressing asserts a series of 
agonising estrangements" (289) ; it is a signifier of her 
marginalised status both with regard to the family and 
society. Newton explains: "She is alienated from her 
mother, as the New Woman often was, and as the lesbian 
was, increasingly, from heterosexual women" (289). These 
comments fail to identify another more fundamental 
estrangement that Stephen's cross-dressing asserts: the 
alienation she experiences from her female-sexed body 
and its assigned feminine gender. It is a personal 
dissonance that is apparent to other characters in the 
novel. As a child, Stephen's father notices "that 
indefinable quality in Stephen that made her look wrong 
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in the clothes she was wearing, as though she and they 
had no right to each other" (23). It is also observed by 
Stephen herself who, forced to adopt conventional female 
attire for social functions, searches for an explanation 
for the strange appearance that results: "'Am I queer 
looking or not? '" she muses uneasily as she looks in the 
mirror (7 0) .' 
According to Lacanian theory the "mirror stage" is 
the foundational moment in the process of individuation. 
As a literary device, the mirror has become a familiar 
and rather cliched method of establishing a character's 
sense of "otherness". Mirrors often feature in 
transsexual life-narratives where they are seen to have 
a prominent place in the subject's transition. In the 
context of these various theoretical and literary 
associations, the relation between Stephen's mirrored 
image and her construction of a sense of "self" assumes 
a particular import. Those scenes in which Stephen is 
confronted by the material reality of her female status, 
reflected not only in mirrors but in the faces of the 
people she meets, constitute a dramatic exposure of her 
given identification which constantly undermines her 
Although "queer" as a synonym for homosexual is more readily 
associated with the second half of the twentieth century, the 
unconscious irony of Stephen's use of the word may have been 
apparent to some of Hall's readers at the time of publication. The 
first recorded use of "queer" to mean homosexual, according to the 
OED, occurs in 1922 in a scientific study conducted by the U. S 
Department of Labor. However, Hugh Stevens cites an instance from 
1895 of "queer" used for "homosexual" (Henry James and Sexuality 
12). 
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conception of who she really is. 
Stephen experiences a great deal more self- 
confidence and self-ease once she can re-gender her 
clothing and appearance and the "hated soft dresses, and 
sashes, and ribbons" (16) of childhood can be discarded. 
There is a meticulous attention to every detail of the 
flannel suits and related accessories that she selects, 
and the quiet pride and pleasure that accompany this new 
sartorial image contrasts sharply with the anxiety and 
discomfort created by feminine clothing. Although the 
narrator acknowledges that clothes are "a form of self- 
expression" (71), the message of The Well seems to be 
that it is the prescribed relation between anatomy and 
clothing that ultimately determines destiny. For Stephen 
Gordon, unlike that other famous literary cross-dresser 
and gender transgressor of the period, Virginia Woolf's 
Orlando, costumes are not "selves" and the limitations 
of sex and gender cannot be transcended by simply 
adopting a different garment. Whilst cross-dressing 
brings some personal relief for Stephen, therefore, it 
is always only going to facilitate partial rather than 
complete self-expression. The clothes may change but 
Stephen's view of her body does not and when she is 
faced with the image of her naked form it remains, in 
her eyes, "a monstrous fetter imposed on her spirit" 
(187) and an object both to be despised and pitied. 
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In addition to the adoption of masculine clothing, 
Stephen uses exercise and weight-training to try to re- 
fashion her body. Such practices suggest parallels with 
present day experiences of transsexual men; Gayle 
Rubin's definition of transsexual subjects as 
"[i]ndividuals who have very powerful gender dysphoria, 
particularly those with strong drives to alter their 
bodies to conform to their preferred gender identities" 
(467) is particularly pertinent. The extent to which 
Stephen is able to change her gender is limited. She can 
fence and build her muscles using weights, she can cut 
off her hair and wear suits, but she will always be read 
as a woman who looks, dresses and behaves like a man. 
She will never be the man she thinks she is. 
For Stephen gendered embodiment is the key to 
affecting "realness" and hence legitimacy. Judith 
Butler, in Bodies That Matter, states that the 
"approximation of realness appears to be achieved" at 
the point when "the body performing and the ideal 
performed appear indistinguishable" (129). To achieve 
this symbiosis a performance must work; that is, it must 
not be read as artifice. Stephen does not consciously 
attempt to pass as a man. Her masculine appearance never 
conceals her female sex from others. The porter at the 
hotel in Cornwall where Stephen stays with her mother 
describes her as a "`queer-looking girl'" (159), and 
during a shopping trip to a jewellers in London Stephen 
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attracts the attention and mocking comments of passers- 
by: "People stared at the masculine-looking girl who 
seemed so intent upon feminine adornments. And someone, 
a man, laughed and nudged his companion: `Look at that! 
What is it? "" (164) . 
Other masculine female characters in the novel are 
described in similar terms. Of Wanda, whose difference 
is described as being as "pronounced" as Stephen's, the 
narrator observes: "She, poor soul, never knew how to 
dress for the best. If she dressed like a woman she 
looked like a man, if she dressed like a man she looked 
like a woman" (356). Part of the reason for the 
incongruities of Stephen's appearance must be 
sartorial: there are restrictions, perhaps self- 
imposed, to the extent of her cross-dressing; she can 
wear tailored suits and ties, but there does not seem 
to be an option for her to wear trousers. 8 Her 
appearance also suggests that Stephen's gendered 
incoherence, or her sense of it, has been translated to 
the surface of her body and any attempt to conceal that 
disparity or disguise it only compounds the effect. 
Stephen is unable to achieve "realness" in her 
terms: she is not male and therefore cannot be a man. 
This aspect of her narrative introduces a destabilising 
element, but it does not lead to the character's self- 
8 It seems that trousers were worn by some women during the 1920s. 
Kate Summerscale's biography of the "female invert" Joe Carstairs 
refers to "[a] few women" who wore "Oxford Bags, with billowing 
trouser-legs that removed any hint of the female form" (90). 
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empowerment. On the contrary, it is the underlying and 
inescapable source of her personal dissonance. The 
nature of Stephen's sense of bodily alienation can be 
examined further in terms of her relationships with 
other characters in the novel. 
Relative others 
The gendering of Stephen's relationships with the 
female and male characters of The Well is constructed 
as "masculine", but it is the sexual dynamics of those 
relationships that are the more usual focus of 
discussion. Taken in isolation, Stephen's relationships 
with Angela Crossby and Mary Llewellyn are the 
prototype for the classic butch/femme lesbian model, 
but the nature of these erotic liaisons needs to be 
considered more closely and in the context of Stephen's 
other relationships in the novel. 
Stephen's relationships with female characters 
fall into three categories. The first two categories 
involve those females who are traditional in their 
gender roles and their sexuality, or whose same-sex 
desire is constructed in sexological terms as being 
"learned" and therefore "temporary". The third category 
comprises other female inverts. 
The first group is one in which Stephen sees other 
women as objects of romantic love and desire with 
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herself as heroic protector. In this role Stephen is 
like the "Miss D. " of one of Havelock Ellis's case 
studies who imagines herself to be "always the prince 
or the pirate, rescuing beauty in distress, or killing 
the unworthy" (Sexual Inversion 239). This category 
includes Collins, the housemaid, who is the unwitting 
object of the young Stephen's affections and fantasies, 
and Stephen's mother, Lady Anna, who is seen always 
more as an object of desire and worship than as a 
maternal figure. Some critics have taken Stephen's 
desire for her mother as further evidence of the 
character's lesbianism. Charlotte Wolff asserts the 
view that "Emotional incest with the mother is indeed 
the very essence of lesbianism" (72). A similar 
sentiment is expressed by Newton who sees mother- 
daughter eroticism as a central component of lesbian 
orientation (290). Psychoanalysts such as Nancy 
Chodorow would disagree with this interpretation of the 
mother-daughter bond, seeing it as relating to the 
female child's gender identity, rather than her 
sexuality. In Freudian terms, Stephen would be regarded 
as occupying the position of the male child in the 
Oedipal triangle in her childhood identification with 
her father and desire for her mother. Even without this 
psychoanalytic frame, Stephen's position of alienation 
from the majority of the female characters in the 
novel, both "heterosexual" and "homosexual", can be 
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attributed more obviously to her gender identification 
than her sexual desire. 
It is interesting to consider how the female 
characters who are objects of desire for Stephen relate 
to her. What is the nature of Angela's and Mary's 
attraction to Stephen? Is it female-female or female- 
male desire, or is it something that cannot be 
meaningfully expressed by the employment of binary 
labels? Is it perhaps the ambiguity of Stephen's sexual 
and gendered identity itself that draws such women to 
her? In the absence of any narrative perspective for 
these characters it is difficult to reach a definite 
conclusion, but it is surely significant that Stephen's 
rivals for their affections are men (Roger Antrim and 
Martin Hallam), rather than women or even "mannish 
women". In the mother-daughter interaction the nature 
of the relationship is more clearly defined. Stephen's 
ambiguous gender, and particularly her physical 
resemblance to Sir Philip, are the cause of Lady Anna's 
antipathy towards Stephen. However, the extreme 
violence of this emotion-Lady Anna describes it to 
Stephen as "a kind of physical repulsion, a desire not 
to touch or to be touched by you" (203)-suggests that 
beneath its surface might lie other, forbidden 
feelings: an eroticism that would carry the double 
taboo of incest and same-sex desire. Lady Anna states 
that she finds her "repulsion" for her daughter 
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"unnatural"; she describes it as "a terrible thing for 
a mother to feel" (203). In the reading I am 
suggesting, it is erotic attraction masquerading as 
disgust that may be the more disturbingly "unnatural" 
instinct for this particular mother. 
The second category of females comprises those 
characters whose gender experiences are most intensely 
antithetical to Stephen's. The prime example is Violet 
Antrim, the enforced female companion of Stephen's 
childhood whose "feminine poses" (44) Stephen both 
despises and sees through. Another example is the young 
women whom Stephen meets socially, who irritate and 
embarrass her with their talk of menstruation and other 
such intimate female matters. Curiously, there is a 
point in the text where we are made aware of Stephen's 
desire to be like these girls. The secure `'feminine 
conclaves" which they seem to inhabit represent for 
Stephen a conspiracy which both repels and clearly, at 
times, attracts with equal force: "While despising 
these girls, she yet longed to be like them-yes, 
indeed, at such moments she longed to be like them" 
(74) . 
Once again there is a narrative finesse evident in 
the contradictory elements of this response. This is 
not to be taken as expressing any serious desire to be 
conventionally "feminine" but, as Jane Rule suggests, 
represents "moments of despair when she feels rejected 
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in the company of men" (58). It could also be read as 
the articulation of a more unspecific yearning for the 
gendered coherence that, to Stephen, those girls seem 
to represent and the sense of belonging that such 
unambiguous identities appear to bring. 
Stephen's relationships with the female characters 
discussed so far can never be conducted on equal terms. 
In both of the categories detailed above she occupies a 
position of otherness, because in this company she can 
neither identify as a woman, nor be accepted as a man. 
Before considering how Stephen's estranged 
position influences her relationships with other female 
inverts in the novel, it is interesting to examine her 
friendship with the character Martin Hallam. Probably 
Stephen's strongest identifications in the novel are 
formed with male figures: notably her father, Sir 
Philip, and Martin Hallam. In Gabriele Griffin's 
discussion of Hall's "lesbian" images, she describes 
how the lesbian is frequently constructed in fiction as 
having a heterosexual man as her other. In a footnote, 
she states that "[s]uch male others inhabit the pages 
of The Well" (182). For Griffin, these figures 
symbolise patriarchal power in their attempts to keep 
the lesbian's sexuality under control or put it in 
order. 
The most obvious male other to Stephen in The Well 
is Martin Hallam, the man with whom Stephen forms a 
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friendship, then rejects as a lover, and to whom 
finally she sacrifices her partner, Mary Llewellyn. If 
Stephen's relationship with Martin Hallam is read 
within the frame of anatomical sex and gender, rather 
than sexual desire, a far more complex picture emerges 
than that suggested by Griffin. When Stephen first 
meets Martin she identifies with him and perceives her 
relationship with him in male terms: "She said: `You're 
the only real friend I've ever had, except Father-our 
friendship's so wonderful, somehow-we're like brothers, 
we enjoy all the same sort of things "(94) . 
As the friendship progresses Martin becomes a 
mirror in which Stephen's gender difference is 
reflected back to her as she is forced to recognise the 
limits of that identification. The tension and 
incoherence that this revelation creates have a crisis 
point when Martin tries to sexualise their friendship. 
After the incident, Stephen attempts to rationalise her 
response: "What was she, what manner of curious 
creature, to have been so repelled by a lover like 
Martin? Yet she had been repelled, and even her pity 
for the man could not wipe out that stronger feeling. 
She had driven him away because something within her 
was intolerant of that new aspect of Martin" (98). 
The conventional reading of this scene would be 
that the "something within her" which could not 
tolerate the idea of Martin as a lover is her 
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attraction to women, her "lesbianism". Perhaps a more 
likely cause of Stephen's outraged response to Martin's 
sexual advances is her need to believe that she is no 
different to Martin. Catharine R. Stimpson's essay on 
the lesbian novel takes up the idea of Stephen's 
fraternal identification with Martin, made explicit in 
the phrase "we're like brothers" (94) and argues that, 
for Stephen, Martin's behaviour towards her constitutes 
"a form of homosexual incest" ("Zero Degree" 305). 
My own reading has some sympathies with Stimpson's 
analysis. When a sexual component is introduced to 
their relationship, Stephen's sense of her relationship 
with Martin as being that of two young men, not a young 
woman and man and, therefore, her sense of herself as 
in some way male is destroyed. In eroticising their 
relationship, Martin is not just redrawing its lines; 
he is explicitly signalling his perception of Stephen 
as a woman. Taking up Stimpson's point, in view of 
Stephen's perception of her relationship with Martin, 
the emotional violence of her response to his sexual 
interest might be compounded by her sense that certain 
sexed and familial boundaries have been transgressed. 
But I would argue that it is Martin's exposure or 
"outing" of Stephen's female identity that has the more 
personally devastating effect; it critically undermines 
any identification she has of herself as male and 
threatens to destroy everything that constitutes her 
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sense of who she is. Stephen's mental state at this 
point in the narrative is worth examining: 
Alone-it was terrible to feel so much alone-to 
feel oneself different from other people. At 
one time she had rather enjoyed this 
distinction-she had rather enjoyed dressing up 
as young Nelson. Yet had she enjoyed it? Or 
had it been done as some sort of inadequate 
protest? But if so against what had she been 
protesting when she strutted about the house, 
masquerading? In those days she had wanted to 
be a boy-had that been the meaning of the 
pitiful young Nelson? And what about now? She 
had wanted Martin to treat her as a man, had 
expected it of him. ... [ellipses in 
original] (99) 
In this passage, Stephen's estrangement is 
conceptualised in terms of being "different from other 
people", rather than being linked specifically to men 
or women. The choice of the word "people" here seems to 
evoke the sexological role of a "third" or 
"intermediate sex", according to which Stephen is 
neither fully man nor woman. This intersexual state is 
expressed at other points in the novel in phrases such 
as "no-man's land of sex" (77) and "midway between the 
sexes" (81). Also in the passage, the adult Stephen 
tries to reason out her childhood experiences and in 
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doing so diminishes their importance. When she had 
dressed up as Nelson, she had been "masquerading"; she 
had wanted to "be" a boy, but her efforts were 
"pitiful". What had seemed straightforward and 
axiomatic during childhood-if Stephen felt like a boy 
and dressed as a boy then she must be a boy: "'I must 
be a boy, 'cause I feel exactly like one, I feel like 
young Nelson in the picture upstairs'" (16)-is 
complicated and challenged by the adult mind. Then, as 
Stephen perceives it, she had wanted to be a boy and 
the dressing-up was part of that wish-fulfilment. Now 
she identifies as a man and not only wants but also 
expects to be treated as such: "She had wanted Martin 
to treat her as a man, had expected it of him" (99) (my 
emphasis). This understanding of the particular degree 
of Stephen's identification is essential when examining 
her relationship with my final category of female 
characters: the female inverts who Stephen meets in 
Paris. 
The Well does not confine itself to the 
sexological model of the "mannish congenital invert" 
and the "pseudo-homosexual feminine" object choice; 
like the case studies themselves it represents multiple 
models of "female inversion". In the Paris community 
Stephen finds a subculture peopled with genetically 
female characters who are performing non-traditional 
roles. 
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There are two contrasting settings in which we 
find the "inverts" gathered. There are the "salons" 
held by the pioneering Valerie Seymour to which the 
intellectual and artistic elite would flock; and the 
ghettoised subculture of the bars and nightclubs. 
Stephen does not feel comfortable in either setting and 
never actively seeks friends for herself from this 
community. It is only on Jonathan Brockett's advice 
that she encourages and supports the friendships that 
Mary Llewellyn makes. For herself, Stephen experiences 
a mistrust of Valerie Seymour and an aversion to what 
she sees as the ugliness and sordidness of the bars and 
clubs. She hopes for a day when "happier folk" will 
accept her relationship with Mary, but "in her fear of 
isolation for Mary" (360) she turns to other inverts as 
the only reliable source of company available. 
One of the characters Stephen mixes with most 
regularly, despite her initial misgivings, is Valerie 
Seymour. Although Valerie, based on the salon hostess 
and writer Natalie Barney, adopts a traditional female 
identity she is not to be confused with the 
conventionally "feminine" Angela Crossby, or even Mary 
Llewellyn. Unlike these characters, with their 
"temporary" brand of homosexuality, Valerie Seymour is 
constructed as a confident, well-balanced, sexual being 
whose same-sex desire is a preference rather than a 
congenital or pathological condition. Valerie does not 
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fit the more popular notions of inversion: she is 
neither the "mannish" female invert nor the "pseudo- 
homosexual" object of desire. She is a character who 
intriguingly eludes definition or categorisation. 
"Great men had loved her", Stephen is told by Jonathan 
Brockett, "but Valerie was not attracted to men" (245). 
She is not beautiful and yet she has a "quiet and 
unconscious grace" (246) and an abiding impulse towards 
beauty. When Stephen first meets Valerie she is 
"dressed all in white and a large white fox skin was 
clasped round her slender and shapely shoulders" (246), 
but here dress is no clue to sexual identity. 
Valerie Seymour's lovers are similarly atypical: 
the enigmatic Hortense, Comtesse de Kerguelen, "a very 
great lady, of a calm and rather old-fashioned beauty" 
(354), who left her husband, family and home because 
her love for Valerie was "[g]reater than all these most 
vital things" (355); and Jeanne Maurel, an equally 
striking woman, but in terms of image quite different 
to the Comtesse: "An elegant person wearing pearls 
around her throat above a low cut white satin 
waistcoat. She was faultlessly tailed and faultlessly 
barbered; her dark, severe Eton crop fitted neatly" 
(387) . 
Valerie's relationship with Stephen is also hard 
to define. Valerie is not an object of desire for 
Stephen, although her sexual attraction towards Stephen 
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is made clear. When Stephen asks Valerie to pretend 
that they are lovers, as part of her plan to force Mary 
to leave her for Martin, the response is typically 
candid: "If you want to pretend that you're my lover, 
well, my dear, to be quite frank, I wish it were true-I 
feel certain you'd make a most charming lover" (443). 
But Stephen's objects of desire and choice of lovers 
are always portrayed as heterosexual women and her 
friendship with Valerie develops despite the 
character's same-sex relationships, not because of 
them. 
Stephen also meets other masculine women in Paris. 
Dickie West, the American aviator, "lived her life much 
as a man would have lived it" (387) and yet the way 
that she experiences her gendered embodiment is neither 
tragic nor morbid. By way of explanation the narrator 
informs us that Dickie "belonged to the younger, and 
therefore more reckless, more aggressive and self- 
assured generation" (387). The choice of name here 
would seem to have more than a passing significance, 
both in its rather crude sexual connotation (Dickie) 
and its geographical reference (West). A generation 
which in modern terms would be deemed "out and proud", 
Dickie and her type seem to the narrator to be saying: 
"`We are as we are; what about it? We don't care a 
damn, in fact we're delighted!, " (387). 
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The difference between Stephen's experience and 
Dickie's might be understood as being generational. It 
would be easy to go along with the narrative 
explanation that depicts Stephen and those like her as 
a pre-war generation of oppressed and despairing 
inverts, whilst affording Dickie and her peers a post- 
war confidence and optimism which refuses to be 
silenced. Another interpretation might focus on the 
degrees of difference between the characters. Dickie 
might be seen as an alternative model of female 
masculinity in which the decision to appropriate 
masculine signs has a different source and therefore a 
different expression. In the absence of any internal 
perspective for the character, however, it is unclear 
whether her masculinity is more obviously an aspect of 
her erotic identity or her gendered one. 
The question of where characters such as Valerie 
Seymour and Dickie West fit into the novel's 
representation of inverts is significant. Valerie 
Seymour is not a "true invert" according to sexological 
definition (neither, strictly speaking is Dickie), and 
yet she is depicted as a leading figure within the 
community of inverts. As stated earlier, Hall must have 
known from her own experience that for every woman like 
Stephen there was a woman like Valerie. If Hall studied 
the sexological case studies with enough care, she 
would have also been aware that the overtly "mannish" 
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woman was a relatively rare phenomenon within the range 
of types of female congenital inverts. This begs the 
question why Hall chose to make Stephen, rather than, 
say, Valerie Seymour or Dickie West, the protagonist of 
her novel. 
By presenting us with characters like Valerie and, 
to a lesser degree, Dickie, Hall provides an insight 
into the range and diversity of women whose primary 
sexual attraction is towards other women. She also 
demonstrates that for Stephen it is neither her 
sexuality nor her appropriation of "masculine" signs 
which set her apart from other female characters, 
although both of these factors contribute to Stephen's 
sense of isolation. It is her inability to identify as 
a woman or with women, which goes beyond her sexual 
relationships, coupled with a need for a coherent 
gendered identity that cannot be adequately fulfilled 
by cross-dressing, which give Stephen her tragic 
singularity. 
There are other female-bodied masculine characters 
in The Well who appear to share something of Stephen's 
singular experience in that they clearly perceive that 
difference, as Stephen does, as something tragic and 
morbid. The characters who most closely match this 
model of inversion are Wanda, the Polish painter, 
tortured by twin demons: her Catholicism and the 
alcohol which serves to obliterate the "unnatural" 
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lusts forbidden by the teaching of that church; and the 
lugubrious, splenetic Jamie who, forced into a life of 
poverty and ill-health in the Parisian suburbs by the 
intolerance of her own community in Scotland, has 
become "a trifle unhinged because of the music that 
besieged her soul and fought for expression through her 
stiff and scholarly compositions" (354). 
Whilst Wanda and Jamie are only minor characters, 
the unreservedly abject complexion of their portraits 
allows for interesting comparisons with Stephen Gordon. 
Their presence in the novel also demands that 
differences be recognised within the community, rather 
than erased under the categories of "invert" or 
"lesbian". Together these three characters can be seen 
to constitute the origins of a consciousness which does 
not sit comfortably within the larger community of 
inverts. 
One of the most interesting points of comparison 
is that all three characters experience exile at a 
physical level, having to leave homelands which in 
different ways have failed them but which never cease 
to call them back. Wanda's account of her life in the 
little Polish town speaks of the "persecution and 
strife" which "ravaged her most unhappy country" (379). 
Yet her wistful nostalgia for the home which outlawed 
her-Wanda's brothers, who "were men of stone and of 
iron" (379) seem to Stephen to be the source of the 
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unexplained enforced departure-is anthropomorphised in 
her description of the incessantly chiming bells: "the 
Mass bells beginning at early dawn, the Angelus bells, 
the Vesper bells-always calling, calling, calling, they 
were, said Wanda" (378-79). Jamie's bouts of deep 
depression are the result of the combining emotions of 
hatred for "the beautiful city of her exile" and an 
overwhelming longing for "the dour little Highland 
village" with its dullness and respectability and sense 
of security, all of which are qualities which create a 
kind of double bind for the character. On the one hand, 
they insist on a certain way of living which Jamie 
values and aspires to; at the same time, they exclude 
potentially destabilising elements such as Jamie. 
Stephen, too, is never able completely to detach 
herself from the lure of her home; she is haunted by 
its absence and just as the bells of Wanda's home town 
call to her and Jamie pines for the dull respectability 
of her Highland village, Morton is never far from 
Stephen's thoughts. 
Morton has been interpreted as Edenic with 
Stephen's expulsion as punishment for the "sin" of 
"homosexuality". 9 This analogy applies equally to 
Wanda's and Jamie's experiences. Each of these 
characters have been adjudged to have transgressed 
9 See Jean Radford's "An Inverted Romance: The Well of Loneliness 
and Sexual Ideology", and Catharine R. Stimpson's "Zero Degree 
Deviancy: The Lesbian Novel in English". 
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"natural" laws and as a consequence they have been cast 
in the role of outlaw; each has necessarily felt 
compelled to forfeit her "rightful" place in their 
homeland rather than continue to live in its hostile 
environment. The adult Stephen not only forfeits her 
right to remain at Morton but eventually decides to 
leave England itself. Yet the homeland continues to 
evoke feelings of nostalgia and loss for Stephen. This 
enforced exile can be used to demonstrate how Stephen's 
ambivalence towards her home mirrors a similar reaction 
to her sexed body. 
Foreign parts 
If we accept that Morton represents the conventionally 
masculine values of tradition and class, values that are 
personified in its owner and steward, Sir Philip Gordon, 
and revered by Stephen, her banishment from the estate 
can be read against conventional interpretations. Her 
strong sense of belonging can be seen to align with and 
at some foundational level contribute to her 
construction of herself as male. These sensations-the 
sense of belonging and the sense of being male-are both 
challenged as Stephen grows up and is confronted with 
the fact that the official classification and popular 
perception of her sexed body will not allow her to 
continue to behave as if she were a man. The increasing 
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strain which Stephen experiences culminates dramatically 
in her exile from Morton, an exile that has come about 
because, as this reading of the novel would suggest, 
Stephen cannot become the woman that her body and, 
therefore, society, demands she should be. It takes the 
threat of scandal, Stephen's relationship with an older 
married woman, Angela Crossby, to bring matters to a 
crisis point, but Stephen's position at Morton and 
within the community has already become that of an 
outcast. This illegitimate status owes as much to her 
gendered embodiment as to her sexuality. 
When Stephen is forced to leave Morton by her 
mother's ultimatum, "one of us must go" (205), and her 
own desire to do "the manly thing", it marks her 
severance from a home which had, at least temporarily, 
offered her a sense of gendered as well as familial 
belonging. Stephen grieves for the loss of Morton and 
her nostalgic and patriotic allegiance to the home and 
country of her birth is reflected in the impassioned 
statement: "There's no country for me away from Morton" 
(248). Her loss is also experienced at an aesthetic 
level. She craves for "the curving hills, for the long 
green hedges and pastures of Morton" (401), but this 
obvious display of nostalgia can contain an additional 
meaning. It can be read as a craving for a period in 
Stephen's life when there was less demand for gendered 
intelligibility, and a desire to recapture those rare 
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moments when it was possible for Stephen, in her own 
words, to be "happy just being myself" (37). Always 
underlying Stephen's wistfulness is a realisation that 
the haven which Morton seemed to offer Stephen in 
childhood, the feeling that she had an authentic place 
there in its masculine domain was an illusion or, at 
least, a passing phase and Stephen can never be "at 
home" at Morton again. These conflicting emotions seem 
to find expression in the description of Morton as "so 
quietly perfect a thing, yet the thing of all others 
that she must fly from, that she must forget" (235). 
Geographical exile can be seen to be linked to the 
metaphysical exile which Stephen experiences. 
Gabriele Griffin presents expatriation as a trope 
for the lesbian protagonist's "alienated condition" 
(11). Stephen's alien state, however, can be traced to a 
double difference. At a literal level, it is both her 
choice of sexual partner and her expression of gender 
which set her apart and force her to leave Morton. 
Symbolically, I would suggest, it is her dissociation 
from the sex and gender of her own body, rather than her 
sexual desires, which her enforced departure represents. 
In Prosser's essay on Leslie Feinberg's Stone Butch 
Blues, the transsexual woman or man is imaginatively 
conceived as a displaced person searching for a home. 
Hence, the transsexual narrative becomes a quest for 
what Prosser calls "gendered becoming" ("No Place Like 
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Home" 490), with the period of transition being seen as 
a "means to an end" rather than "an end in itself". In 
the course of this extremely difficult journey the 
transsexual person must, according to Prosser, occupy 
"uninhabitable space", during which gender must be 
"redone, that is, done up differently" (488). 
Judith Halberstam challenges the adoption of 
colonial metaphors and rhetoric in narrative and 
critical representations of transsexual subjectivity. 
In particular she questions the usefulness and ethics 
of what she views as a largely uncritical application 
of metaphors of travel and border crossings. "In 
Chicano/a studies and postcolonial studies in 
particular", Halberstam observes, "the politics of 
migration have been fiercely debated, and what has 
emerged is a careful refusal of the dialectic of home 
and border" (170). The potential dangers of borrowing 
from "contradictory and competing" (165) histories and 
narratives in the way Halberstam suggests are clear, 
but it is also surely an inevitable and, to some 
extent, necessary feature of evolving cultural 
identities to make such appropriations. 
There is a very real sense in which Stephen is not 
"at home" but is instead caught in a period of 
transition, an "uninhabitable space" from which, in her 
case, there is not even an option of escape. This 
position of dislocation is conceptualised in The Well as 
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a "no-man's land of sex" (77), and the distress that 
Stephen experiences as her public world widens stems not 
from her sexuality, but from her inability to identify 
as a woman or be a man. 
Another contemporary transgender narrative which 
can be usefully introduced to my discussion at this 
point is Rose Tremain's novel Sacred Country, first 
published in 1992. The parallels between Hall's and 
Tremain's protagonists-the inverted Stephen Gordon and 
the transsexual Mary/Martin Ward-and the 
representations of their experiences are striking. 
Tremain had read Hall's novel and had intended to 
return to it during her research period for Sacred 
Country; she subsequently decided that it was no longer 
relevant to her own project and focused her research 
primarily on written and oral transgender narratives. " 
Nevertheless, the plot line of Mary/Martin Ward's life 
has remarkable affinities with that of Stephen Gordon. 
It is perhaps purely coincidental, or inadvertently 
referential, that the respective objects of Stephen's 
adult sexual desire and gender identification, Mary 
Llewellyn and Martin Hallam, have been resurrected in 
the given and chosen names of Tremain's transsexual 
character. The interpretive potential of this allusion, 
whether intentional or not, is irresistible. In terms 
of The well's overt narrative, it evokes the 
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heterosexual union of Mary and Martin with which the 
novel ends and which appears to brand same-sex love as 
inferior and doomed. At a symbolic level, it brings 
together the rival components of Stephen's identity-her 
attraction to women and her male identification-and 
gives it a name: transsexuality. 
The narrative trajectories of Stephen Gordon's and 
Mary/Martin Ward's lives have certain shared features 
and both characters display similar identifications and 
desires. Throughout Mary's childhood and young adult 
life, as far as she is concerned, she is a boy. She is 
not confused by her girl's body: she knows that it is 
the wrong one for her boy's identity. The strength of 
this conviction is reflected in her belief that as she 
grows her body will transform itself into that of a 
man's: "She imagined that, as she grew, her man's skin 
was hardening on her" (95). When this metamorphosis 
does not take place and she develops a woman's anatomy, 
she at first tries to conceal this outward indicator of 
sex and then begins a process of bodily transformation, 
initially through binding her breasts and adopting male 
clothing and ultimately through male hormones and a 
mastectomy. 
Mary's discomfort with her gender role as a child 
is vividly portrayed in the imagery of a smocked dress 
lo I am grateful to Rose Tremain for her written response to my 
questions about Sacred Country. 
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which she is made to wear to the village fete. It is 
significant that Mary's mother has stitched the 
smocking by hand herself: in both The Well and Sacred 
Country mothers are represented as guardians of a 
strict gender division and a particular kind of 
feminine role. " The heat of the day and the smocking on 
the dress irritate Mary's skin causing her to scratch 
at it angrily. The "little circles of blood" which 
appear among the "silky stitches" (9) of the dress seem 
to anticipate the arrival of puberty and the onset of 
menstruation. The grotesque tableau it presents gives 
this reminder of Mary's biological sex a slightly 
sinister feel and the whole scene a feeling of 
burlesque. 
For the adult Mary, male clothing is encoded with 
a masculine virility which almost seems to transfer 
itself to the character: the "hard feel of the denim in 
her crutch was potent" (178). However, whilst the male 
clothing she now wears feels "right" it does not, in 
itself, solve the conflict Mary experiences between her 
inner and outer identity and actually serves to 
intensify her sense of incongruity. When Mary leaves 
home after a particularly brutal scene with her father 
she imagines the life ahead of her: "If you are Martin 
11 The role of the fathers in the novels 
narrative distinction; Sonny Ward, like 
first-born child to be a boy. In marked 
narrative, however, Sonny is depicted a! 
father who actively, and at times quite 
Mary's male identification. 
provides an interesting 
Sir Philip, wills his 
contrast to Stephen's 
3a brutal and ignorant 
violently, suppresses 
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Ward and you have white breasts, you pack your life up 
in cardboard and carry it away, always away, always on 
and never knowing where" (118). In this extract, Mary's 
"white breasts" are seen to represent the reason why 
Martin Ward can achieve no sense of a fixed, stable 
identity. This reference to the female anatomy, and 
particularly the emphasis on its whiteness, is 
reminiscent of Stephen's response to her own white, 
female body which must accompany her through life like 
a "monstrous fetter imposed on her spirits" (187). When 
viewed alongside their female anatomies it becomes 
clear to Stephen and Mary that clothing can only allow 
them to masquerade as men; they cannot be male. Far 
from allowing a freedom to travel between genders, in 
these narratives cross-dressing only makes the boundary 
more rigid and leaves both characters in limbo. 
Another area for comparison is the representation 
of Mary's sexual desire as heterosexual: "she could 
only love women who loved men" (225). Mary's 
identification with the heterosexual male role can be 
seen to evolve during her adolescence when she meets 
and falls in love with Lindsey, a girl at her school. 
When Lindsey describes to Mary the things that her 
boyfriend does to her, Mary uses this to feed 
masturbatory fantasies about Lindsey in which her own 
body becomes the feminised object of her essentially 
male heterosexual gaze: 
138 
I laid her underneath me. My breasts became 
hers. I closed my eyes. She begged me to go 
deeper into her, to hurt her. She said: 
"Destroy me, Martin. " And when I was finished, 
she was bruised, she was crying. I licked her 
tears. I whispered to the wet pillow: 
"Lindsey, it's your own fault. " (150) 
In this fantasy, which in its mawkishness even has a 
stylistic resemblance to The Well, Mary is punishing 
Lindsey for loving Ranulf Morrit, but more 
significantly she is punishing her own female body 
which is seen as the physical barrier between herself 
and a male heterosexual relationship with girls like 
Lindsey. She wants to usurp Ranulf Morrit's position in 
Lindsey's life-"Mary thought one day I will be like 
Ranulf Morrit. I will care for her" (96)-but her female 
body, like Stephen's, is a constant reminder of the 
impossibility of fulfilling that role. In the passage 
quoted above, the destructive and desiring drives to 
which Mary's body is subjected can be compared to 
Stephen's ambivalent response to a body that has become 
an object of hatred and pity. 
As we follow the stages of Mary's physical 
transition into Martin, we are shown that even with the 
aid of hormones and surgery her sense of personal 
antipathy can never be completely overcome. There can 
be no satisfying union between her experience of 
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herself as male and her transformed body, and a 
melancholic sense of loss attends the various stages of 
that process. As it is depicted, the invention of 
Martin can never be completed. At the end of the novel, 
living a new life as a man in the United States, Martin 
recognises that this process has no end and chooses to 
curtail it. He rejects phalloplasty, the creation of a 
penis out of his own flesh, resigning himself to the 
fact that his gender identity as Martin is already as 
complete as he can hope for: "I am him and he is me and 
that's all" (353). In making this decision, Martin 
recognises that he will always occupy an in-between 
state as far as society's definitions of sex and gender 
are concerned, regardless of surgical intervention. 
To a degree Tremain's decision to leave Martin's 
transformation incomplete challenges the biological 
determinism which dictates that you must have a penis 
to be a man. It is a male psychiatrist, Dr Sterns, who 
links Martin's sense of being a "real" man to the need 
to have a penis. Martin has no desire for further 
surgery and no need of a penis, and his story ends on a 
note of self-acceptance. Conversely, Stephen's story 
ends with the character wracked by the burden of being 
the spokesperson for the legion of inverts who seek 
society's acceptance. Nevertheless, in their distinct 
ways, both novels question the sex and gender rules 
which force people like Stephen and Martin into the 
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cultural margins. In depicting Martin's transition as 
an incomplete project, Tremain demonstrates that there 
are alternatives to the limited gender options 
prescribed by culture and society, but they are located 
in an intermediate territory: a "country in between, a 
country that no one sees" (148). This spatial metaphor 
provides a particularly resonant point of comparison 
between Tremain's Sacred Country and Hall's The well 
and returns my discussion to the shaping of Stephen 
Gordon's narrative. 
The Well is not a "transsexual" novel anymore than 
it is a "lesbian" novel in any modern sense of these 
terms, but certain features of that narrative can be 
understood in terms of the tropes of transgender 
narratives that Prosser's critical text and Tremain's 
novel identify. There is a feeling throughout The well 
that Stephen is trying to "re-do" her gender, but it 
also clear that this is a transformation that will 
always remain unfinished. This is certainly not the 
playful, seamless, optional gender fluidity enjoyed by 
Woolf's Orlando, and Stephen can never truly be the 
"perfect gentleman" which, it is her strong conviction, 
she was born to become. 
In the final section of this chapter the gap 
between Stephen's identification as male and her gender 
performance is examined for its potentially queer 
effects. 
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Queer states 
Attempts to read the transgender aspects of Stephen 
Gordon's character in a queer context are initially 
constrained by the realist narrative and melancholic 
tone of the novel. The shaping of Stephen's narrative 
is constructed as a meandering but linear narrative 
quest for gendered belonging. The representation of 
that search may be transgressive, but it is 
characterised by feelings of shame, confusion and 
bereavement. It is questionable whether an experience 
of gender transgression that carries with it such a 
profound element of suffering can be discussed 
meaningfully in terms of the playful rhetoric of 
Butler's theory of gender performativity. The 
construction of Stephen's masculine gender during her 
childhood might be understood as the repeated 
simulation of the signs and behaviours of the male role 
models who inform and guide her early development: her 
father; the young Nelson; and old Williams, the groom. 
On the other hand, this account of the text fails to 
address what it is in Stephen that motivates such 
identifications and imitations. 
It also unclear whether the dissonant effects of 
Stephen's masculinity serve to denaturalise gender or 
simply reinstate gender's "natural" status. In Bodies 
That Matter, in response to critics who challenge the 
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terms of her earlier representation of drag, Butler 
cautions against assuming that the denaturalisation of 
gender will in itself be subversive, arguing that it 
can be "the very vehicle for a reconsolidation of 
hegemonic norms" (125). Significantly for my 
discussion, in the chapter "Gender is Burning: 
Questions of Appropriation and Subversion", Butler uses 
a preoperative transsexual woman to illustrate her 
point. Venus Xtravanganza, one of the main subjects of 
Paris is Burning (1991), Jennie Livingston's 
documentary film of Harlem drag balls, is described by 
Butler as a "Latina/preoperative transsexual, cross- 
dresser, prostitute, and member of the `House of 
Xtravanganzal" (125). In the passage below, Butler's 
comments about this literal transsexual subject 
contrast markedly with her reading of the playful 
transgendered figure in Gender Trouble. In that earlier 
work the drag queen's figurative approach to gender has 
subversive potential; in Bodies That Matter, Venus's 
actualisation of gender-her desire to be a "whole 
woman"-is deemed to be almost certainly reinscriptive. 
Butler observes: 
when Venus speaks her desire to become a whole 
woman, to find a man and have a house in the 
suburbs with a washing machine, we may well 
question whether the denaturalisation of 
gender and sexuality that she performs, and 
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performs well, culminates in a reworking of 
the normative framework of heterosexuality. 
The painfulness of her death at the end of the 
film suggests as well that there are cruel and 
fatal social constraints on denaturalisation. 
As much as she crosses gender, sexuality, and 
race performatively, the hegemony that 
reinscribes the privileges of normative 
femininity and whiteness wields the final 
power to renaturalize Venus's body and cross 
out that prior crossing, an erasure that is 
her death. (133) 
The second half of this passage deals with the subject 
of Venus's death during the making of the film. Earlier 
in the chapter, Butler expresses the view that Venus 
was murdered by an unsuspecting "client" who had 
discovered her male genitals. On this basis, Butler 
attributes the cause of her death to "homophobic 
violence" (130). In using the term "homophobic", Butler 
is probably accurately describing what motivated the 
fatal attack in view of a public perception that 
continues to conflate and confuse transsexual and 
homosexual identities; if Venus's self-identification 
as a transsexual is to be upheld, however, this crime 
might be classed more accurately as transphobic. 
For Butler, it is because of the contradiction 
between Venus's passing female identity and her pre- 
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surgical body that she is both a threat to the dominant 
order and its certain victim. Butler links the cause of 
Venus's death-her "remaining organs"-to the 
subversiveness of her phantasmatic identification which 
"cannot be translated into the symbolic" (131). At the 
same time, Butler argues that it is Venus's 
transgressive potential which leads to her death: "This 
is a killing that is performed by a symbolic that would 
eradicate those phenomena that require an opening up of 
the possibilities for the resignification of sex" 
(131). Butler's construction of Venus's gender and race 
performance as "denaturalising" on the basis of her 
violent death is clearly contentious. Prosser, in his 
critique of Butler's reading of Venus, observes: 
Even in her death, because of her transsexual 
incoherence between penis and passing-as-a- 
woman, Venus holds out for Butler the promise 
of queer subversion, precisely as her 
transsexual trajectory is incomplete. In her 
desire to complete this trajectory (to acquire 
a vagina), however, Venus would cancel out 
this potential and succumb to the embrace of 
hegemonic naturalisation. (Second Skins 49) 
The "literalising/deliteralising" binary which 
structures Butler's discussion of Venus is one of 
Prosser's main concerns about queer theory's 
appropriation of transgender. In this 
instance, 
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Butler's recuperation of Venus into a queer frame is 
challenged by Prosser on the grounds of its ambivalent 
reading of the "literal ambivalence of Venus's 
transsexual body" (49) at the time of her death: 
That Butler figures Venus as subversive for 
the same reason that Butler claims she is 
killed, and considers indicative of hegemonic 
constraint the desires that, if realized 
might have kept Venus at least from this 
instance of violence, is not only strikingly 
ironic, it verges on critical perversity. 
Butler's essay locates transgressive value in 
that which makes the subject's real life most 
unsafe. (49) 
Prosser's comments present Butler's reading of Venus as 
ironic and critically perverse because in its queer 
abstractions it disregards the painful, literal 
embodiment of being "differently sexed" (55). In 
conclusion, Prosser finds that Livingston's film and 
Butler's theory obscure "the intractable materiality of 
that body in its present state and its peculiar sex" 
(55). Although Butler's reading of Venus Xtravaganza 
shows that it is possible to locate this transsexual 
subject in a queer frame, then, Prosser's critique of 
that reading would suggest that such an approach is 
neither appropriate nor desirable as it questions the 
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resignifying potential of gender performances, rather 
than addressing lived, embodied narratives. 
Much of my discussion of Stephen Gordon has 
focused on the material aspects of Hall's 
representation of her gendered embodiment. Aspects of 
that representation, however, can be usefully examined 
from a queer perspective that has informed the 
emergence of transgender in cultural and political 
terms. Although the "debt" to queer theory and in 
particular Judith Butler's writing is generally 
acknowledged by transgender theorists, some of those 
theorists are now keen to sever that alliance. 
Prosser's distinction between queer and transgender 
approaches to differently sexed or gendered subjects 
aims to demonstrate a rationale for that break. He 
states that whilst queer theory sees this difference as 
"positive and empowering", transgender theory views it 
as "a source of acute discomfort, most obviously 
experienced as shame" (492). 12 The polarity that 
Prosser's definition seeks to establish is troubling in 
that it appears to redefine transgender according to a 
highly prescribed criteria. The experience that Prosser 
associates with this term is certainly one that is a 
common feature of some transgender narratives, 
particularly those of subjects identifying as 
12 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has written on the subject of shame 
in 
relation to queer theory in an article, co-written with 
Adam 
Frank, "Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins". 
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transsexual. But in terms of those narratives, there is 
surely more overlap between queer and transgender 
theorisations of sexed and gendered difference than is 
allowed for by Prosser's decisive statement. 
Readers of The Well will be conscious of the 
feelings of "acute discomfort" and "shame" which 
characterise Stephen Gordon's narrative. But it is also 
possible to interpret the character's cross-gender 
desires in terms similar to those applied to Venus's 
transsexual desires. Stephen's interests in "being a 
man" are presented as being non-negotiable: Stephen 
wants to become a "whole man" with all the 
conventional, domestic trappings that such an 
unequivocally sexed and gendered identity would bring. 
In respect of those desires, Stephen is not actively 
seeking to challenge the dominant norms and her 
behaviour could indeed be seen to be reinstating them. 
In the painful details of Stephen's life, as opposed to 
Venus's death, the "cruel", although in this instance 
not fatal, "social constraints of denaturalization" can 
be witnessed. Finally, the hegemony that "reinscribes 
the privileges" of normative "masculinity" constantly 
undermines Stephen's "crossing". Neither Venus nor 
Stephen choose to remain in between sexes: 
circumstances, which could not be more different, 
dictate that common experience. Nevertheless, the 
necessarily limited "realness" of Stephen's cross- 
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gender identification results in an incoherent 
relationship between her body and gender which has 
queer effects as well as literal consequences. 
It is unclear whether Hall is consciously 
subverting the theories and case studies on which she 
so heavily draws for her characterisation of Stephen 
and the other inverted characters of her novel, but it 
is possible to read Stephen Gordon's "masculinity" as 
both literalising and deliteralising. The novel's 
central characterisation produces certain tensions. On 
the one hand it appears to represent a gender meaning 
derived from and dependent upon a hegemonic, 
heterosexist culture; on the other hand, its 
recontextualisation of that performed gender creates 
discordant narrative and linguistic effects. One of the 
key elements of that disjunction is Stephen's name. 
By giving her protagonist a male name, Hall is 
making public what is a common practice among some of 
the masculine women she knew. Hall herself is known as 
John; her friend Toupie Lowther is addressed by Hall 
and Una Troubridge as "Brother"; and the English 
artist, Gluck, adopts the name Peter. 13 In Hall's novel, 
the fact that the choice of a male name for a female 
character takes place within a heterosexual matrix 
seems significant. From Hall's conservative, 
13 Other examples include: Mary Allen, a policewoman, who took the 
name Robert; and the writers Christabel Marshall, who adopted 
her 
baptismal name Christopher St. John, and Naomi Jacob who was 
called Micky (Hallett 52-3). 
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masculinist view, it may appear to give an authority 
and legitimacy to that nomenclature that is lacking 
from her and her friends' pseudonymous practices. At a 
narrative level, there is no suggestion of the 
motivating force behind the naming of Stephen being 
anything other than bitter disappointment in her female 
sex and a stubborn refusal fully to accept the 
situation: "He [Sir Philip] insisted on calling the 
infant Stephen, nay more, he would have it baptized by 
that name. `We've called her Stephen so long, ' he told 
Anna, `that I really can't see why we shouldn't go on'" 
(9). Whether we are supposed to read this as social 
determinism or prophetic insight, it creates one of the- 
most destabilising effects of the novel. 
Sir Philip's act of bestowing a male name on his 
daughter demonstrates an absolute paternal authority, 
whilst at the same time undermining the "natural" laws 
of the dominant order from which such authority 
derives. Culturally, a male-named, masculine-gendered 
but female-bodied character confuses the fixed 
relationship between naturalised sex and gender roles 
through its ambiguous mix of cultural markers. As 
discussed earlier, that disturbance is repeatedly shown 
in a recognition of Stephen's incongruous appearance 
both by herself and other characters; the rhetorical 
question she addresses to her mirrored image: "'Am I 
queer looking or not?, " (70) acquires an additional 
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resonance here. The character's personal incongruity is 
also jarringly reproduced in the language of Stephen's 
narrative where a masculine proper noun opposes a 
feminine pronoun. The dissonant relationship between 
the sexed and gendered elements of Stephen's identity- 
her female anatomy and male identification, her 
assigned feminine gender and performed masculine one- 
reveals both "the distinctness of those aspects of 
gendered experience which are falsely naturalized as a 
unity" (Butler, Gender Trouble 137) and the cultural 
power of the notion of ideal, unified subjects. In this 
light, the conflict between Stephen Gordon's cross- 
gender desire and her cross-gender performance can be 
seen to have both subversive and reinscriptive effects. 
Hall's creation of Stephen Gordon is often 
condemned for what is seen as its uncritical 
appropriation of a figure which is itself modelled on 
stereotypical views of sex and gender roles. A careful 
reading of some of the case studies of female inverts 
and Hall's representation of inversion has revealed 
diverse and subtle differences operating within and 
between these texts. By focusing on Stephen's masculine 
identification and reading it for its literal 
significance, as well as its denaturalising potential, 
a new meaning to the historical and literary 
complexities that surround the character's identity has 
been offered. It is true that Stephen wants the 
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advantage and protection, both for herself and her 
sexual partner, that being a man would ensure, but it 
goes further than that. Stephen is not simply the "New 
Woman" who wants to have the same privileges and 
liberties as a man. She is not the lesbian who wants to 
make that sexuality visible. Stephen seeks a gendered 
coherence and this can only be achieved, it would seem, 
if her conception of her "true" gender can be embodied. 
My location of Stephen's singular masculinity in a 
queer context identified some contradictory effects, as 
well as highlighting a certain ambivalence in the 
relationship between queer and transgender theories. In 
the next chapter, similar tensions emerge as a major 
theme of visual representations of transgender 
masculinities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Peter (A Young English Girl): 
Visualising transgender masculinities 
Peter was shingled, dark, handsome, dressed 
like a boy, and looked like a boy, and yet I 
was assured that Peter was "jeune fille 
anglaise. " 
-report of a private view of Romaine Brooks's 
work at the Alpine Club Gallery, London, in 
The Daily Graphic dated 3 June 1925.1 
Presenting his subjects as looking "just like 
men" ... [Loren] Cameron sustains the value 
of gender realness. 
-Jay Prosser, Second Skins: The Body 
Narratives of Transsexuality (230) 
"To be myself ... I need the illumination of 
other people's eyes, and therefore cannot be 
entirely sure what is my self. " 
-Bernard from Virginia Woolf's The Waves (78) 
1 This report can be found in the National Collection of Fine Arts 
research material on Romaine Brooks (1874-1969) at the Smithsonian 
Institution in Washington DC. 
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During 1992-1993 an exhibition entitled "Visualising 
Masculinities" was held at the Tate Gallery in London. 
The declared aim of the exhibition was to examine "the 
display and meanings of the male body in art since the 
mid-nineteenth century". In doing this, the brochure 
informs us, it "recognises the important role that 
visual culture has played in circulating, often in a 
celebratory way, images of male power and the norms of 
manliness". One of the assumptions upon which the 
exhibition had been based was the view that masculinity 
"is a historical construct changing from period to 
period, and as a category is neither `natural' nor 
culturally innocent". 2 
This chapter focuses on two artists who from their 
opposite ends of the twentieth century have produced 
portraits that visualise and celebrate their subject's 
own particular styles of masculinity. The works of both 
artists recycle "images of male power" and could be 
said to reinstate "the norms of manliness". They also 
demonstrate that "masculinity" as a category is neither 
fixed nor natural. And yet Romaine Brooks's portraits 
of cross-dressed females (1920-1924) and Loren 
Cameron's photographic studies of transsexual men 
(1993-1998) would severely test the boundaries of an 
exhibition of this kind because they do not display 
2 These extracts are taken from a passage from the exhibition 
brochure "Visualising Masculinities" quoted in Joseph Kestner's 
Masculinities in Victorian Painting (1). 
154 
"the male body" which, unlike masculinity, continues to 
be viewed as a stable and constant referent. Although 
the masculinity being "visualised" in the Tate 
exhibition has seemingly unlimited possibilities, there 
would almost certainly have been an underlying, tacit 
agreement that the biological origin of the masculine 
subjects should be male. Such fixed interpretations 
reflect an approach to identity that is 
institutionalised. In Female Masculinity Judith 
Halberstam challenges academic discussions of 
masculinity which continue to display "absolutely no 
interest in masculinity without men" (13). This chapter 
explores ways in which Brooks's and Cameron's portraits 
might be said to challenge the continuing association 
of masculinity with biologically male subjects. It also 
considers the extent to which either artist's work 
unsettles the cultural construct of "man" which informs 
and sustains that relationship. 
In this context, the potentially dissident visual 
effects of Brooks's and Cameron's portraits are 
apparent. The juxtaposition of a masculinity that 
appears "real" with a body that is not biologically 
male might disturb dominant views that uphold a 
relationship between a gender that is constructed and a 
sexed body that is natural. Moreover, the forms of 
identification and desire provoked and solicited by 
these images may also have a disruptive impact on 
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viewers. On the other hand, such familiar images of 
masculinity may serve simply to recall and reinforce 
hegemonic norms, rather than revise or transgress them. 
The visual impact and cultural significance of these 
portraits depends upon the existence of certain 
tensions between the gendered pose, the sexed subject, 
and notions of "real" gender. 
A close analysis of Brooks's and Cameron's works 
will reveal a number of ways in which such tensions are 
produced and highlight areas for comparison between 
these two very different artists. My discussion of the 
gendered effects of the portraits will primarily focus 
on three aspects of their composition. These are: the 
reworking of traditional genres and poses, the 
employment of visual dissonances, and the organisation 
of space and gaze. 
Collectively, these portraits appear to represent 
visually what Chris Straayer, in Deviant Eyes, Deviant 
Bodies: Sexual Re-orientations in Film and Video, calls 
"a postmodern collapse of male-female and body-costume" 
in which "transsexualism" can be seen as "a kind of 
transvestism" (283-4). This shift of emphasis from the 
sartorial to the somatic in images of transgender 
masculinities from either end of the twentieth century 
is surely not incidental. 3 A consideration of the 
3 My use of the term "transgender masculinities" in this context 
aims to reflect the visual and cultural affiliations of the female 
masculinities of Brooks's portraits and the transsexual 
masculinities of Cameron's which this chapter proposes. 
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relationship between the different media employed by 
Brooks and Cameron and the different subjects 
represented makes evident the important role played by 
developing technologies, both artistic and scientific, 
in the visualisation of transgender identities. It also 
suggests the significant contributions that both 
artists have made to the emergence of that process of 
visualisation. 
In the sections that follow, the individual and 
combined effects of Brooks's and Cameron's portraits 
will be examined. First, each artist will be set in her 
or his historical and cultural context. 
Artistic profiles 
In the 1920s an American-born artist called Romaine 
Brooks produced a series of portraits of cross-dressed 
women. Renata Borgatti au Piano (c. 1920), Self- 
Portrait (1923), Peter (A Young English Girl) (1923-4), 
Una, Lady Troubridge (1924), and Elisabeth de Gramont, 
Duchesse de Clermont-Tonnerre (c. 1924) all feature 
biological females in recognisably male poses and 
costumes with the favoured self-representation being 
that of the fin-de-siecle figure of the decadent dandy. 
The "androgyne" had become an increasingly popular 
subject for unconventional artists and writers during 
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the second half of the nineteenth century. Emmanuel 
Cooper's study The Sexual Perspective: Homosexuality 
and Art in the Last 100 Years in the West describes how 
artists belonging to the Aesthetic Movement at the end 
of the nineteenth century took their inspiration from 
the androgynous visionary figures of works by 
Renaissance artists such as Leonardo Da Vinci (8). In 
"The Androgyne In Nineteenth-Century Art and 
Literature", Bram Dijkstra presents this renewed 
interest in the ideal of the androgyne as "the central 
symbol of revolt" in an ideologically motivated 
artistic movement against the dominant values of 
bourgeois society (73). Other critics have interpreted 
the androgyne's presence in late-nineteenth-century art 
as expressing "a fear of women that was part of 
nineteenth-century culture" (Kestner, "Edward Burne- 
Jones" 117), and constituting a repressed misogyny in 
its representation of the female as a castrated and 
castrating figure (Benstock, Women 303). 
As Cooper points out, some of the subjects of 
Romaine Brooks's early portraits evince the androgynous 
qualities favoured by the Aesthetic Movement (90). 
Female nudes with boyish figures are the central focus 
of scenes inspired by myth and heavy with symbolism 
in 
works such as The Masked Archer (1910-11) and The 
Crossing (Le Trajet) (c. 1911). Androgyny was also a 
theme Brooks returned to in her semi-abstract drawings 
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produced during the 1930s, but her portraits of cross- 
dressed females are markedly different to the epicene 
figures of these other works. 
Brooks was not the only artist to represent the 
cross-dressed female in this form during the modernist 
period. The English artist Gluck's work on this theme 
is comparable to that of Brooks both in its use of a 
realist portrait style and its dramatic quality. 
Gluck's Self-Portrait with Cigarette (1925) and the 
unfinished portrait, Mrs Romaine Brooks (1926), of 
which only a photograph now exists, provide valuable 
contemporary counter-views to Brooks's Self-Portrait 
and her portrait of Gluck in Peter. 
In addition to painted representations of cross- 
dressed females from this period, there are many 
photographic studies including a number of quite 
stunning portraits of Brooks, Gluck and Radclyffe 
Hall. 5 These visual texts are central to a wider survey 
of female cross-dressing in that they document what 
Laura Doan calls "the wide spectrum of female 
masculinities in the 1920s" (697). Doan's essay 
"Passing Fashions: Reading Female Masculinities in the 
1920s" emphasises the multiplicity of spectatorial 
4 Gluck's choice of a six foot canvas for a reciprocal portrait of 
Brooks sparked a conflict between the two artists which resulted 
in the work being abandoned before completion. Subsequently, Gluck 
recycled the canvas. For a more detailed account of this 
incident 
see Diana Souhami's Gluck: Her Biography (63). 
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effects that women's adoption of "boyish or mannish 
garb" would have produced at the time, and cautions 
against (mis)readings informed by current cultural 
assumptions (665). Doan concludes: "Without a nuanced 
and historically detailed reading ... we are in 
danger of collapsing into narrow and limited categories 
(cross-dressing) and labels (mannish lesbian) a rich 
terrain of sartorial and sexual possibilities" (697). 
While recognising the importance of that diversity 
and the need for historical and cultural specificity, 
this chapter adopts a quite different focus and aim. 
Doan's essay provides a historical survey of "female 
masculinities". It resists singular readings of this 
"fashion" and stands as an implicit rebuke to those 
critics and activists who would appropriate these women 
as part of any one sexual or gender identity's history. 
In this chapter, it is partly that relationship between 
visual culture, processes of identification and the 
construction of visible identities which underpins and 
inspires a discussion of particular images of cross- 
dressed females from the 1920s. 
In this respect, Brooks's portraits offer some of 
the most compelling source material from the era. 
Despite a period of unfashionability in the post-war 
years it is these images that have endured. Following a 
5 Examples can be seen in Meryle Secrest's biography of Brooks, 
Between Me and Life, Diana Souhami's Gluck, and Terry Castle's 
Noel Coward and Radclyffe Hall: Kindred Spirits. 
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retrospective exhibition in America in 1971 Brooks's 
life and works have been the subject of biographical 
and critical scrutiny. In terms of her artistic status, 
since being rediscovered in 1971 her place in the 
history of American art has been secured. 
Significantly, Self-Portrait is one of two of her works 
currently on permanent display at The National Museum 
of American Art in Washington DC. The other portraits 
discussed in this chapter, with the exception of 
Elisabeth de Gramont, are either held in storage at the 
museum or hang in its administrative offices. 6 The 
artist's unpublished memoirs, No Pleasant Memories, are 
lodged in the National Collection of Research Materials 
on Brooks in the Smithsonian Institution's Archives of 
American Art, together with photographs of the artist 
and reviews of her work and exhibitions. 
The combined impact of the style and content of 
Brooks's work is as striking today as newspaper reports 
and journal articles would suggest it was when it first 
appeared. A photograph of Brooks from the period 
(c. 1925), cross-dressed and posing outside an art- 
gallery, bears the caption: "Romaine Brooks whose 
remarkably forceful paintings aroused much favorable 
comment at her recent exposition in the Charpentier 
Gallery". In an article from the February 1926 edition 
6 Elisabeth de Gramont is held in France at the Musee d'Art 
Moderne de la Ville de Paris. 
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of International Studio, John Usher refers to "a 
masculine vitality that propels from the canvases of 
this painter" (46). Most accounts of her portraits 
mention the distinctiveness of her style, and a review 
in the Sunday Observer, dated 7 June 1925, remarks on 
the pronounced effects of the "almost complete 
elimination of definite colour" from her work. ' 
Such contemporary appraisals of her artistic 
importance go some way to challenge more recent 
critical devaluations of her work. Brooks's use of a 
traditional realist form to represent subjects whose 
masculinity does not have a biological origin has led 
to the labelling of her work as "derivative" and her 
subjects as "castrated" and "self-mutilating". Bridget 
Elliott and Jo-Ann Wallace in Women Artists and 
Writers: Modernist (Im)positionings explore the reasons 
for this negative appraisal of Brooks's work. In a 
discussion which focuses on constructions of the 
modernist avant-garde and the originality it so highly 
esteems as masculine, Elliott and Wallace conclude: "In 
avant-garde terms her portraits represent mere copies 
of subjects who are themselves `copies' of a 
heterosexual `original' or `natural"" (36). A reading 
of Brooks's portraits which counters this view will be 
one of the outcomes of this chapter. 
The photograph, article and review are part of the Research 
Materials on Brooks at the Smithsonian Institution's Archives of 
American Art. 
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Viewed together, the portraits create an 
impression of being proud and powerful statements of 
how each subject chooses to be seen. The reality behind 
the images may, in some instances, be rather more 
equivocal. Meryle Secrest's biography of Brooks reports 
that although Una Troubridge expressed approval of her 
portrait to the artist, with friends she questioned the 
verisimilitude of the likeness (291). Diana Souhami 
describes Gluck's feelings of antipathy towards 
Brooks's work and life-style: "She thought Romaine's 
work technically and psychologically inferior to her 
own and scorned the `lesbian haute-monde' as she called 
Romaine's social circle" (63). Nevertheless, these 
"offstage" disputes do not detract from the overall 
dramatic impact of the portraits, or the suggestion of 
energy and conscious self-fashioning which 
characterises the subjects of the works. 
Individually, there is a diversity of "look" in 
the portraits which frustrates attempts to read them as 
a coherent body of work. Although the portraits are 
linked thematically and temporally, they are not a 
collection in the way that Loren Cameron's photographic 
studies of transsexual men are. In my discussion of the 
subjects of Brooks's portraits the adjective "cross- 
dressed" has been applied in favour of the term "cross- 
dresser" to avoid the imposition of specific sexual or 
gender categories. As suggested by Doan in the comments 
163 
quoted earlier, the reasons for the adoption of male 
attire during this period are varied, and attempts to 
apply singular identities are therefore hazardous and 
unwise. Furthermore, for the purposes of this chapter 
the actual intent of the subject is of secondary 
importance to the effect that is produced in each of 
the portraits. 
In this respect, there are clear and important 
differences between the portraits; in particular, the 
"realness" of the masculine gender portrayed varies 
according to the subject. This is an important 
distinction which critical studies of Brooks's work 
tend to overlook. In Una (Figure 1), for example, the 
ambiguous relationship between the subject's gender and 
sexed body has a particular quality which sets it apart 
from the other portraits being discussed. Here, the 
conjunction between the classic signs of the 
aristocratic dandy and highly visible feminine cultural 
markers produces an extraordinary effect. The presence 
of the monocle and the tailed coat in combination with 
earrings, lipstick, and bobbed hair, a feminine 
domestic pose (with pet dogs in an interior setting), 
and an unequivocal portrait title can produce a 
playful, even ironic, relationship between the subject 
and the male clothes and accessories she adopts. 
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Figure 1 Romaine Brooks, Una, Lady Trowbridge (1924) 
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By exhibiting the most extreme visual characteristics 
of the dandy the figure takes on a burlesque quality. 
Benstock expresses disquiet about the "dandy's 
burlesque of the female" (Women 180), but here that 
gender travesty appears to have become the subject of 
further transgressive revision. There is something 
about the conflicting messages of the image which gives 
it a double drag quality, as if the "original" subject 
of the masquerade were male and what we see is a man 
impersonating a woman cross-dressed as a man. 
Marjorie Garber's discussion of the portrait in 
Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiet 
argues that the masculine signs which Una Troubridge 
adopts are "the most recognizable and readable signs of 
the lesbian culture of Paris" (152). As Doan suggests, 
this unproblematised conflation of certain cultural 
signs and lesbianism may foreclose "interpretive 
possibilities" through its inflexible association of 
"accessory and identity" (679). 
Other more sinister implications have been 
construed from critical studies of this portrait. Una's 
rather fierce look, accentuated by the monocle 
enlarging her right eye and her imperiously arched 
eyebrows, has been interpreted by Benstock as 
indicative of the divided and tortured psyche of the 
female cross-dresser (Women 304-305). Benstock's 
reading of Brooks's portraits of cross-dressed women as 
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being all part of "Romaine's dark vision" (304) is 
informed by a pre-conceived view that cross-dressing is 
the female invert's expression of self-hatred. Susan 
Gubar, whom Benstock cites, expresses similar views. In 
her essay, "Blessings in Disguise: Cross-dressing and 
Re-Dressing for Female Modernists", Gubar's discussion 
of the paintings of Brooks and Frida Kahlo draws a 
parallel between each artist's representations of 
female figures in male costumes: 
In their different ways, both reveal how-as an 
erotic strategy-cross-dressing can free the 
woman from being a sex object for men, even as 
it expresses the mutilation inextricably 
related to inversion when it is experienced as 
perversion. For these two artists, the cross- 
dresser is ... a self-divided, 
brooding 
Byronic figure who dominates the center of 
their canvases, hinting at power diminished or 
fallen. (486) 
Gubar is referring specifically to Brooks's and Kahlo's 
self-portraits here, but these comments are extended 
inferentially to the rest of Brooks's portraits of 
cross-dressed females including Una. Gubar describes 
the "power" and "ambiguous sexuality" which 
characterise these paintings, and observes that "even 
the most powerful of these figures look lonely" (489). 
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Brooks's sense of estrangement is alluded to in 
her private memoirs, No Pleasant Memories, where she 
writes of a "determination to remain outside the circle 
of convention" and calls herself "one of `Les Lapides'" 
(145). Yet her increasingly public displays of 
transvestism might be seen more as a harmonisation of 
the dissonant elements of her identity, than as an 
expression of some personal disunity. With regards to 
the portrait of Una the subject certainly looks severe, 
but might this not be read as an aristocratic 
haughtiness that would not attract the same kind of 
attention if she were dressed conventionally (or if a 
male subject had adopted the same demeanour)? Why 
should it be an expression of psychological angst? 
Readings which construct Brooks's portraits as 
reflecting the "soul" of the subjects through their 
"amazon bodies" (Benstock, Women 304) fail to 
distinguish adequately between the artist's life and 
her work. Furthermore, they seem to be inspired by an 
oversimplified belief that cross-dressing purely reacts 
to the heterosexual norm "by aping its forms" 
(Benstock, Women 307). Such readings also overlook the 
marked differences between the visual effects of a 
painting such as Una, where the gender transgression is 
parodically figured, and those of Self-Portrait (Figure 
2), and Peter (Figure 3), where the ambiguities are 
more subtly expressed. 
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Figure 2 Romaine Brooks, Self-Portrait (1923) 
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Figure 3 Romaine Brooks, Peter (A Young English Girl) 
(1923-4) 
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Figure 4 Romaine Brooks, Renatta Borgatti au Piano 
(c. 1920) 
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The female dandy, like her male counterpart, is 
not a monolithic image and Brooks's portraits reflect 
that historical and sartorial diversity. In the process 
of wearing an image that has been variously reworked 
since its emergence in the eighteenth century, Brooks's 
subjects give that image a new slant; or, more 
precisely, a new range of slants. In each portrait we 
see a different version of the dandy. It is only by 
viewing the original works together that the variety of 
these self-representations and their differing effects 
can be fully appreciated. As already stated, the 
overdetermined glamour of the dandy in Una evinces a 
certain self-parodying incongruity in its deliberate 
mixing of signs. In Brooks's Self-Portrait the 
confidence and ease of the full-face pose and the 
penetrating gaze give the figure a sexy, decadent air. 
Peter has a quite different feel to it. This version of 
the dandy is reminiscent of the earlier, more sober 
figure epitomised by Beau Brummel at the end of the 
eighteenth century. Portraits of dandies from this 
period demonstrate the often funereal style of costume 
that was favoured by these men. 8 In keeping with this 
earlier fashion Gluck cuts a stylish but rather austere 
and remote figure. She is facing away from the 
8 Elizabeth Wilson, in her essay "Deviant Dress", explains how the 
early dandies introduced a style of dress for men that intensified 
masculinity leading, at the time, to the association of manliness 
with sober attire (69). The more flamboyant, so-called decadent 
dandy emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. 
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spectator apparently ignoring her or his gaze. There is 
a strong sense of the subject's desire to be taken 
seriously in her male pose. There is also something 
deeply attractive about the quiet intensity of this 
youthful, masculine figure. 
The dandy of Peter underplays the theatricality 
which the dandy of Self-Portrait embraces and which Una 
positively flaunts. All three portraits, despite these 
apparent differences in register, suggest an affinity 
between their subjects which is ostensibly to do with 
the class and gender suggested by the sartorial codes 
they exhibit, but also derives from a feeling of self- 
containment and composure which emanates from each 
figure. It is a quality present in Renata Borgatti au 
Piano (Figure 4) and Elisabeth de Gramont. In both 
portraits the subjects are models of self-possession. 
Renata presents a figure dressed in a black cloak and 
white shirt, short dark hair swept away from the face, 
eyes closed in concentration or possibly quiet rapture, 
apparently in enthralled communion with the piano which 
occupies almost half of the framed space. The portrait 
of Elisabeth de Gramont foregrounds a poised and 
commanding figure sporting a short, foppish 
hair-style, 
brown top-coat and elaborate white neckcloth. Although 
the subject's body faces the spectator, 
the angle of 
the head and direction of the eyes towards a point 
outside the boundaries of the painting once 
more 
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suggest an unawareness or deliberate evasion of that 
controlling gaze. The backdrop, in typically 
understated fashion, depicts a house of classical but 
fading elegance. The resulting ensemble is imbued with 
masculine authority. Consequently, although all the 
portraits feature cross-dressed females, each subject's 
interpretation of dandyist style produces a distinctive 
masculine "look" and the degree of authenticity 
achieved varies according to its dissonant elements. It 
is in respect of this sense of the subject's agency in 
combination with her cross-gendered image that these 
paintings can be identified as quite remarkable 
representations of masculine self-fashioning. 
Loren Cameron, like Brooks, is an American-born 
artist. In the course of the 1990s he too has produced 
a set of portraits which are quite stunning in their 
visualisation of unconventional masculinities. 
Cameron's photographic studies of himself and other 
transsexual men, collected together in Body Alchemy: 
Transsexual Portraits (1996), are described by Diane 
Middlebrook as "[a]n irreplaceably valued documentation 
of a cultural moment". 9 The cultural climate in which 
these portraits have emerged, with its developing 
technologies in the fields of art and science, is 
significant. Susan Sontag's On Photography describes 
the translation of experience into images which the 
9 This comment is quoted on the back cover of Body Alchemy. 
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"industrialization of camera technology" has enabled as 
the democratisation of "all experiences" (7). 
Developments in medical technology have allowed 
transsexual subjects to translate a particular 
experience-an experience of gender that conflicts with 
their bodies-into an image. That these personal images 
should then be made public or, to use Sontag's term, 
democratised through the process of photography gives 
Cameron's work a particular rationale. 
Cameron's portraits have appeared at a point where 
visual images of androgynous-looking women and men 
abound. From a position of marginality and, according 
to some readings, revolutionary symbolism in the works 
of a small group of late-nineteenth-century artists, 
the androgyne "look" has become a pervasive, 
domesticated presence in mainstream culture. 10 To be 
truly androgynous is to display masculine and feminine 
qualities in equal measure and thus evade or defy any 
one fixed gender definition. By contrast, transsexual 
subjects more usually attain to one gender or the 
other. 
The unequivocal masculinity of many of the 
subjects of Cameron's work seemingly resurrects the 
gender binary that recent fashions would affect to 
blur. For Cameron, that is its point: he wants to 
uphold the rights of transsexual men to have an 
10 See Marjorie Garber's Vested Interests. 
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unambiguous gender identity. " Viewed in this context, 
his work invites the same types of negative comments as 
Brooks's portraits have provoked. Judged alongside 
other contemporary artist-photographers working in 
similar areas it is easy to lose sight of the profound 
impact of Cameron's contribution. Certainly his work 
does not have the immediate gender queerness of Del 
LaGrace's work; nor does it elicit the same kind of 
viewer responses. LaGrace's photographs have always 
been controversial; designed to break taboos, excite 
and shock. Jacqui Gabb's essay "Marginal Differences? 
An analysis of the imag(in)ed bodies of Del LaGrace" 
calls LaGrace "one of the `kings' of queer" (298). From 
the dildo-wearing female models of the collection Love 
Bites (1990) to a more recent project "Trans-genital 
Landscapes", described in an exhibition catalogue as 
"oversize studies of genital mutations, including the 
photographers [sic] own", LaGrace's images continually 
aim to challenge normative gender identities and sexual 
practices . 
12 Cameron's work as a transsexual artist- 
photographer (an adjective he hopes to shed in the 
future), rather than a queer one, has its own less 
11 I met Loren Cameron in October 1998 to discuss his role as a 
photographer and his work in general. 
12 Love Bites was produced when LaGrace was identifying as a 
lesbian and working under the name Della Grace. Currently, his 
full name is Del LaGrace Volcano. The exhibition Witness: Works of 
Trans-representation was mounted at various venues in Hoxton 
Square, London to coincide with the 2nd International Transgender 
Film and Video Festival held on 24-27 September 1998. 
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immediately evident transgressive effects. It also 
constructs a distinct visual space for his subjects. 
Other photographers have carved out similar areas. Nan 
Goldin's collection The Other Side (1991) pays personal 
homage to the "gender euphoria" of the transvestite and 
transsexual women who are her friends and openly 
acknowledged objects of desire; Mariette Pathy Allen's 
"Photographs from a Movement" presents a visual archive 
of the work of United States based activists 
Transsexual Menace, recording key moments in its 
history from the years 1995-96; and Cathy Opie's 
representations of alternative masculinities include 
portraits of transsexual men. 13 Whilst recognising the 
value of other photographers working in this field and 
accepting areas of overlap, the specific nature of 
Cameron's relationship to his subjects, and especially 
to himself as subject, give his contribution an 
artistic and cultural distinction. As a transsexual man 
photographing transsexual men what Cameron is doing is, 
in his own words, "the first of its kind". More 
personally, the nature of many of the portraits 
included in Body Alchemy make a public performance or 
narrative of his own and other transsexual men's gender 
transitions. 
13 "Photographs from a Movement" is included in Read My Lips by 
Riki Anne Wilchins; examples of Opie's work are discussed in 
Halberstam's Female Masculinity. 
177 
Cameron's black and white portraits are primarily 
concerned with showing his subjects as people and, as 
such, the narratives that are presented are personal 
rather than political ones. In discussing his work, 
Cameron explains that his photographs are not about 
constructing masculinity but are a visual means of 
making transsexual men's experiences of "who they are" 
visible and therefore "real". In this respect, the 
images disclose and celebrate the masculinity of their 
subjects, but also give the subjective "truths" of 
those identifications a material "reality". A new 
project, shot in colour, presents nude portraits of 
transsexual men and women with their partners. This 
combination of a conventional pose-the double 
portraiture of the standard heterosexual couple-and an 
unorthodox subject 
Sis typical of the productive and 
distinctive way Cameron reworks "authentic" stock 
images. One of the effects of this technique may be to 
question naturalising concepts of masculinity and 
heterosexuality. Although the portraits appear to 
sustain binary categories, they also foreground erotic 
relationships between conventionally and 
unconventionally sexed and gendered subjects in ways 
which can trouble those dominant norms. 
There is something of this in Romaine Brooks's 
work too. Brooks's portraits, like Cameron's, employ 
traditional genres and poses. The particular manner in 
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which "borrowed" images are reworked by Brooks can be 
seen to resist those critics who would label both the 
style and cross-dressed subjects of her portraits as 
"second hand". In less overt but similarly challenging 
ways to Cameron's work, Una, Self-Portrait, and Peter 
question original/copy models of identity. These 
portraits obscure gaps between the biological sex of 
the subject and their gendered pose; expose 
inconsistencies between that pose and the "reality" of 
the masculine aesthetic adopted; and, inferentially, 
question the stability and authenticity of masculinity 
itself . 
The following sections, in which these effects are 
examined in detail, centre on the co-existence of a 
number of seemingly contradictory or conflicting 
positions which Brooks's and Cameron's portraits make 
visible. These include: a visual construction of the 
subject's gender which presents it as "authentic" and 
yet "different"; the presence of "phallic" or 
androgynous symbols and the absence, real or implied, 
of the penis; and the adoption of looks and poses which 
both recall and refute normative views of "manliness". 
Siting difference (s) 
The use of visual dissonances to register difference is 
an important aspect of the dislocating experience that 
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a first encounter with Brooks's portraits of cross- 
dressed females produces. Viewing Romaine Brooks's 
Self-Portrait for the first time is a strangely 
arresting moment. The handsome aristocratic figure that 
dominates the canvas captivates and unsettles. There is 
a pleasing depth and sensuality to the predominately 
monochromatic composition. The rich, textured blackness 
of the subject's hat, hair and jacket, offset by the 
brilliance of the white winged collar and shirt front 
give the figure an air of elegance and decadent 
glamour. A vaguely defined background comprising sky, 
water, hills and featureless buildings, depicted in 
various shades of grey, enhances the air of mystery and 
romance that emanates from the darkly brooding image. 
The greenish tinge to the skin colour gives the face a 
slightly ghostly pallor suggestive of effeteness and 
physical frailty; the chin and neck have a more robust 
appearance. A classic, formal pose is struck; one arm 
held closely to the side with a thumb hooked inside the 
dress jacket. In spite of the low brim of the top hat, 
the eyes are clearly seen as the spectator's gaze is 
boldly returned. There is a defiant, even arrogant 
bearing in both the look and the pose; a refusal to be 
objectified or rendered passive. But the firmly set 
lips are just a touch too pink, and there is something 
about the stray tendrils of hair that softly curl 
around the face that invite the discerning spectator to 
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look more closely at the "male" subject of this 
portrait. The self-referentiality of the portrait's 
unequivocal title might resolve any questions 
concerning the "actual" identity of the figure, yet the 
disrupting elements in the composition itself are 
minimised as Brooks resists the female identity which 
spectators might seek to impose on the figure 
portrayed. 
Elliott and Wallace draw parallels between this 
sense of dislocation and the jarring note created in 
The Well of Loneliness by Hall's use of a female 
pronoun in relation to the protagonist Stephen Gordon. 
The masculine proper noun, Elliott and Wallace explain, 
disrupts the female pronoun (49). This is specifically 
compared to Brooks's choice of title, Peter, for her 
portrait of the English artist Gluck. The portrait's 
title, we are told, "directs the viewer to look again 
and to look differently" (49). 
There is something linguistically playful and 
provocative about the title for Gluck's portrait which 
sets it apart from Brooks's other paintings on this 
theme. In semantic terms, the title is an anomaly that 
encapsulates the paradoxical nature of the image it 
represents; a paradox which only becomes fully evident 
once it is known. The tension between the subject's 
sexed body and gendered pose which the portrait only 
hints at is forcefully presented in the juxtaposition 
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of the masculine image of the portrait and the gender 
ambiguous name-Peter-and specific female role of its 
title. 14 The latter seems to have little to do with the 
figure we see before us, for the impression created by 
Gluck's portrait is anything but that evoked by the 
designation "a young English girl" with its promise of 
feminine propriety. Indeed, the painting confronts the 
spectator with the youthful masculinity of its subject 
in what might seem to be an uncompromising manner. The 
black coat, white shirt and black tie, the short 
cropped hair and strong but sensitive profile, the 
stiff impassivity of the pose, all seem to denote a 
faithful and unembellished representation of a young 
man of a certain class and temperament. Any hint of 
effeminacy in the image is unlikely to be attributed to 
the "true" source of the subject's "difference" and it 
is the portrait's title which must register the gap 
between the masculine pose and the female sex of the 
subject. This has a certain rationale for it is 
language that will continue to construct the subject of 
the portrait as a woman even though she looks like a 
man; visually, we see Gluck as the man she and Brooks 
presumably want us to see. Consequently, although 
14 Gluck had rejected her birth name, Hannah Gluckstein, as part of 
her masculine self-fashioning. By 1918, when 
Gluck was twenty- 
three, she was calling herself Peter. 
She was also given the names 
Tim and Timothy Alf by one of 
her lovers, Nesta Obermer (Souhami, 
Gluck 1,35). 
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Brooks's painting of Gluck obscures the sitter's given 
identity, the portrait's title exposes it with 
seemingly self-conscious irony. In ways similar to some 
of the transsexual autobiographies discussed in the 
next chapter this choice of title troubles conventions. 
A Girl's Journey to Manhood, the subtitle of Raymond 
Thompson's co-written autobiography, makes explicit the 
paradoxical and yet "real" (because lived) experience 
of his identification as a man. The title Peter (A 
Young English Girl) becomes an important key to reading 
the complexities of the subject's identity and an 
integral part of the portrait's effect. Although the 
painted image of Gluck foregrounds the subject's 
sameness to some men, the title reveals what the visual 
text chooses not to foreground: the subject's 
difference, in biological and cultural terms, from all 
men. 
An important aspect of the impact of all of the 
portraits being discussed is the sartorial style upon 
which they draw. The adoption of the costume and pose 
of the male dandy in itself registers the subject's 
difference. By choosing to assume a masculine aesthetic 
originating in the late-eighteenth century and more 
contemporaneously associated with male 
homosexuals such 
as Oscar Wilde, the women exhibit 
the cultural markers 
of an already recycled figure and 
identify themselves 
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with "a marginal, deviant, and illegal sexuality" 
(Elliott and Wallace 51). There is a degree of irony 
and sound reasoning in this appropriation since the 
women concerned are themselves very often exhibiting 
sexual desires and practices which, whilst they were 
not illegal, were being categorised by sexologists of 
the time as "marginal" and "deviant". If the cross- 
dressed images are viewed purely in the context of the 
development of a visible lesbian identity, then, as 
Elliott and Wallace argue: "Part of that process 
included culturally imag(in)ing themselves from a 
perspective that embodied their differences in a form 
that could be socially recognised" (52). The flamboyant 
persona of the dandy was certainly one that was easily 
identified. 
There is another construction of the dandy which 
allows us to look beyond the figure's erotic 
signification and towards his or her function as a 
symbol of reinvention. In Gender on the Divide: The 
Dandy in Modernist Literature, Jessica Feldman presents 
the dandy as a "figure who practices and even 
impersonates, the fascinating acts of self-creation and 
presentation" (3). Feldman argues that the dandy's 
self-conscious costume and poses, together with his 
enthusiasm for presentation and performance, make him 
an especially instructive symbol for the 
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constructedness of gender identity. Indeed, this dandy 
declares "I am what I choose to appear to be" (13). 
The primacy of a self-affirmation of identity over 
any other identity that might be attributed or imposed 
will be illustrated in my discussion of Woolf's Orlando 
and transsexual life-narratives in Chapter 3. It would 
seem to have equal, if not greater, currency in visual 
texts. This interpretation of the dandy gives a new 
meaning to Brooks's work, particularly Self-Portrait 
and Peter. In both paintings the subjects can be seen 
to have assumed not only the dandy's sartorial style 
but also his self-conscious construction and 
presentation of gender. More problematically from a 
feminist perspective, they might additionally be seen 
to have embraced the dandy's uncritical stance towards 
the social conventions the dandy feigns to ignore and 
yet intrinsically depends upon. Rhonda K. Garelick's 
Rising Star: Dandyism, Gender, and Performance in the 
Fin de Siecle identifies a weakness in Feldman's 
reading of dandyism as a force for change. In an 
endnote, Garelick argues: 
While dandyism certainly questions gender 
role, this would not be sufficient to move it 
beyond patriarchy, whose essentially class- 
based system dandyism did little to question 
The dandy was never politically 
subversive, nor was he a feminist. (209) 
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Critical perceptions of the failure of Brooks and other 
cross-dressing females of the period to challenge 
either the class structure or women's oppression are 
clearly reinforced by their sartorial associations with 
the dandy. Although this is an important issue, the 
political implications of the cross-dressed female's 
recourse to male authority is not a central concern of 
this chapter. Nevertheless, as will become apparent, a 
reading of the shifting but contingent relationship 
between the dandy that inspired the subjects of 
Brooks's portraits, the dandy that is portrayed, and 
male authority will reveal a greater potential for 
disruption than is immediately evident. 
There are a number of interesting comparisons to 
be made between Brooks's images of the dandy and 
Cameron's adoption of the look and poses of the 
bodybuilder in the triptych of black and white self- 
portraits, "God's Will", shot in 1995. Although both 
figures have misogynist associations, in terms of class 
and aesthetics they would seem to be the antithesis of 
each other. The dandy's upper-class effeteness and the 
bodybuilder's working-class machismo seemingly position 
these figures at opposite ends of a continuum of male 
masculinity. In Judith Halberstam's critique of male 
masculinity she identifies the 
"stereotypical 
constructions" which label particular 
classed or raced 
bodies as either insufficiently or excessively 
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masculine; in either instance this is seen as a process 
that reinforces the alignment between masculinity and 
middle-class white maleness (2). Although Brooks's 
nineteenth-century dandy and Cameron's twentieth- 
century bodybuilder express distinct versions of white 
masculinity, applying Halberstam's terms of lack and 
excess distances both figures from the white male 
middle-class body of dominant concepts of masculinity. 
The culturally enforced marginalisation of the dandy 
and the bodybuilder might suggest a shared potential to 
reflect critically upon that construction of gender 
normativity. 
Beyond that, certain factors upon which the 
bodybuilder's display of masculinity relies parallel 
elements of the dandy's presentation. There is a 
theatricality about both figures: an emphasis on show 
and surface, and a certain "drag" quality to that 
performance. The bodybuilder like the dandy can be seen 
as what Feldman describes as "nothing but the sum total 
of powerful, premeditated, costumed poses" (12). For 
the bodybuilder it is the sculpted body, rather than 
stylish attire, which clothes those poses and the 
muscles themselves that become a form of costume. 
15 
Marcia Ian's essay "How Do You Wear Your Body: 
Bodybuilding and the Sublimity of Drag" interprets the 
is The idea of muscles as costume is not a new one. 
See Chris 
Holmlund's "Masculinity as Multiple Masquerade: The `Mature' 
Stallone and the Stallone Clone", and Laurie 
Schulze's discussion 
of female bodybuilding, "On the Muscle". 
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act of bodybuilding as "the desire to abolish any 
separation between mind and body, wearer and wear-ee, 
and become one with the tightest fitting bodysuit 
imaginable, a suit made of veins and translucent skin 
that looks like the inside worn on the outside" (83). 
Ian's description recalls the postmodern blurring of 
body and costume discussed earlier, and can be seen to 
cast bodybuilding as a another "kind of transvestism" 
(Straayer 284). The extent to which bodybuilders might 
also be said to display an androgynous mix of sexed and 
gendered signs, and thus suggest a further link to 
transgendered subjects, will be explored later. 
In Brooks's portraits of cross-dressed females the 
relationship between the male costume and poses of the 
dandy and the relative gender realness or gender 
ambiguity of the subjects depends on the manner and 
tone in which they are adopted. In Cameron's self- 
portraits the site of meaning is relocated to the 
hypermasculine physique and postures of the 
bodybuilder, and the particular way in which he has 
chosen to present that body is in direct relation to 
the realness of the masculinity that is disclosed. 
These studies also register a difference that other 
self-portraits in Body Alchemy, where he might adopt 
the work clothes and pose of the professional man or 
the labourer, neither reveal nor suggest. 
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Each of the three shots in "God's Will" exhibits a 
potent display of hypermasculinity as well toned 
muscles, suitably "pumped up" for the occasion, and 
flame-like tattoos are complemented by the classic 
bodybuilder pose that Cameron adopts. These familiar, 
recycled images which could be so trite and uninspiring 
are rendered new and extraordinary by the visual 
dissonances that surround and inhabit the subject's 
body. In one of the three shots (Figure 6), Cameron 
wields a dumb bell; in the other two poses an image 
which is a familiar and legitimate means to acquired 
muscularity is replaced, to ironic effect, by other 
more culturally burdened signs: the scalpel (Figure 5) 
and the syringe (Figure 7). In disclosing his naked 
body Cameron is laying bare quite literally what it has 
taken to embody his particular experience of 
masculinity; surgery and regular injections of 
testosterone have contributed to the powerfully built, 
sculpted form that we see. 
In this context the scalpel and syringe might be 
read as just another part of the artistic process: 
intrinsic elements of the final product and for the 
purposes of these photographs no more or 
less important 
than the dumb bell or the camera that captures the 
images. But such images, however playfully employed, 
cannot be so readily distanced 
from their literal and 
symbolic associations: a 
bodily transformation which 
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Figure 5 Loren Cameron, "God's Will" (1995) 
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Figure 6 Loren Cameron, "God's Will" (1995) 
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Figure 7 Loren Cameron, "God's Will" (1995) 
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requires the use of a scalpel and a syringe must 
involve pain; a naked, ambiguously sexed subject 
wielding a scalpel may invoke "castration" models. 
In these shots nothing is hidden from view. In 
speaking about "coming out" to people as a transsexual 
man, Cameron says: "By revealing myself, I have 
consensually invited their voyeurism; they can't help 
but watch as I make a spectacle of myself" (15). The 
photographing of his naked body, together with the 
various props that have helped to refigure it, take 
that "spectacle" to its furthest and most literal 
point. The portraits also have another important effect 
in that they draw attention to the constructedness of 
"natural" signs of masculinity of which the body- 
builder's muscles would seem to be a particularly 
hyperbolic instance. In this light, the syringe as a 
means, albeit illegitimate, to excessive muscularity 
and the scalpel as a means to a surgically altered body 
shape assume a more general significance. It is not 
only transsexual men who inject themselves with male 
hormones or resort to surgery in their quest to embody 
an ideal of physical perfection. Nevertheless, the 
evidence of Cameron's naked body and the props he 
displays distinguishes his relation to that ideal from 
that of other bodybuilders. The scalpel and the 
syringe, viewed in conjunction with the mastectomy 
scars on Cameron's chest and his female genitalia, 
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indicate the highly particular nature of this subject's 
life-narrative. 
Such images produce differing effects according to 
the spectator. Undoubtedly they have a "surprise" or 
"shock" value for some audiences, particularly those 
unfamiliar with the "differences" of transsexual 
bodies. During my presentation of a research paper, a 
number of the academic staff and students viewing the 
portraits for the first time responded in ways which 
emphasised the pain of the images. 16 Critical 
discussions hostile to transsexual subjects often 
utilise the term "self-mutilating" in pejorative ways, 
and for some spectators an ideological or physical 
squeamishness can predetermine a negative or hostile 
reaction to Cameron's self-studies. 
More affirmative responses may read the portraits 
as an absolute and unapologetic statement of who 
Cameron is: a man whose masculinity does not depend 
upon the possession of a penis, or as Stephen Whittle 
argues in his discussion of one of Cameron's self- 
portraits, "a man who is proud to be without, because 
his masculinity does not come from a penis but from 
himself" (214). According to this reading, Cameron's 
uncompromising disclosure of his masculine identity, 
including the elements of that identity that mark him 
16 The paper, "Peter, A Young English Girl: Visualising Transgender 
Masculinities", was presented at a Modern School Research Seminar 
at the University of York on 27 May 
1999. 
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as "different" or "other"-the presence of a vagina 
rather than a penis, the faint but discernible scarring 
from chest surgery-may serve to demystify transsexual 
masculinity. His self-portraits invite us to witness 
his sameness to some men, whilst frankly acknowledging 
his difference. 
Another reading of the self-portraits might 
embrace the ambivalence suggested by the responses 
discussed above. This approach could see the "pain" of 
those images as an intrinsic stage in the subject's 
journey towards the proud man he now presents himself 
as. It could read both irony and reverence in the 
manner in which Cameron has chosen to inhabit and 
perform his gender. 
There is, of course, a great deal more to 
Cameron's self-presentation than the stylised poses he 
strikes and props he adopts; at a personal level the 
way in which he embodies his masculinity has important 
personal significance. In Body Alchemy Cameron explains 
the inherent relation between the development of his 
muscular physique and the visible emergence of his 
identification as a man: 
So much about my coming to manhood has been 
about a quest for size. I mean, I really need 
to be a big man. All of the men I've looked to 
as role models have been body-builders and 
athletes. They seem like gods and great beasts 
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to me in their huge and beautiful bodies. I 
envy them. I want to be like them. They look 
so virile and invincible. (85) 
This passage might be taken as more than the earnestly 
expressed, personal desires of a transsexual man for a 
particular gendered embodiment; this could just as 
easily be the fantasy of a non-transgender male. More 
generally, it could say something about the ambivalent 
relation between all subjects and the gender ideals to 
which they try to attain. Butler's analysis of the 
Jennie Livingston film Paris is Burning, discussed in 
the previous chapter, emphasises the power of those 
ideals and the pain of only ever being able to 
approximate them (Bodies 128-33). If there is any 
melancholic dimension to Cameron's self-portraits (or, 
as critics have suggested, to Brooks's portraits) it 
might be read in terms of representing a more general 
human experience, rather than something specific to 
gender variant subjects. 
In his photographic self-portraits Cameron can be 
that "big man"; he can embody that physical ideal. In 
person and fully clothed he is surprisingly slight. 
Part of the process of making real that bodily aspect 
of his manhood necessitates his nakedness; it is only 
through literally making a spectacle of his body that 
we see Cameron the way he wishes us to see 
him. Like 
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Feldman's dandy, in art if not in life, Cameron is what 
he chooses to appear to be. 
A key element in this process of self-presentation 
is the absolute control Cameron exerts over the 
translation of his experience of masculinity into an 
image. The presence in the self-portraits of the 
shutter-release bulb, clearly visible in all three 
shots, links and makes explicit the artist's and 
subject's role in constructing the photograph and, by 
implication, its referent: the "big" male body he so 
proudly displays. Like Brooks's title Peter (A Young 
English Girl), this visual dissonance is a vital part 
of the meaning of the triptych of shots, being one of 
the more understated ways in which the self-portraits 
disclose a difference between this image of a 
bodybuilder and countless other conventional versions. 
At first, the wire which leads to the bulb partially 
concealed in Cameron's clenched fist may not be 
detected; once aware of its presence spectators might 
experience surprise at this deliberate exposure of the 
process behind the final product. Ultimately, a 
connection can be established between this technology, 
the act of self-creation and the subject of the image 
it produces: a transsexual man. If the association is 
missed, however, Cameron's introduction to Body Alchemy 
outlines both the practical reasons for the visibility 
of the bulb (he does not have a shutter timer or, being 
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naked, anywhere to conceal the device) and the 
appropriateness of its presence metaphorically: "I am 
creating my own image alone, an act that reflects the 
transsexual experience as well" (11). The title of the 
triptych, "God's Will", has an ironic appeal in light 
of these self-styled acts of reinvention. 
The muscular physique revealed in "God's Will" is 
just one of a range of "costumes" that Cameron displays 
in disclosing the many and varied aspects of his 
masculine identification. Brooks's portraits do not 
have the same collective impact and meaning. 
Collectively, Cameron's images present a personal 
narrative which allows us to see material differences 
in his male body, whilst showing us just how like some 
men, and unlike other men, he is in all other respects. 
This is an important part of Cameron's intention in 
photographing transsexual men. He wants to emphasise 
the sameness of his subjects to biological men; at the 
same time, he does not want to hide their differences. 
The context in which the photographs appear clearly 
identifies the subjects as transsexual men. The book is 
subtitled "Transsexual Portraits" and the introduction 
makes clear its project: Cameron describes it as "the 
first photodocumentation of transsexual men from within 
our community" (12). A section titled "Emergence" 
presents photographs of the subjects prior to 
transition alongside current photographs of the men; in 
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"Our Bodies" images of genital and chest 
reconstructions disclose the surgical procedures that 
embody that transition. The combined effect of these 
images is to expose a difference which the section 
titled "Fellas" does not register. In these photographs 
the men have chosen settings that reflect their lives 
and interests; as such, they have a personalising 
effect, placing the emphasis on who the men are rather 
than what they are. 
The contextualisation of Cameron's subjects and 
its effects are discussed by Jay Prosser in Second Sex: 
"Presenting his subjects as looking `just like men' 
against the backdrop of their real-life situations 
Cameron sustains the value of gender realness" 
(230). But, in also allowing us to see "the material 
differences" of transsexual men's bodies, Prosser 
argues, Cameron "lets us look at this referential 
difference" (230). Thus gaps between the assigned sex 
of the subjects, their masculine identifications and 
other masculinities are subtly deployed. Undetectable 
in straightforward portraits of Cameron's subjects, 
these are differences that must be highlighted to be 
seen and, in many cases, must be seen to be believed. 
The act of making transsexual bodies visible enacts a 
process of familiarisation, presenting its subjects as 
commonplace and unremarkable rather than something 
either exotic or freakish. 
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One of the potential effects of Cameron's nude 
self-portraits is to suggest that the relationship 
between possessing a penis and masculinity may be both 
arbitrary and negotiable. Although in the images we see 
here Cameron does not have a penis, he could opt to 
have one constructed at a future date, or wear one made 
of rubber or latex any time he chooses, or continue to 
do without one. The use of phallic surrogates for the 
inadequate penis is a recurring theme in discussions of 
constructions of masculinity through visual media. 
Joseph Kestner's Masculinities in Victorian Paintin 
describes the tendency in studies of male nudes for 
artists to conceal the male organ, whilst the presence 
of certain weapons or armour assures the 
commensurability of the penis "with the demands of the 
phallus/Law of the Father and its aggregation of 
superiority, power and authority" (35). In the case of 
visual constructions of masculinity which have no male 
organ to conceal or augment the imagery may produce a 
more ambiguous range of effects than is at first 
evident. 
Images in Cameron's and Brooks's portraits can be 
read for their individual "phallic" symbolism, but also 
for their potential effects as "androgynous" symbols. 
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Re-presenting the phallus 
It is the clothing and accessories of the aristocratic 
dandy in Brook's portraits that invest the subject with 
male authority, most notably exemplified in the top hat 
of Self-Portrait and the monocle of Una. The relation 
to male authority that these images recall is a 
culturally and historically contradictory one. As 
Rhonda Garelick points out, "whilst dandyist charisma 
appears to flout social institutions, it is, 
nevertheless, entirely bound up with them" (164). In 
their immediate effects, there is something of this 
ambivalence in the images that Brooks's portraits 
present. Marjorie Garber observes that in its 
adaptation of the costume of the male dandy, the 
"transvestite high style" displayed by Brooks's 
subjects "declared at once its difference from, and its 
alliance with, masculine social and economic power" 
(Vested Interests 153). The most obvious sign of the 
equivocal nature of the dandy's social, cultural and 
sexual standing is the monocle. 
The sense of empowerment suggested by some of 
Brooks's portraits has a quite different force in Una 
where the already uncertain male authority of the dandy 
is thrown into almost caricatured relief. A key element 
of that effect is the presence of a monocle worn to 
startling effect in Una's right eye-socket. Domna C. 
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Stanton's study of constructions of the dandy from 
seventeenth- and nineteenth-century French literature 
demonstrates the way that the dandy's eyes are 
frequently depicted as the site of his "enormous 
power". Stanton calls this the "phallic eye" (151). The 
visual effects of the monocle so evident in Una- 
magnifying the eye and intensifying its gaze-would seem 
to harness and exaggerate that ocular force and phallic 
authority. 
Critics such as Marjorie Garber and Laura Doan 
consider the monocle's cultural significance as a sign 
of the wearer's social and sexual difference. Doan's 
discussion of the monocle-wearing female is keen to 
stress its multiple associations, citing class and 
sexual difference as just two of a range of symbolic 
meanings which include: "class, Englishness, daring, 
decay, rebellion, affectation, eccentricity-and 
possibly, but not necessarily, sexual identity" (681). 
Garber's interpretation has a narrower focus. She 
argues that the monocle may represent a "displacement 
upward of the single and singular male organ" (153) and 
reads it as a marker of the male and female subject's 
gendered ambiguity: 
just as a man with a monocle was coming to be 
thought of as effete, a woman with a monocle 
was regarded as a sign of defiant pathos. 
Through this addition both declared, indeed 
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flaunted, both what they `had' and what they 
lacked. (Vested Interests 154) 
The "effeminacy" of the male dandy and "pseudo- 
masculinity" of the female dandy position both of these 
figures as other to a masculinity that is biologically 
male and heterosexual. According to Garber's reading, 
the wearing of a monocle is seen to denaturalise the 
anatomical penis and parodically comment on the male 
authority it invokes: 
Simultaneously a signifier of castration 
(detachable, artifactual, made to be put on 
and taken off) and of empowerment, the monocle 
when worn by a woman emphasizes, indeed 
parodies, the contingent nature of the power 
conferred by this instrumental "affectation. " 
(Vested Interests 154) 
The playful qualities of the monocle suggested by 
Garber and its associations with both castration and 
empowerment invite comparisons visually to the strap-on 
latex dildos of some of Del LaGrace's lesbian and 
transgender images. 17 Similar effects might be found in 
Brooks's portrait and LaGrace's photographs, for in 
both instances the thing worn may reflect ironically on 
what it stands in for and suggest a masculinity that 
17 See Love Bites and The Drag King Book (1999), a text jointly 
produced with Judith "Jack" Halberstam. 
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does not require a biological origin and a phallic 
authority that does not require a biological penis. 
An important difference lies, of course, in the 
dildo's penis-like appearance and erotic function both 
of which graphically recall its physical equivalent. 18 
This is where a different reading of the monocle might 
set it apart from those images which are unmistakably 
phallic and which evoke, even if they playfully revise, 
crude male/female oppositions and psychoanalytic models 
of castration. In symbolic terms the monocle might be 
seen to suggest both masculine and feminine properties. 
On the one hand, as already discussed, its function as 
an appendage has phallic connotations; on the other 
hand, its physical appearance is more obviously 
associated with the vagina. As a fashion accessory the 
monocle has a certain gender ambiguity or unisex 
quality. It cannot be defined clearly as either 
masculine or feminine and has the paradoxical visual 
effect of making a male dandy seem less of a man and a 
female dandy more of one. In Una the monocle epitomises 
the exaggerated nature of the gendered pose adopted. It 
also contributes to a mixing of signs which makes it 
difficult to ascribe any one sexed identity to the 
subject portrayed. It is perhaps significant that this 
ostentatious marker of the subject's 
difference is 
la Chris Straayer blurs this flesh/latex divide conceptualising the 
penis as a male costume and the dildo as a 
"deconstruction/reconstruction" of that costume 
(282). 
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absent from Brooks's other portraits where masculine 
signs are adopted in less ambiguous ways. Even in these 
portraits, certain cues-a tendril of hair, a delicacy 
of features-exert a curious influence on the more 
dominant masculine elements giving all of the subjects, 
to varying degrees, mildly androgynous effects. 
A less obvious ambiguity is also at work in the 
bodybuilder poses of Cameron's self-portraits. On the 
surface, the bodybuilder's excessive display of 
masculinity suggests an uncritical relationship to male 
authority, but as has already been suggested that very 
need for excess conceals a distinctly uneasy 
association. Richard Dyer's essay "Don't Look Now: The 
Male Pin-Up" discusses the importance of muscularity to 
naturalising definitions of masculinity: "Muscularity 
is the sign of power-natural, achieved, phallic" (273). 
Dyer describes how the potential for muscularity has 
been constructed as a biological and therefore 
"natural" effect of being a man. As a consequence, Dyer 
argues, "[t]he `naturalness' of muscles legitimizes 
male power and domination" (274). Yet in considering 
the male bodybuilder Dyer finds a contradiction: 
"Muscles that show" are not natural, but achieved 
(274). In these terms, the male and female 
bodybuilder's muscular physiques can be seen to 
hyperbolise the constructedness of masculinity. 
205 
Dyer's discussion of the bodybuilder projects this 
figure into a representational and discursive space 
where theories of biologically determined gender are 
seen to be displaced by visible enactments of self- 
construction and reinvention. To return to an earlier 
theme, the bodybuilder might be viewed as the dandy of 
the late-twentieth century. The potential challenge 
which such acts of self-fashioning might constitute to 
normative gender identities has been noted in relation 
to female bodybuilding. Laurie Schulze's essay "On the 
Muscle" describes female bodybuilding as "a direct, 
threatening resistance to patriarchy at its most 
biologist foundations", in that it visibly challenges 
the assumption that men are "naturally" physically 
superior (71). Schulze argues that there is "something 
irretrievably `male'" about the excessive muscularity 
of female bodybuilders (77). In this respect, there is 
a material sense in which the act of bodybuilding 
allows the female subject and transsexual man to 
transcend biological sex to differing effects. However, 
more needs to be said about the binary oppositions 
which the bodybuilder would seem to question, for if 
the excessive muscularity of the female bodybuilder 
marks that body as "irretrievably male", then the 
shapeliness of the male bodybuilder-the well-developed 
pectoral muscles; the nipped in waist; the small, firm 
buttocks-might be read as the more usual signs of the 
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late-twentieth-century "ideal" female physique. A 
feminising effect is often further enhanced by the 
depilated, well-oiled appearance of the skin and the 
manner in which that body presents itself as spectacle 
to the controlling gaze. 
Dyer's analysis of the differences between the 
female and the male pin-up discusses the ways in which 
images of men must be seen to resist the "element of 
passivity" that being an object of the gaze necessarily 
imposes ("Don't Look" 269). Although Dyer wants to 
challenge dominant notions of looking as active and 
being looked at as passive, he observes that most 
images of men show them either doing something active 
or exhibiting "the body's potential for action" (269). 
Dyer argues that although the visibility of muscles is 
one of the key signs of this capacity to act, the 
employment of this type of phallic symbol has another 
function which is to conceal the instability of the 
masculine identity on display. Describing the typical 
pose and look of the bodybuilder-"The clenched fists, 
the bulging muscles, the hardened jaws"-Dyer argues 
that the visible presence of these phallic symbols 
attempts to compensate for the failure of the penis, 
"whether limp or erect", to match the mystique of the 
phallus (275). Hence in images of bodybuilders specific 
body parts act as the lances and spears of nineteenth- 
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century portraits of male nudes, discussed earlier, and 
the "built body" itself becomes a type of armour. 19 
Marcia Ian's discussion of bodybuilding and 
subjectivity constructs the entire bodybuilder's 
physique as the surrogate male organ; the bodybuilder's 
aim is "to look as much like a giant erection as 
possible .. ." (79). Taken on these terms the built 
physique, whatever its biological origin, and 
bodybuilder pose become symbols of masculine crisis. In 
the case of the male bodybuilder, the continual drive 
towards greater bulk and definition of muscle can be 
seen as an obsessive and ultimately doomed striving for 
a masculine identity which can be experienced as stable 
and inviolable. This reading of the bodybuilder's 
troubled relationship to male authority invites rather 
different interpretations when the bodybuilder is a 
woman or, in the case of Cameron, a transsexual man. 
Laurie Schulze's consideration of the disruptive 
potential of the professional female bodybuilder 
proposes an interesting connection between bodybuilding 
and Bakhtinian theory: 
Bodybuilding's materiality, its emphasis on 
the spectacular, on the sheer presence of the 
body and the pleasures of looking at muscle 
made visible ... 
its slippage between play 
19 Dyer compares the appearance of the "built 
body" with its hard 
surfaces and contours to armour 
in his book White (152). 
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and display, sport and art, art and life, all 
seen to connect it strongly with Bakhtin's 
analysis of the carnivalesque. (69) 
In light of this comparison, she concludes that female 
bodybuilding can be viewed as "a `resistance to' and 
`refusal of' social control" (69). Schulze also 
recognises that a counter argument might construct 
female bodybuilding as the converse of the physical 
excess of carnival in its exemplification of "the 
perfected body beautiful" (69). This would then be seen 
to conform to, rather than escape from, a social 
ideology which relies on discipline and demonises 
excess. 
Cameron's visualisations of himself as bodybuilder 
have a potential for similarly ambivalent readings. The 
extent to which his self-portraits reveal the 
differences between his version of masculinity and the 
cultural "ideal", and the extent to which that 
disclosure can be seen as playful rather than shameful, 
may determine whether he is deemed to be resisting and 
refusing social control, or reinstating it. As the gaps 
narrow between the gender of the pose adopted, the 
gender that is experienced by the subject, and notions 
of "real" gender, the capacity to trouble conceptions 
of normative identities is adjudged to diminish. 
Cameron's decision to reveal the dissonant elements of 
his gender performance, appearing naked rather than 
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adopting the conventional posing pouch of bodybuilder 
images, is crucial here. The already far from secure 
expression of masculine identity that the bodybuilder 
represents can be seen to be further burdened by images 
which show a man who does not have a penis. 
The type of phallic symbols Dyer details-the 
"clenched fists, the bulging muscles, the hardened jaws" 
("Don't Look Now" 275)-are certainly in evidence in 
Cameron's self-portraits. Although Cameron's fists are 
clenched for practical reasons (they are holding a 
scalpel or the shutter-release bulb), the combined 
presence of these symbols might still give the 
impression that this is just another "male" bodybuilder 
if it were not for the unequivocal absence of male 
genitals. Is Cameron's overtly masculinised image an 
attempt doubly to compensate for that "lack" or, as 
Whittle argues, is the meaning of "lack" in his case 
rendered insignificant? Adopting and extending Marcia 
Ian's body-as-erection analogy, Whittle presents his 
view that: 
Cameron becomes the human fucking penis. He is 
what he does not apparently possess, and which 
by default we would assume he desires. Yet 
does he desire the penis? ... We see in him 
the female signifier of "lack", yet in his 
case the meaning of "lack" is meaningless: he 
chooses not to wear a phallus because that 
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would not be him, he is without "lack". He has 
gender through himself and because of himself. 
(214) 
On the one hand, using Dyer's formulation, Cameron's 
body and pose exhibit the classic symptoms of a 
phallocentric male neurosis; on the other hand, the 
fact that the body that we see clearly does not have a 
penis, and indeed clearly never has had one, may be the 
mark of a man who is free from the cultural and 
ideological burdens of the male organ. As Whittle 
argues, in Cameron's case theories of "having" and 
"lack" seem redundant, or certainly irrelevant. From 
this perspective, the masculine identity disclosed in 
Cameron's self-portraits could constitute a strong 
visual challenge to the alignment of phallus and penis 
that underpins the governing fiction of masculinity. 
The danger of bringing psychoanalytic theory into 
a discussion of transgender masculinity is that its 
phallocentric logic may be used to explain that 
identification simply in terms of "penis envy" or 
"lack". Unreconstructed theories of sexual difference 
may provide us with a vocabulary for exploring cross- 
gender identification, but they are in danger of 
returning all discussions of masculine-identified 
females to the literal or symbolic significance of the 
phallus. For Cameron, the photographic disclosure of 
that identity does not rely on a flesh or latex 
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simulacrum of the male organ; indeed, the poses he 
adopts literally draw attention to his female genitals. 
On a more general note, "penis envy" is not the sole 
preserve of female-bodied subjects, and it might be 
interesting to speculate who would be the first in line 
for surgery if a fully functional, custom-made penis 
were ever to be genetically engineered. 
So far, my discussion of Brooks's and Cameron's 
portraits has been directed primarily at the subject's 
costume, whether that be clothing or flesh, and her or 
his pose. There are other elements outside the 
subject's body that contribute to the visual 
construction of gender; the organisation of the space 
of each portrait and its influence on the spectator's 
gaze can also be read as markers of the subject's 
difference. 
Singular locations 
Griselda Pollock's Vision and Difference: Femininity, 
Feminism and the Histories of Art discusses the 
delineation of "spaces of masculinity and of 
femininity" (62) and the way that the spectatorial gaze 
is partly determined by the "space of the look at the 
point of production" (66). Pollock' s analysis of 
paintings by male and female artists genders the 
spatial dimensions of the works in several ways. She 
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looks at "spaces as locations" (56), that is whether 
they are private or domestic, or in the public domain. 
She considers the "spatial order within paintings" 
(62), by which she means the accessibility to and 
positionality within certain spaces for male and female 
subjects. Finally, she examines the "location of the 
spectator" (63) or the distance between the spectator 
and the text. Although Pollock's treatment of space is 
concerned primarily with spaces of femininity, it is an 
approach that can be usefully adapted to my discussion 
of Brooks's and Cameron's work. 
In Brooks's portraits the backgrounds against 
which each subject is presented are central to the 
overall effect of the painting. Either delineated in 
abstract form or featureless, the backgrounds emphasise 
the singularity of their subjects by seemingly 
enclosing them in their own personal space. The 
locations for Self-Portrait, Peter, and Renata cannot 
be gendered in the way that Pollock describes because 
they are stripped of the signs that would clearly 
define them as feminine (private or domestic) or 
masculine (public). The stark impersonality of the 
settings seems to suspend the subjects in a space that 
escapes or certainly resists gendered meaning. it is 
tempting to speak of this location as a "third" space, 
although the term's culturally pejorative connotations 
limit the productiveness of its use. 
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In Peter and Renata the spaces that the subjects 
occupy are undefined. Meaning is concentrated solely in 
the subject's pose; that is, the manner in which she 
possesses that space and her clothing. In other words, 
the authority of each figure is situated in the person 
and what she is doing rather than her surroundings. 
Even in Self-Portrait and, to a lesser extent, 
Elisabeth de Gramont, where an exterior location is 
suggested the positioning of the subject focuses 
empowerment in the subject's self rather than her 
environment: her back is turned to the landscape and 
her body blocks out much of what might have been seen. 
The positioning of the spectator in relation to 
these subjects is influenced by the lack of specificity 
in their locations. Pollock's description of the 
reworking of femininity by female artists Berthe 
Morisot and Mary Cassatt refers to the depiction of 
"highly specified locations of which the [female] 
viewer becomes a part" (87). In Brooks's paintings 
there is no defined location for the spectator to enter 
and we are instead forced to engage directly with the 
subject to varying effects. As discussed earlier, in 
Renata, Peter and Elisabeth the spectator is shut out 
by the subject's apparent unawareness of her or his 
presence. In Renata the eyes are hidden behind closed 
lids; in Peter and Elisabeth the subjects gaze out 
beyond the boundaries of the canvas to something we 
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cannot see. In each case the subject evades the 
spectator's controlling gaze and frustrates traditional 
viewing positions. The subject of Self-Portrait stares 
back at the spectator, returning and reversing her or 
his objectifying look. Thus, an apparent passivity that 
would construct the subject as object is disavowed by 
the active gaze that meets our own. We cannot be the 
unobserved observer of this subject: the looked-at 
becomes the look-er and the spectator feels the force 
of that critical regard. 
The way Loren Cameron positions himself in the 
"God's Will" portraits focuses his masculinity in the 
body's surfaces and pose and certain "props", rather 
than his environment. There is a sense in which his 
muscled body becomes the landscape for these images. 
The plain backdrops of the "God's Will" images have two 
noticeable effects. First, they enhance the muscle 
definition of the body and sharpen up the lines and 
contours of its overall shape. The second effect is 
similar to that produced by Brooks's use of space. By 
appearing to suspend Cameron's body in an undefined, 
gender-free location, the singularity of his 
masculinity is visually asserted. 
This effect might be compared to that of another 
nude shot of Cameron from the "Self-Portraits" section 
of Body Alchemy. The portrait, titled "Carney", shows 
Cameron wearing a jester's cap and reclining languidly 
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on a bed or sofa, his body turned towards us with 
conventionally feminine passivity. The background is a 
bold geometric design of diamonds which complements the 
luxurious feeling of the whole image. There is a 
certain campness to the pose and setting that Cameron 
adopts which homoeroticises the masculinity that is 
displayed. The arrangement of Cameron's body-the 
slackness of the pose, the drooping right hand and 
relaxed muscles-is suggestive of a post-orgasmic state. 
The dreamy expression on Cameron's face as he looks 
away from the spectator (perhaps towards a lover) 
reinforces the heavy sensuality of the portrait. 
The combination of feminine and masculine signs in 
"Carney" is in marked contrast to the "God's Will" 
shots with their proud, almost aggressive display of 
muscular masculinity. In the first and third shots 
(Figures 5 and 7), Cameron's eyes are fixed on the 
implements that he holds: the scalpel and the syringe. 
He seems unaware of our presence, apparently absorbed 
by the acts of self-creation that he theatrically re- 
enacts for the camera. In both shots his lower body is 
turned slightly away from the spectator's prying gaze. 
These poses seem neither coy nor provocative, but 
instead create a feeling of what Dyer calls the male 
body's "potential for action" ("Don't Look" 269). 
Cameron adopts a full frontal pose for the central 
image of the triptych (Figure 6) and returns the 
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spectator's gaze with his own fierce stare. In some 
ways it is this image of the three that has the most 
profound impact on the spectator, for it combines 
Cameron's masculine physique at its most enhanced with 
the clearest exposure of the absent male genitals. In 
this context, the intensity and directness of Cameron's 
gaze is a crucial part of the portrait's meaning and 
effect. 
Halberstam's discussion of photographer Cathy 
Opie's portraits of "bearded, pierced, and tattooed 
dykes and transgender men" (35) describes the 
spectatorial effects of the model's returned gaze: 
The power of the gaze in an Opie portrait 
always and literally rests with the image: the 
perpetual stare challenges the spectator's own 
sense of gender congruity, and even self, and 
it does indeed replicate with a difference the 
hostile stares that the model probably faces 
every day in the street. (35) 
Halberstam's comments are also clearly relevant to 
Cameron's self-portrait. His fierce gaze seems to 
demand admiration and appreciation for the 
hypermasculinity of his body. 2° It also appears to 
challenge the spectator to read that body as anything 
20 Halberstam proposes a similar effect in Opie's portraits where 
it is the subject's tattoos and body markings which force the 
spectator to be "admiring and appreciative rather than simply 
objectifying and voyeuristic" (35). 
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other than male and forces the spectator's gaze back on 
her or himself in a self-referential manner. 
This relationship between spectator and image can 
be opened out into a broader consideration of how 
Brooks's and Cameron's portraits challenge and revise 
traditional ways of looking. In addressing this aspect 
of the works a series of engrossing questions arise. 
How is the spectator to look when s/he views these 
images? In what ways is this process of looking 
affected by the spectator's existing identifications 
and desires? To what extent can psychoanalytic theories 
of visual pleasure-the voyeuristic gaze and 
narcissistic identification-account for the multiple 
viewing possibilities that such images allow? If there 
can be "trans-sex identification", as Laura Mulvey 
argues, whereby a female spectator adopts the "male" 
gaze which informs and constructs mainstream cinema, 
and if lesbian images "force us to theorize a lesbian 
gaze" ("Dis-Graceful Images" 86) as Reina Lewis has 
urged, to what extent do Brooks's and Cameron's visual 
texts demand the conceptualisation of a transgender 
gaze? 
How do I look? 
The visual aesthetic to which Brooks and Cameron 
contribute is a highly productive element in the 
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formation of transgender identifications and desires. 
The archive materials of transsexual gay man and 
activist Louis Sullivan, who died from an Aids-related 
illness in 1991, include a large number of transgender 
images taken from newspapers and journals, some 
reproducing photographs from the 1920s and earlier. 
There are also many personal photographs which, 
together with his unpublished journals and letters, 
document and celebrate Sullivan's physical transition. 
His journals are especially instructive. At fifteen, 
Sullivan wrote: "I want to look like what I am but 
don't know what some one like me looks like" 
(unpublished journals, 6 June 1966). 21 It is in the 
context of comments such as these that the personal 
force of viewing Brooks's and Cameron's work is 
revealed. 
For a self-identified transsexual man such as 
Sullivan images of transgender masculinities might 
result in an increased feeling of gender congruity, but 
it would be reductive and erroneous to suggest that all 
transsexual men would respond in this way. The 
particular masculinity visualised might conflict with 
the transsexual spectator's experience or expression of 
gender. It is not a case, then, of a neat 
divide 
between "gender normative" and "gender variant" 
21 Sullivan's unpublished journals are part of the Louis Sullivan 
Collection held by the Gay and Lesbian Historical Society of 
Northern California. 
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spectators, but more to do with the individual 
spectator's specific interaction with the visual text, 
which may differ each time that encounter occurs. The 
various dissonances that inhabit the gendered subjects 
of Brooks's and Cameron's images are likely to impact 
on the spectator's experience of identity, whatever 
that may be. The consequence of this encounter may be 
pleasurable or threatening, or a mixture of the two, 
depending on the extent to which the embodiment of 
gender displayed is felt to speak to and for the 
spectator's own identifications and desires. As Chris 
Holmlund argues in his discussion of masculinity as 
masquerade, so much depends on "who is looking, how, 
why, at whom" (216). The context in which the image is 
viewed-alone, with friends, with strangers, in private, 
in the street, in a public gallery-should be added to 
this list of variables. 
Having acknowledged that element of variability, 
the manner in which the tensions and contradictions 
identified in Brooks's and Cameron's portraits have 
been shown to question conventional narratives of 
spectatorship has a certain consistency. Given that 
unsettling quality, a common spectatorial effect might 
be the production of an "uneasy gaze". This phrase is 
borrowed from Laura Mulvey's influential essay "Visual 
Pleasures and Narrative Cinema" and although there it 
is employed in a discussion of the patriarchal 
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conventions of film, parallels can be drawn between the 
male spectator of that medium and the self-identified 
"gender normative" spectator of transgender images. 
Mulvey's discussion of the films of Alfred 
Hitchcock describes the "uneasy gaze" of the apparently 
respectable male heroes as representing the (male) 
spectator's own experience of inner conflict. What has 
unsettled that gaze in the case of films such as Marnie 
and Vertigo, Mulvey explains, is the opposition between 
the hero's (and spectator's) perceived moral 
correctness and his erotic drive to subject the female 
lead to his will and gaze by sadistic and voyeuristic 
means (66). 
In the case of Brooks's and Cameron's portraits, 
what could unsettle the gaze for the so-called gender 
normative spectator are the inconsistencies and 
disparities underpinning that stable experience of 
identity, which the artist's vision and the subject's 
gaze potentially invoke. Thus these and other 
transgender images may induce unease in a spectator 
where they are felt to challenge the coherence and 
"naturalness" of her or his identifications and 
desires. 
Anne Friedberg's "A Denial of Difference: Theories 
of Cinematic Identification" argues that because 
identification "can only be made through recognition" 
(45) it constantly confirms the normative values of 
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dominant culture. Friedberg, adopting a theme from 
Mulvey's essay, argues: 
The institutional sanction of stars as ego 
ideals establishes normative figures, 
authenticates gender norms 
Identification enforces a collapse of the 
subject onto the normative, a compulsion for 
sameness, which, under patriarchy, demands 
critique. (45) 
In their fusion of dissimilitude and likeness, the real 
subjects of Brooks's and Cameron's portraits may 
interrupt those signifying processes which serve to 
naturalise and consolidate gender. As argued in earlier 
sections of this chapter, these images of transgender 
masculinity can trigger an array of responses which 
rely upon recognisable gender norms. Yet in their 
recasting of those norms they may also undermine that 
authenticity. To varying degrees, then, the subjects 
portrayed appear to exceed the conventional sexed and 
gendered boundaries which they represent. They also 
display incongruities which mean that they cannot be 
comfortably read according to the usual binary 
oppositions. 
This aspect of some transgender images highlights 
the problem of finding a language with which to read 
(and write about) these unconventional visual 
narratives. The multiple effects that such texts 
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produce cannot be accounted for adequately using the 
binary codes around which Mulvey's theory of visual 
pleasure is constructed. Halberstam's discussion of 
gaze as "queer" or multidimensional explains that: 
Most rewritings of this formulation of visual 
pleasure ... comment on the ways in which 
spectatorship is necessarily more 
heterogeneous than psychoanalysis allows and 
also less neatly organized around identity 
categories. (179) 
She suggests a way forward is to avoid psychoanalytic 
theories and devise a "new cinematic vocabulary" (179). 
But how might the "creative reinvention of ways of 
seeing" (179) which Halberstam finds in queer cinema be 
applied to the still images of transgender 
masculinities discussed in this chapter? 
Reina Lewis's conceptualisation of a "lesbian 
gaze" might be helpful here. In an essay co-written 
with Katrina Rolley, Lewis proposes that it is possible 
for the female viewer to "look as a lesbian whether or 
not she actually is/considers herself to be lesbian" 
("Ad(dressing) the Dyke" 183). In this formulation 
"lesbian" becomes one of a range of viewing positions 
that may be accessed by, in this instance, a female 
spectator. Valerie Traub's essay, "The Ambiguities of 
`Lesbian' Viewing Pleasure", adopts a similar approach 
to visual pleasure in her critique of the film Black 
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Widow (1987). Traub suggests that "lesbian" should be 
recognised as "a position taken in relation to desire" 
rather than as a person or even an activity (324). 
Halberstam also cites Traub's queer reading of this 
mainstream heterosexual film, describing it as an 
especially productive example of an "attempt to 
pressure the notion of ` lesbian spectatorship'" " (178). 
Halberstam explains: "By making visible the ambiguity 
that structures both viewing pleasure and narrative 
pleasure in this film, Traub is able to imagine access 
to a plenitude of spectator positions rather than 
binary codes of gazing" (178). It is interesting to 
consider what might be achieved by a similar recasting 
of "transsexual"? Unlike the term "lesbian", there is 
already a growing insistence from within the community 
and its supporters that "transsexual" be used as an 
adjective rather than a noun. Adopting Traub's formula, 
the word "transsexual" might be similarly redefined: it 
does not denote a person or an activity, but, in broad 
terms, describes a (usually constant) position taken in 
relation to identification. Transgender, in the context 
of many theorists' use of the term, could be understood 
as indicating a range of variant and quite possibly 
varying identifications. Hence "transgender" might be 
used to describe the heterogeneity of the gaze in a 
similar, although not identical, way to that suggested 
by the term "queer". A "transsexual gaze", however, 
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like Lewis's "lesbian gaze", implies a more specific 
mode of viewing which, in this instance, will tend to 
centre more exclusively on the materiality of the body. 
This point can be illustrated specifically by 
looking at Prosser's critique of the relationship 
between the transsexual subject and the photographic 
field. Prosser argues, "We can only look at the 
transsexual ... if we look at how we look" (230). The 
ambiguity of meaning in Prosser's statement is echoed 
by my choice of section heading, "How do I look? ". Its 
immediate connotation in Prosser's discussion is in 
reference to the act of looking, the way in which the 
gaze is constructed by images of transsexual subjects: 
"that look of fascination, objectification and desire 
s/he may cast" (230). His discussion is also concerned 
to identify the self-referential impact of these 
images: the ways in which transsexual bodies force the 
spectator to view the "look" of her or his own body. 
Prosser's analysis of Del LaGrace's close-up shots 
of a "clitoris-turning-penis", explains how the bodily 
difference of the transsexual subject returns the 
spectator to the familiarity of her or his own body in 
search of meaning: "envisioning how you look; how you 
look next to [the subject] Nataf's body, alongside his 
body, even as his body" (234). Thus the spectator's 
gaze is redirected to the material differences of its 
own embodiment: 
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Arresting your look-that is, not only holding 
your look but rooting it (locating it), it 
demands from your body a narrative: How do you 
look? What do you see here? And what does what 
you see here reveal about you? (234) 
A quote from Halberstam given earlier describes the 
subject's gaze of Catherine Opie's photographic models 
as questioning the spectator's sense of her or his own 
gender congruity. Here, it is the transsexual subject's 
body parts which are seen to resist the controlling 
gaze and invoke self-referential anxieties in the 
spectator. The "absolute focus on the genitals" (233) 
quite literally breaks down the distance between the 
spectator and the subject of the image. Prosser 
distinguishes the apparent fetishism of this 
disembodiment of the genitals from the pervasive 
cultural fetishisation of transsexual bodies, 
redefining it as a "provocative affirmation of the 
transsexual's bodily difference" (233). The extreme 
close-up shot of Nataf's genitals is intrinsic to its 
effect on the spectator, producing a "dynamic of 
intimate looking [which] is immediate and unmediated" 
(234). In conclusion, Prosser stresses the importance 
of foregrounding the material reality of transsexual 
subjectivity, or what he calls "the embodied 
specificity of the point of regard" (234), 
in 
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theorisations of transsexuality. 
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According to Prosser's argument the act of looking 
at transsexual bodies can alert all spectators, not 
just transgender ones, to aspects of their own sexed 
and gendered identities which might be deemed to be 
variant rather than normative. In similar ways, 
spectators witnessing the immediate material realness 
and difference of the subjects' masculinities in 
Brooks's and Cameron's portraits might experience 
certain gaps and slippages between their own biological 
sexes, gendered poses and notions of "real" gender. 
What is less clear is how such potentially disruptive 
effects might change dominant ideas about identity. As 
Halberstam, drawing on Butler, observes: "the 
revelation that gender is a social construct does not 
in any way relieve the effects of that construction to 
the point where we can manipulate at will the terms of 
our gendering" (119) . 
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To explore this point in more detail and conclude 
the chapter my discussion returns to the dandy and the 
bodybuilder. Brooks's and Cameron's utilisation of 
these "looks" in their portraits has been read as a 
sign of the subject's difference. Both images are 
culturally prescribed in distinct ways, but the 
relationships to male authority which they evoke have 
been shown to have a corresponding ambivalence. An 
22 As I will discuss in Chapter 4, Kosofsky Sedgwick makes a 
similar point in Epistemology of the Closet (10). 
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aspect of this ambivalence which has not yet been 
closely addressed is the parodic potential of Brooks's 
and Cameron's visual aesthetics in the context of 
discourses of original/copy binaries. 
Appropriate images 
The dandy's appropriation of conventionally feminine 
elements has resulted in a construction of dandyism as 
misogynist and a "burlesque of the female" (Benstock, 
Women 180). Parallels can be drawn to feminist 
criticisms of other "parodic identities" deemed to be 
"degrading to women" such as drag queens and male 
cross-dressers which Judith Butler discusses in Gender 
Trouble (137). Butler suggests that the binary model of 
original/imitation which informs this view is more 
complicated than such critics would allow. By way of 
illustration, she uses the male drag act to conduct a 
recasting of the relationship between "primary 
identification-that is, the original meanings accorded 
to gender-and subsequent gender experience" (137). 
Although Butler's claims for the absolute 
subversiveness of drag have been legitimately 
questioned and she has revised her comments in Bodies 
That Matter, the notion of gender parody offered in 
Gender Trouble continues to influence current sexual 
and gender discourses. In the following passage, Butler 
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uses the various anatomical and gender disjunctions at 
work in a drag performance to exemplify the discrete 
elements of gendered experience: 
The performance of drag plays upon the 
distinction between the anatomy of the 
performer and the gender that is being 
performed. But we are actually in the presence 
of three contingent dimensions of significant 
corporeality: anatomical sex, gender identity, 
and gender performance. If the anatomy of the 
performer is already distinct from the gender 
of the performer, and both of those are 
distinct from the gender of the performance, 
then the performance suggests a dissonance not 
only between sex and performance, but sex and 
gender, and gender and performance. (137) 
The gaps and slippages that Butler identifies in drag 
provide the basis for a concept of gender as imitative 
and contingent. Thus, although on the surface male drag 
presents "woman" as if she were a unified entity, at a 
covert level it exposes the false and illusory nature 
of that unity. According to this theory, whether a drag 
performance dismantles gender ideals or simply 
reinforces them must depend on the manner and context 
in which that gender dissonance is revealed (if it is). 
What makes Brooks's portraits and Cameron's self- 
portraits interesting is the particular ways in which 
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each image orchestrates a performance of certain 
disjunctions between its version of masculinity and a 
normative model. In Brooks's Peter a combination of 
consistent, familiar signs suggests that the subject of 
this portrait is a young male and appears to support an 
idea of "man" as a coherently sexed and gendered being. 
Employing Butler's framework, that sense of wholeness 
is fractured once the disunities between the anatomy of 
the subject (female), the gender of the subject 
(feminine) and the gender that is being "performed" 
(masculine) are understood. As discussed in an earlier 
section, the portrait's title makes explicit anomalous 
elements at which the gendered image only hints. 
Butler's concept of gender parody as "the parody ... 
of the very notion of an original" (Gender Trouble 138) 
has some relevance here. Butler explains: 
just as the psychoanalytic notion of gender 
identification is constituted by a fantasy of 
a fantasy, the transfiguration of an Other who 
is always already a "figure" in that double 
sense, so gender parody reveals that the 
original identity after which gender fashions 
itself is an imitation without an origin. 
(Gender Trouble 138) 
Butler conceptualises gender as neither a natural 
effect nor a cultural construction, but as a 
performative force and hence a condition of 
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subjectivity, rather than its outcome. According to 
this theory male and female subjects are performatively 
constructed through the compulsory repetition of gender 
norms. For Butler, subversive possibilities lie in the 
variations or discontinuities which will necessarily 
occur "within the practices of repetitive signifying" 
(145), since the gender ideals it approximates have 
only a phantasmic existence. 
For some spectators, the "realness" of the 
gendered performance in Peter-its capacity to conceal 
its contradictions-will be attributed to its subject's 
sexual inversion or talent for impersonation, rather 
than to gender's own skills of mimicry. The disclosure 
of difference in that representation of masculinity 
suggests an arbitrary relation between the image and 
the ideal it supposedly resembles which extends beyond 
the subject of this portrait. 
The disjunctions between image and ideal in 
Brooks's Self-Portrait also have potentially subversive 
effects on original/copy models of identity. Brooks's 
adoption of an image of the dandy that is itself deemed 
to parody the female introduces a further layer of 
imitation. Far from simply "aping male 
heterosexuality", as suggested by Benstock, the 
masculine style that is favoured by Brooks is itself 
derived from elements of female heterosexuality and has 
a cultural signification that is primarily read as 
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homosexual. In such a confusion of signs, the notion of 
there being one original identity around which this 
parodic identity has formed becomes strained. 
In the instance of the bodybuilder, masculine 
gender is effectively parodied through an exaggerated 
display of masculinity. Holmlund's essay "Masculinity 
as Multiple Masquerade: The `Mature' Stallone and the 
Stallone Clone" describes Sylvester Stallone's muscular 
"tough guy" image as "a masquerade of proletarian 
masculinity" (214). Holmlund is primarily concerned 
with those dissident figures whose differences are not 
visible: "the gay butch clone, the lesbian femme, or 
the passing black" (214). Of these identities, it is 
the butch clone's masquerade of masculinity which 
Holmlund explores through his queer reading of two 
Stallone films. Holmlund concludes: 
The butch clone's muscles and macho attire, in 
particular, ensure he looks "like a man", and 
a working-class man at that. He is living 
proof that, as Lacan hints, masculinity, not 
just femininity, is a masquerade. Yet for 
those who know where and when to look, his 
homosexuality, seemingly so invisible, is 
unmistakable. (219) 
Visually, Holmlund's "butch clone" and the muscular 
transsexual man may activate similar identifications 
and desires. When Cameron adopts the "look" of the 
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bodybuilder he ensures that he looks like a working- 
class man. It is possible that he may also be read as a 
gay man initially, rather than a transsexual one. In 
either case, masculinity is shown to be as much of an 
"act" as femininity. 
Holmlund's essay uses a specific gay identity to 
reveal the ways in which masculinity is a kind of drag 
which all men "do" to varying degrees. LaGrace's choice 
of female models to perform gay male identities in his 
photographs from the series "Dyke Daddies" (1994)23 
appears to exploit this cultural association. Gabb 
explains: "the characters in the images are women, who 
are acting as `real' gay men, who are in turn parodying 
the performance of masculinity" (298-99). The perceived 
dynamics of these images are reminiscent of the effects 
described in Brooks's portraits where female subjects 
act as "real" male dandies who are themselves parodic 
identities. Cameron's self-portraits, in their apparent 
realignment of maleness and masculinity, enact a 
further exposure of the parodic nature of heterosexual 
white masculinity in their particular enactment of the 
disunities between subject, gendered pose and "real" 
gender. 
Where the mode of masculinity adopted by Brooks's 
dandy in Self-Portrait imitates female heterosexuality 
but signifies male homosexuality, Cameron's masculine 
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self-representation recalls a particular version of 
male heterosexuality which is a predominant image of 
gay male visual culture. In this respect, both the 
dandy and the bodybuilder represent styles of 
masculinity which have the potential to confound binary 
oppositions of sex, gender and sexuality. It is this 
capacity to mix signs which makes them such productive 
images in visualisations of transgender masculinities. 
The displacement of gender meaning in Brooks's and 
Cameron's portraits can be used to show how these 
images may undermine the male authority they evoke and 
apparently endorse. For Butler, context is the key: 
"Although the gender meanings taken up in ... parodic 
styles are clearly part of hegemonic, misogynist 
culture, they are nevertheless denaturalized and 
mobilized through their parodic recontextualization" 
(138). Where "styles" evoke dominant images from 
heterosexist culture there is always a need to "read 
against the grain", and attempts to present absolute 
readings will be constantly threatened. 
Leo Bersani's critique of Paris is Burning is 
scathing about suggestions that resignification can be 
anything other than an act of "politically impotent 
disrespect" (51). Bersani's cynicism is hard to 
counter; it is, as Bersani argues, difficult to imagine 
23 For examples from this series see Lily Roxxie Burana and Linea 
Due's Dagger: On Butch Women (199,210). 
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that any form of mimetic transgression which recalls 
hegemonic norms will "ever overthrow anything" (51). On 
the other hand, it is also hard to imagine 
transgressive representations of any kind, mimetic or 
otherwise, having that amount of cultural and political 
force. The weakness of Bersani's argument is that it 
perhaps takes critics' liberal use of the words 
"subvert" and "subversion" too seriously. In its 
determination to expose the ill-conceived and 
irresponsible theorising of "middle-class academic 
analysts" it appears unwilling to consider that 
anything short of revolution could be valid and 
significant personal and political acts. The visual 
images discussed in this chapter will almost certainly 
not change dominant cultural practices, but they may 
begin to change minds. 
If the publication of a collection like Cameron's 
Body Alchemy reflects the increasing visibility of 
transsexual masculinities, Brooks's portraits can be 
seen to mark an important foundational stage in the 
evolving transgender consciousness which has 
constructed those identities. A comparison of the 
transgender masculinities visualised by Brooks's and 
Cameron's portraits has demonstrated some unusual 
affinities shared by these visual texts. The multiple 
ways in which these images have been shown to dislocate 
conventional ways of viewing and the creative 
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manoeuvres demanded of the spectator give them a 
shared, although not identical force. Productive and, 
at times, quite unexpected areas of commonality have 
been identified by my pairing of the dandy and the 
bodybuilder. The identifications which the dandy and 
the bodybuilder make visible, and thereby "real", have 
depended upon a capacity for change and 
reinterpretation evident in theorisations of both 
figures. In discussing representations of white 
muscular masculinity, Dyer argues that "building bodies 
is the most literal triumph of mind over matter, 
imagination over flesh" (White 153). The personal 
significance for some transsexual men of such material 
acts of self-creation is clear. Viewed in this context, 
the dandification of the female body might be seen to 
demonstrate a feat of corresponding consequence given 
the more limited and temporary possibilities for self- 
gendering of the period. In this respect, the movement 
from costume to body as the site of difference mirrors 
the historical development of transgender identities 
and, more specifically, the emergence of transsexual 
bodies. The development of photography as the primary 
means of representing reality has a related function in 
this process of materialisation. 
The nature of portraiture suggests that the 
subject depicted is "real" and that all self-portraits, 
regardless of medium, are enacting an assertion of 
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identity. However, as Roland Barthes observes in Camera 
Lucida: Reflections on Photography: "Painting can feign 
reality without having seen it", whereas "in 
Photography I can never deny that the thing has been 
there" (76). Paintings such as Brooks's Self-Portrait 
convey a sense of the subject's unconventional self- 
fashioning in their sartorial codes and choice of pose 
and setting, but they lack the photograph's capacity to 
prove existence; that fusion of image and object at a 
given moment which leads Barthes to describe the 
photograph as "literally an emanation of the referent" 
(80) 
. 
Of course, although Cameron's photographic 
portraits could be said to provide a more literal proof 
of existence than Brooks's painted portraits, like any 
art form, visual or written, they still have an 
uncertain relationship to "truth". That the subjects of 
Cameron's portraits are men seems hard to deny (for 
those who would want to) once the spectator is faced 
with the photographic documentation of their masculine 
identifications. However, the decisions made by the 
photographer and subject concerning what images are 
produced and which are finally selected exert an 
influence that, using Susan Sontag's words, makes 
photographs "as much an interpretation of the world as 
paintings and drawings are" (6). 
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What is perhaps more relevant to my discussion is 
not whether the portrait is a photograph or a painting, 
but how the interpretative process is managed and, more 
crucially, who has managed it. This relationship 
between representation and authorship is identified by 
Prosser as being "of massive general significance" to 
transsexual subjects in view of the emergence of 
transgender studies as an academic discipline (Second 
Skins 230). The visual effects that have been 
identified in my discussion of Brooks's and Cameron's 
portraits imply a relationship between artist, subject 
and image that is primarily structured around personal, 
rather than political, concerns. The subjects' apparent 
self-containment and agency and the empowering quality 
of their self-representations give all of the images, 
not just the self-portraits, a certain autobiographical 
quality. Brooks's portraits appear to authenticate the 
transgender masculinities they represent whilst 
sustaining their "inauthentic" elements. The masculine 
"look" of her subjects is, of course, markedly 
different to that of the transsexual men of Cameron's 
photographs and although it has a certain diversity 
there are necessary limits to its range of expression. 
Moreover, Brooks's subjects do not necessarily share 
the varied but mutual experiences of gender that inform 
the masculinities disclosed in Cameron's portraits. 
Nevertheless, in visual terms, Brooks's and Cameron's 
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portraits have been shown to address similar issues and 
have the potential to activate similar responses. 
Although this chapter recognises the complex 
personal narratives which inform the portraits 
discussed, its main concerns have been to identify some 
of the wider, cultural implications of reading those 
narratives. In considering these implications, three 
related outcomes are central to several of the 
overarching themes of this thesis. First, the masculine 
looks and poses displayed in Brooks's and Cameron's 
portraits create a site for constructing transgender 
masculinities as "real". Second, that construction of 
gender realness provides models of masculinity which 
both recall and depart from conventional concepts of 
"maleness" and "manliness". Third, and perhaps most 
significantly, the dissonance that is performed by 
these visual representations of transgender 
masculinities may call into question the stability and 
coherence of all masculinities and, by extension, all 
sexed and gendered identities. 
In the next chapter, narrative representations of 
sex- and gender-crossings, both fictional and lived, 
are examined for their revisionary impact on notions of 
"true" identities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
True Stories: Orlando, life-writing, and transgender 
narratives 
My life was one long protest against the 
separation of fact from fantasy: fantasy was 
fact, I reasoned, just as mind was body, or 
imagination truth. 
-Jan Morris, Conundrum (110) 
when a subject is highly controversial-and any 
question about sex is that-one cannot hope to 
tell the truth. One can only show how one came 
to hold whatever opinion one does hold. ... 
Fiction here is likely to contain more truth 
than fact. 
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own (6) 
He stretched himself. He rose. He stood 
upright in complete nakedness before us, and 
while the trumpets pealed Truth! Truth! Truth! 
we have no choice left but confess-he was a 
woman. 
-Virginia Woolf, Orlando (132) 
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Surely no sex change has ever been quite so easy. No 
therapy, no "life test", no hormones, no surgery. ' 
Instead just several days of deep sleep, a few trumpet 
flourishes and the protagonist rises from his bed a 
perfectly formed woman. In its depiction of a seamless, 
pain-free and absolute transition from male to female, 
this passage provides the climax to what is 
unquestionably the most theatrical and most memorable 
scene in Virginia Woolf's Orlando (1928): the main 
character's transformation at the age of thirty from a 
man to a woman. 2 
By devising this narrative twist it could be 
argued that Woolf constructs an ultimate transsexual 
vision. In this fantasy of perfection the author 
emerges as the ideal gender reassignment surgeon, not 
only refashioning existing materials into new although 
reassuringly familiar shapes, but effecting complete 
biological authenticity. As the narrator so 
emphatically states: "Orlando had become a woman-there 
is no denying it" (133). This biographical endorsement 
of the legitimacy of Orlando's change of sex 
constitutes a representation of truth which provides a 
1 Prior to surgery, a transsexual person is usually required to 
live full-time in her or his "chosen" gender role for a period of 
between one and two years. This is generally referred to as a 
"life test". 
2 Marjorie Garber describes Orlando's transformation as a non- 
surgical "transsexual procedure" that is "in effect a pronoun 
transplant" (Vested Interests 134). 
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compelling link to a particular form of transgender 
narrative: transsexual autobiography. 
A striking aspect of Woolf's Orlando is what one 
critic describes as "the tensions between inner and 
outer realities" (Schlack 80) that it demonstrates. 
Analogous tensions inform and construct many 
transsexual narratives, in which the truth of the sex 
and gender experienced denies the truth of the sex and 
gender assigned at birth. The following statements, 
drawn from autobiographies by transsexual women, stand 
as bold challenges to conventional understandings of 
"physical" and "material" evidence that would disavow 
the legitimacy of those experiences. In Conundrum Jan 
Morris observes: "To myself I had been woman all along, 
and I was not going to change the truth of me, only 
discard the falsity" (101). Claudine Griggs's Passage 
Through Trinidad: Journal of a Surgical Sex Change 
records her feelings on receiving official confirmation 
of the surgical reassignment of her sex: "I am pleased 
that a doctor finally states that I am 
specifically female. This will be convenient, since I 
have been a girl or woman all my life" (76). Finally, 
in an extract from a letter written on 8th June 1952, 
Christine Jorgenson explains to her family: "Nature 
made a mistake, which I have corrected, and I am now 
your daughter" (125). 
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By identifying this common theme I am not 
suggesting that Orlando, the character, is a 
transsexual woman; to do so would be damagingly 
reductive to both Woolf's text and transsexual 
subjectivities. My decision to compare a fictionalised 
and fantastic biography from the 1920s with transsexual 
autobiographies drawn from the latter part of the 
century acknowledges the many important differences 
between these texts and, indeed, within the wider genre 
of transgender life-writing itself. 3 
At a narrative level there is no indication that 
Orlando is unhappy with his body or its designated 
gender prior to the transformation and although there 
are hints of precognition, there is no real suggestion 
of agency in that process. Furthermore, the presence of 
other types of sex- and gender-crossing in Orlando- 
primarily centred around notions of drag-contrives to 
maintain a fluidity of gender which aligns its 
protagonist more obviously with the transgendered 
figure allegorised in queer theory's constructionist 
account of gender. 
In terms of genre, although Orlando is clearly a 
fictional rather than non-fictional narrative, it is 
very much a hybrid text. Its use of the genres of 
biography and fantasy, together with photographs of the 
3 The distinction that is being made here between transgender and 
transsexual narratives is predicated on the basis of the subject's 
self-identification. 
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protagonist's living model, Vita Sackville-West, give 
the novel a heterogeneity which fittingly reflects its 
primary concern with notions of androgyny. 
The reasons why Woolf chose to present this 
particular novel in this particular form have been 
debated at length. There are clear biographical and 
autobiographical influences, as will be discussed 
shortly. That in itself, however, seems hardly 
sufficient explanation given the acknowledged personal 
sources of inspiration for characters in her other 
novels; the central figure of Mrs Ramsay in To the 
Lighthouse, for example, is based on Woolf's mother. 
Woolf's playful adoption of different genres for 
Orlando sets this novel firmly apart from the rest of 
her oeuvre both formally and stylistically. And 
although questions of identity inform most of Woolf's 
writing, both fictional and non-fictional, the full 
title Orlando: A Biography signals that this novel's 
concerns have as much to do with genre as with gender. 
This chapter proposes that the similarities 
between Orlando and transsexual autobiographies lie in 
two related areas. First, issues around fixed notions 
of identity and their relationship to different kinds 
of truths, including auto/biographical truths, are 
explored both by Woolf through the literary device of 
sex change and by transsexual autobiographers through 
the stories of their own transitions. Second, the 
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relationship between life-writing and the processes of 
identity construction that is a constitutive element of 
transsexual subjectivity is also evident in the 
auto/biographical roots of Orlando and its narrative 
form. This aspect of Woolf's novel can be considered 
through reviewing some events from her life which 
instance an enduring and, at times, seemingly obsessive 
fascination with notions of gender difference. 
Woolf's hidden [a] gender4 
In what is thought to be possibly Woolf's first attempt 
at writing, a letter to her half-brother George 
Duckworth, she declares: "I AM A LITTLE BOY AND ADRIAN 
IS A GIRL" (Congenial Spirits 2). An editorial footnote 
suggests that Woolf would have been six or maybe 
younger when she wrote this letter. Clearly this 
statement is not to be conflated with autobiographical 
accounts of the transsexual subject's earliest 
recollections of being gendered differently. The young 
Woolf is using language playfully to invert gender; the 
transsexual autobiographer uses it to describe, 
retrospectively, the inversion of gender she or he 
experienced as a child. The following extract from 
Morris's Conundrum is fairly typical in its epiphanic 
4 This section heading is derived from the title of Kate 
Bornstein's play, Hidden: A Gender. The script is included in 
Gender Outlaw (169-223). 
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tone, although by no means definitive: "I was three or 
perhaps four years old when I realized that I had been 
born into the wrong body and should really be a girl. I 
remember the moment well, and it is the earliest memory 
of my life" (11). In this scene, Morris is able to take 
a specific moment from her early life and interpret it 
as what Jay Prosser calls an "origin story for the 
transsexual self" (Second Skins 118). 
Woolf's spirited challenge to accepted truths at 
such an early stage in her development might also be 
taken as a starting point, since in that moment of 
presumably wilful misrecognition lie the seeds of what 
is to become increasingly a personal preoccupation. Her 
desire to explore what Stephen Whittle in his 
discussion of transgender artists calls different "ways 
of `thinking gender' " (214) pervades much of her 
writing, both autobiographical and fictional. Sue Roe's 
study of the relationship between Woolf's writing and 
gender claims that her writing practice concerns itself 
with "the struggle to create a gendered identity" (3). 
The aim of that struggle might equally be to imagine 
ways to escape particular forms of gendered identity. 
In either case, a kind of alliance exists between 
Woolf's writing practice and the writing practices of 
transsexual autobiographers who shape and re-present 
narratives that dispute dominant concepts of identity. 
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Readers of Woolf will be familiar with her "plan 
of the soul" proposed in her essay A Room of One's Own 
(1929), according to which "in each of us two powers 
preside, one male, one female", but Orlando is surely 
her most comprehensive and radical exploration of 
gender. In her personal life Woolf's experiments with 
cross-gendering were fairly limited and, by comparison 
with more flamboyant and exhibitionist figures from the 
period such as her lover Vita Sackville-West, seem 
relatively tame. There is Woolf's notorious 
impersonation of an Abyssinian prince when she crosses 
gender and racial boundaries to take part in the well- 
documented "Dreadnought Hoax", a practical joke 
organised by her brother, Adrian, and his friend. 5 More 
tellingly, Woolf's adoption of masculine or gender 
neutral personae-the "Billy" (a diminutive of "Billy 
Goat") and "Potto" of letters exchanged with her 
sister, Vanessa Bell, and Vita-suggests that it is in 
and through her writing, rather than any public 
displays, that a type of self-fashioning is enacted. 
A biographical anecdote offers a possible source 
for the change of sex around which the narrative of 
Orlando pivots. The incident occurs at the beginning of 
September 1927, the same month Woolf decided that Vita 
Sackville-West, an aristocrat with a penchant for 
5 Hermione Lee provides a detailed account of this extraordinary 
incident in Virginia Woolf (282-286). 
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cross-dressing, should provide the model for "Orlando, 
a young nobleman" (Diary 3 157). Woolf was at a party 
held by Lydia and Maynard Keynes. Quentin Bell tells 
us: "Someone had brought a newspaper cutting with them; 
it reproduced the photograph of a pretty young woman 
who had become a man, and this for the rest of the 
evening became Virginia's main topic of conversation" 
(Biography 2 132). 
Although this story demonstrates Woolf's awareness 
of transgender non-fiction narratives, no reference to 
the episode can be found in her diaries and letters. 
Woolf's correspondence with Lytton Strachey describes 
the events of the evening but only records the gender- 
crossing antics of Jack Sheppard, the Cambridge 
classicist, who "half naked, tightly swathed in red 
silk, shingled as to his head, with coloured garters, 
was Miss T. .. to perfection" 
(Letters 3 418). 6 The 
extent to which Woolf was directly influenced by these 
personal encounters with sex and gender changes remains 
a matter of speculation, but in a diary entry of 5 
October 1927 she wrote: "And instantly the usual 
exciting devices enter my mind: a biography beginning 
in the year 1500 & continuing to the present day, 
called Orlando: Vita; only with a change about from one 
6 The Miss T. referred to is Dorothy Todd, editor of Vogue between 
1922 and 1926 (Lee 470). Bell's account of the evening has a 
slightly different interpretation of Sheppard's performance 
stating that he "enacted the part of an Italian prima donna" 
(Biography 2 132). 
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sex to another" (Diary 3 161). 
Woolf's personal history should not be relied upon 
too heavily for readings of Orlando, but it might 
sanction some conjecture as to other motivating forces 
behind what has been called the "longest and most 
charming love letter in literature" (Nicolson 186). How 
much is this fictional biography a means for Woolf to 
explore her own identity under the guise of exploring 
another's? Woolf self-consciously parades the fact that 
Vita Sackville-West, whose female sex precluded her 
from inheriting the ancestral home, is the biographical 
source for Orlando. The dedication "To V. Sackville- 
West" and photographs of vita posing as Orlando ensure 
that the reader is aware of the living inspiration for 
Woolf's imagined subject. In the fantasised form of 
Orlando Vita can elude the limits of human existence, 
shape-shifting at will and living forever; but what if 
this far from subtly coded tale has also been 
constructed to conceal and facilitate Woolf's own wish 
to push back the boundaries that confine her self? 
Woolf's preference for a vicarious engagement with 
the more intimate areas of her life is evident both in 
her letters and diaries, and her fiction. Jean 0. Love 
observes that in writing Orlando Woolf was 
"demonstrating that she preferred the role of the 
artist, of the truly fascinated observer and 
commentator, to the role of participant-in sexual as in 
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other relationships" (213). A letter to Woolf from Vita 
during a trip to Berlin, dated 12 January 1929, is 
revealing in this respect: 
We [herself and Harold Nicolson] went to the 
sodomites' ball. A lot of them were dressed as 
women, but I fancy I was the only genuine 
article in the room .... There are 
certainly very queer things to be seen in 
Berlin and I think Potto [Woolf] will enjoy 
himself. (Letters of Vita Sackville West 324) 
Although this letter post-dates Orlando's publication, 
Vita's confident assertion that the gender-crossing 
typical of social gatherings in some parts of 1920s 
Berlin will appeal to Woolf is telling. It adds to a 
growing picture of Woolf as something of a voyeur. 
Writing Orlando as a biography and fantasy allows her 
to traverse gender boundaries imaginatively and through 
the experiences of others. Furthermore, Sackville- 
West's sense of herself as gender normative or, as she 
puts it, the "genuine article" can be compared with 
Woolf's private, self-mocking expressions of gender 
inauthenticity. A letter to Vita, dated 31 January 
1927, includes the comment: "D'you know it's a great 
thing being a eunuch as I am: that is not knowing 
what's the right side of a skirt" (Letters 3 320). 
Writing to Vanessa Bell in the same year, Woolf 
laments: "poor Billy [Woolf] isn't one thing or 
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another, not a man nor a woman, so what's he to do? " 
(Letters 3 401). 
Orlando's status as fiction enables Woolf to bring 
personal matters of selfhood into a public dimension, 
whilst enabling her to explore the truth of identity 
and question what the relationship of that truth might 
be to gender from a safe distance. Representations of 
truth in transsexual autobiographies address similar 
issues but as part of life-narratives those 
representations expose their authors to a different 
type of critical scrutiny. 
Forging truths 
Popular notions of the nature of truth are always in 
dispute in autobiographical narratives. This is in part 
a structural effect; the linear form imposes an 
artificial order on the life story told. As Prosser 
observes, autobiographical writing "endows the life 
with a formal structure that life does not indeed have" 
(Second Skins 116). What is especially compelling about 
the representation of truth in transsexual 
autobiography is its ambivalent relationship to 
official truths and so-called natural laws. 
Some historical context for the forging of this 
alliance of uneasy opposites is useful. In The will to 
Knowledge, Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality, Michel 
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Foucault examines the role of the ancient Western 
ritual of confession in the production of a discourse 
of truth. In particular he identifies the nineteenth 
century as a period when a new kind of scientific 
discourse was pioneered through the ordering and 
classification of an "archive of the pleasures of sex" 
which had been constituted over many centuries by means 
of the "procedures of confession" (63). Foucault 
describes how through the work of sexologists such as 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis the 
personal narratives of men, initially, and then women, 
came to be recognised as valid scientific data. This 
conjunction of personal experience and scientific 
theory is evident in my discussion of sexological case 
studies in Chapter 1. It is also particularly notable 
in transsexual narratives where what Foucault calls 
"lived experience as evidence" (64) is scientifically 
and medically validated. 
In some transsexual autobiographies it takes the 
form of "expert" testimonies incorporated into the 
texts. Christine Jorgensen's autobiography, for 
example, includes an introduction by Harry Benjamin, an 
endocrinologist and the author of The Transsexual 
Phenomenon. In the following extract, Benjamin offers 
unequivocal support for Christine Jorgensen's 
perception of herself as a female inside a male body: 
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Medically, Christine presents an almost 
classic case of the transsexual phenomenon, or 
in other words, a striking example of a 
disturbed gender role orientation. 
But was this female gender role really 
new? The vivid description of her early life 
supplies a negative answer. This was a little 
girl, not a boy (in spite of the anatomy) who 
grew up in this remarkably sound and normal 
family. There was no broken home, no weak or 
absent father with whom the little boy could 
not identify. (vii)7 
In other transsexual autobiographies, the availability 
of hormonal and surgical treatment in itself becomes an 
implicit endorsement of the authenticity of the 
subject's self-identification. Jan Morris's pragmatic 
statement that by undergoing sex reassignment surgery 
she was "not going to change the truth of me, only 
discard the falsity" (101) illustrates this effect. 
The role of medical technology in the construction 
of transsexual subjectivities is a contentious issue. 
It has been argued, primarily by non-transgender 
critics, that the invidious but obligatory position in 
which transsexual subjects often find themselves in 
relation to medical practitioners may also have a 
This official endorsement is reminiscent of Havelock Ellis's 
prefatory support for Radclyffe Hall's depiction of the invert in 
The Well of Loneliness, discussed in my opening chapter. 
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direct bearing on the life stories that are told. 
Judith Shapiro's essay "Transsexualism: Reflections on 
the Persistence of Gender and the Mutability of Sex" 
argues that "transsexuals' own accounts of a fixed and 
unchanging (albeit sex-crossed) gender identity" cannot 
be taken at face value "given the immense pressure on 
them to produce the kinds of life histories that will 
get them what they want from the medico-psychiatric 
establishment" (251). Pat Califia is also concerned 
about the extent to which the personal history of a 
transsexual person is shaped by science: 
None of the gender scientists seem to realize 
that they, themselves, are responsible for 
creating a situation where transsexual people 
must describe a fixed set of symptoms and 
recite a history that has been edited in 
clearly prescribed ways in order to get a 
doctor's approval for what should be their 
inalienable right. (68) 
Where Shapiro's comments highlight the unreliability of 
transsexual narratives, the passage from Califia 
identifies that body of "professionals" who, in her 
eyes, are to blame for the false nature of those 
narratives. Although Califia's stance is clearly 
transgender-affirmative, it is also uncompromisingly 
polemical and some of the terms of her argument should 
be questioned. It is easy to assert the "inalienable 
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right" of a transsexual person to receive hormones and 
surgery; it is perhaps more difficult to imagine a 
situation where such things would be freely 
administered without reference to some already 
established criteria. Although the type of criteria 
medical institutions apply in their responses to 
transsexual subjects is open to criticism, it is 
understandable that some degree of consultation and 
diagnosis is required if surgical and medical 
procedures are to meet individual needs. 
Both Shapiro and Califia highlight a situation in 
which dependence on medical validation has resulted in 
the need to compromise personal truth. What is 
important in terms of this chapter is the extent to 
which this pressure to conform to medically prescribed 
criteria influences the truth of the published 
autobiography, as opposed to the "patient's" narrative. 
In "The Empire Strikes Back: a Posttranssexual 
Manifesto" Sandy Stone discusses the official mistrust 
with which transsexual life-narratives have been 
treated: "Transsexuals ... collect autobiographical 
literature. According to the Stanford gender dysphoria 
program, the medical clinics do not, because they 
consider autobiographical accounts thoroughly 
unreliable" (285). Stone, who like Shapiro believes 
that many transsexual people have been telling the 
story the doctors want to hear, is concerned how this 
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affects the story eventually narrated in 
autobiographies. How, queries Stone, do "the 
storytellers differentiate between the story they tell 
and the story they hear? " (291). Her answer is that 
"they differentiate with great difficulty" (291). 
"Purity" and "denial of mixture" are cited as recurring 
problems of the genre and Stone concludes: "They go 
from being unambiguous men ... to unambiguous women. 
There is no territory between" (286). Having made that 
transition, Stone observes, there is a need to erase 
the past in favour of what she refers to as a 
"plausible history" (295). In making these 
observations, Stone is writing from a transsexual 
subject position. She has personal experience of the 
clinical imperative in this process and describes the 
medical establishment as the "body police" (293). 
A failure to distinguish clearly between the 
"official truth" and the truth of the individual's 
lived experience is less apparent in more recently 
produced life-writing. In Kate Bornstein's Gender 
Outlaw there is a determination to draw a distinction 
between "the story told and the story heard". Bornstein 
is typically uncompromising in her view: 
Transsexuality is the only condition for 
which the therapy is to lie. This therapeutic 
lie is one reason we haven't been saying too 
much about ourselves and our lives and our 
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experience of gender; we're not allowed, in 
therapy, the right to think of ourselves as 
transsexual. (62) 
Bornstein is keen to expose the pressure she found 
herself subjected to by counsellors to conceal her 
transsexual identity through learning to re-invent her 
given identification as female. Bornstein explains 
"Here I was, taking a giant step toward personal 
integrity by entering therapy with the truth and self- 
acknowledgment that I was a transsexual, and I was 
told, `Don't tell anyone you're transsexual'" (62). 
Woolf's brand of gender reassignment requires no 
human mediation. It just happens and there, as far as 
the narrator is concerned, is an end to it; but the 
opportunity is not missed to thumb a nose at the 
establishment's concern to uphold "official truths". In 
the following passage, scientific and medical 
intervention into the sexual identity of the individual 
is alluded to and thoroughly undermined by Woolf's 
narrator. In this wilfully pragmatic statement of the 
facts we are told: 
Many people ... holding that such a change 
of sex is against nature, have been at great 
pains to prove (1) that Orlando has always 
been a woman, (2) that Orlando is at this 
moment a man. Let biologists and psychologists 
determine. It is enough for us to state the 
257 
simple fact; Orlando was a man till the age of 
thirty; when he became a woman and has 
remained so ever since. (133-34) 
The adoption here of a judicial tone and style of 
address serves to mock those "experts" who would 
approach the subject of human identity armed only with 
scientific theories of what is natural. In a wonderful 
combination of blissful ignorance and superior 
knowledge, the narrator is allowed to gloss over the 
truth of the very thing that we desire to know most: 
how can someone who is born male suddenly and 
apparently involuntarily become female? Woolf is not 
concerned with whether it is technically possible to 
change sex. The narrator's dismissive tone renders this 
question irrelevant. The story of Orlando's life is not 
a scientific study or medical treatise and it does not 
have to answer to the given truths of such disciplines. 
It is also, of course, not an autobiography or even an 
authentic biography. Thus, having distanced her subject 
from the usual constraints of the laws of gender and 
genre, Woolf can focus on and explore other more 
personally significant issues. What seems to interest 
Woolf about her character's change of sex is how it 
alters that life and how the chronicling of that life 
challenges representational and biographical truths. 
Transsexual autobiographies pose questions that 
have shared interests with Woolf's concerns, but that 
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are also highly specific to their subjects. What 
happens to the already complex relationship between 
life-writing and a life when much of that life has been 
felt to have been lived in the "wrong body"? What 
happens when that erroneous body is altered to match 
the experience of gender? How are memories synthesised? 
How are kinship ties rendered meaningful? In what terms 
is desire articulated? And how does the handling of 
these singular difficulties impact, as a whole, on the 
autobiographical truth of the narrative? 
Transsexual autobiographies often describe a 
conscious drive towards bodily change and a pre- 
operative existence always troubled by the true sex and 
gender that the writer feels her or himself to be. 
Orlando does not experience that disjunction. His 
transformation is performed in a moment and is 
presented as something that happens to him, rather than 
something he actively seeks. Orlando's life as a man is 
primarily one of gendered coherence. It is only as a 
woman that she feels the need to lead a double life in 
which both selves, female and male, are allowed equal 
expression. Whilst this comments on the limitations of 
the conventional female role, it also promotes Woolf's 
model of androgyny. In changing Orlando from a man to a 
woman and creating a disparity between the character's 
sexed body and gender, Woolf is able to reveal her 
belief in an essential identity, an "inner reality" 
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that is untouched by such material differences. The 
narrator explains: 
The change of sex, though it altered their 
future, did nothing whatever to alter their 
identity. Their faces remained, as their 
portraits prove, practically the same. His 
memory-but in future we must, for convention's 
sake, say "her" for "his", and "she" for "he"- 
her memory then, went back through all the 
events of her past life without encountering 
any obstacle. Some slight haziness there may 
have been, as if a few dark drops had fallen 
into the clear pool of memory; certain things 
had become a little dimmed; but that was all. 
(133) 
It was not that "she" had always been a woman in a 
man's body, but rather that Orlando had always been 
Orlando and would continue to be so regardless of 
somatic or gendered alteration. This continuity is 
reflected in the unchanged name. In Woolf's first 
draft, edited and published by S. N. Clarke, she 
considers feminising "Orlando" to "Orlanda" following 
the transformation from male to female (110). Her 
decision to render the name gender neutral seems 
important to Woolf's message about the androgynous 
nature of identity. 
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There is a suggestion of an inner integrity in the 
characterisation of Orlando which seems antithetical to 
the dysphoric experience that often epitomises 
transsexual narratives. And yet in many of these 
accounts, as witnessed earlier, the person's sense of a 
core identity is unwavering even if the name, the 
clothing and eventually the body have to be altered. To 
take one example here, Christine Jorgensen explains: 
"Though, indeed, my outward appearance was changed, I 
think I'm basically one and the same person I was in 
the earlier part of my life perhaps calmer, more 
accepting, and certainly happier" (329). Like Orlando, 
then, Christine has always been Christine; bodily 
change was only necessary for other people to see her 
as Christine. The narration of this bodily transition, 
however, creates a central paradox in transsexual 
autobiographies. 
Bernice L. Hausman's Changing Sex: Transsexualism, 
Technology, and the Idea of Gender claims to find a 
fatal flaw in transsexual autobiographers' stories. She 
identifies certain "discursive discontinuities" to 
support her book's central argument that transsexualism 
is a technological construct (141). The contradictory 
relationship between a narrative which depicts 
transition and a narrator who is claiming already to be 
the gender to which she or he is transitioning is 
presented as a key piece of evidence: "The tension 
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between the two stories-the story of the subject as the 
other sex and the story of the methods used to make the 
subject represent the other sex-constitutes one central 
disjunction in transsexual autobiographical narratives" 
(148) 
. 
Hausman's reading of this apparent anomaly has 
been brilliantly countered by Jay Prosser's critique of 
the structuring principles common to both autobiography 
and transsexuality: 
The autobiographical self, as is its wont, 
suggests itself from the beginning as already 
there. The transsexual self simply follows 
form. Autobiography produces identity 
(sameness, singularity); transsexual 
autobiography, we should not be surprised, 
produces gender identity. (Second Skins 120) 
What Hausman sees as a "central disjunction", Prosser 
interprets as "not a disruptive paradox but a founding 
dynamic: a dynamic that in turn, as transsexuality is 
reliant on the autobiographical form, founds 
transsexuality" (119). 
Prosser's model of the narrative origins of 
transsexual subjects is alert to the historical and 
cultural complexities of that subjectivity. Hausman's 
argument lacks flexibility in its approach. Her 
assertion that transsexuality did not exist prior to 
the sex reassignment technology of the late 1940s does 
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not adequately address a transsexual desire that, as 
seen in my opening chapter, was being disclosed in 
narratives from sexological case studies of the late- 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and novels 
such as Hall's The Well of Loneliness. 
The story of Orlando's bodily transition creates 
its own "discontinuities". Following Orlando's change 
of sex, known truths about that character are subverted 
and rendered unintelligible. Various manoeuvres must be 
undertaken in order to resolve the conflict between the 
somatic truth of Orlando's new status as a woman and 
the truth of her previous existence as a man. Orlando's 
past life includes the material evidence of property, a 
wife and children, and an ambassadorial role overseas 
(all of which given the historical period were 
undeniably the trappings of manhood). Other "people" 
are required to recognise Orlando as the same person. 
Legal practitioners, servants, former admirers all have 
to reconcile themselves to a new truth: Orlando, who 
has lived as a man for thirty years, has been married 
and fathered children, is now a woman. 
As far as the law is concerned, Orlando must have 
an unequivocal gender identity, regardless of her 
history. The scientific and legal enforcement of a dual 
system of sex and gender is given a typically playful 
and ironic treatment by Woolf's narrator: 
263 
[Orlando] was a party to three major suits 
which had been preferred against her during 
her absence, as well as innumerable minor 
litigations .... The chief charges against 
her were (1) that she was dead, and therefore 
could not hold any property whatsoever; (2) 
that she was a woman, which amounts to much 
the same thing; (3) that she was an English 
Duke who had married one Rosina Pepita, a 
dancer; and had had by her three sons, which 
sons now declaring that their father was 
deceased, claimed that all his property 
descended to them. ... All her estates were 
put in Chancery and her titles pronounced in 
abeyance while the suits were under 
litigation. Thus it was in a highly ambiguous 
condition, uncertain whether she was alive or 
dead, man or woman, Duke or nonentity, that 
she posted down to her country seat, where, 
pending the legal judgement, she had the Law's 
permission to reside in a state of incognito 
or incognita, as the case might turn out to 
be. (161) 
Once more a pompous legalistic style and tone are 
affected in order to ridicule a system patently unfit 
to deal with anomalies and so unable to recognise its 
own shortcomings. One of the things demonstrated in 
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this passage is that as far as the legal authorities 
are concerned, if you begin life as a man you cannot 
end it as a woman. Having implicitly stated this 
incontrovertible fact, Woolf takes great delight in 
disproving it when, despite all the historical evidence 
to the contrary, Lord Palmerston decrees that Orlando 
is "beyond the shadow of a doubt" female (243). The 
fact that Orlando, now a woman, has in the recent past 
been a duke, a husband and a father is overlooked by 
the authorities. It seems that it is possible in 
Woolf's fantasised biography to be both a man and a 
woman in the same lifetime. Whilst Lord Palmerston's 
judgement reinforces the primacy of biological truth in 
the determining of identity, then, this whole incident 
exposes the prescriptive and limiting nature of those 
fixed notions of identity and the oversights that are 
permissible where the upholding of sexual and social 
order is concerned. 
Until the courts have given their verdict on the 
matter, Orlando is caught in what the novel calls (in 
the passage quoted above) "a highly ambiguous 
condition": a sex and gender limbo, a position of non- 
existence. Her transformation has designated her as a 
non-person and her return to "reality" relies upon the 
pronouncements of others. As far as the official 
declaration of Orlando's sex is concerned, if that 
identity is to be realised in a social context then 
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androgyny, it seems, is not an option. A psychoanalytic 
reading of Orlando's position, post-transformation, 
might cast her as the invisible androgyne, the 
"impossible referent" of the title of Francette 
Pacteau's essay. Such a reading would explain why 
Orlando, using Pacteau's terms, must be "unveiled" as a 
"woman or man" (78), or remain in the domain of the 
imaginary, forever situated outside systems of 
signification. Rachel Bowlby's essay "Orlando: An 
Introduction" offers a neat summary of the situation: 
In order for Orlando to continue with her 
life, she has to be granted an agreed 
identity, and in this sense to have a sex, 
one sex or the other and only one, is 
(literally) vital: if you are not 
unequivocally male or female, you cannot be 
accorded the other attributes of a person. 
(166-67) 
Through subjecting Orlando to intense legal scrutiny, 
Woolf exposes the woeful inadequacy of existing 
constructions of sex and gender to deal with the 
complexities of individual lived experience. Whilst at 
a practical level those constructions are recognised as 
a convenient and even necessary means of ordering 
society, in human terms they are presented as arbitrary 
and a barrier to individual expression. Furthermore, in 
isolating the truth of Orlando's identity from its 
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corporeality, and yet at the same time recognising the 
social imperative for gendered embodiment, Woolf 
represents a dilemma that is specific to transsexual 
narratives. 
Claudine Griggs explains in S/he: Changing Sex and 
Changing Clothes: "I altered shape from `male' to 
`femaleness' which is a form that I can compatibly wear 
and allows others to have a glimpse of me" (134). The 
choice of the word "glimpse" is revealing. It 
acknowledges the importance of the surgically altered 
body as a palpable, avowed expression of identity, as 
well as the "self's inevitable reflection" (125). It 
also endeavours to see the body for what it is: to the 
majority of society the most concrete and irrefutable 
evidence of authentic identity there is; to Griggs 
little more than a label or proof of ownership. In this 
context, the body is just one rather unsubtle but 
necessary representation of who the real Claudine 
Griggs is. 
In Orlando, various discourses in the text-legal, 
social, sexual-join forces to give Orlando's new female 
identity the semblance of being fixed, stable and 
singular. At the same time, in a playful aside, the 
narrator informs us of the ambiguous nature of 
identity: 
In every human being a vacillation from one 
sex to the other takes place, and often it is 
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only the clothes that keep the male or female 
likeness, while underneath the sex is the 
very opposite of what it is above. Of the 
complications and confusions which thus 
result everyone has had experience. (181) 
It is Woolf's notion of androgyny that is expressed 
here, but there is a more generally applicable point 
concerning representation. Suzanne Raitt's study of the 
relationship between Sackville-West and Woolf suggests 
that the reason Orlando develops as fantasy is because 
of Woolf's awareness of the "impossibility of 
representation" (37). By using costume as a metaphor 
for Orlando's multiple "selves", Woolf gives a 
colourful articulation of her belief that attempts to 
represent an identity which is natural and fluid will 
always be necessarily contrived and fashioned according 
to societal and cultural dictates. The figure of 
Orlando is described by Raitt as an "approximation" 
rather than an identity (37). These comments offer a 
useful paradigm for issues of identification and 
representation in transsexual autobiographies. 
Inadequate genders 
One of the consequences of Orlando's transition is the 
creation of a dual perspective, something that Stone, 
in her discussion of transsexual autobiography, terms 
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"subjective intertextuality" (298). Because, according 
to Woolf, nothing essential has changed, it is possible 
for Orlando's memories to remain untouched by the 
change of sex. This allows for a synthesising of 
Orlando's lives as a man and as a woman. There is "some 
ambiguity in her terms", we are told; "she seemed to 
vacillate; she was man; she was woman; she knew the 
secrets, shared the weaknesses of each" (152). The 
celebration of this fluidity between the two genders-a 
fluidity that is at its height when, as a woman, 
Orlando continues to experience life as a man by means 
of drag-would seem to be the inverse of the linear 
trajectory from "male to female" or "female to male" 
that is commonly depicted in transsexual 
autobiographies. 
There are good reasons for the unequivocal 
elements of many transsexual narratives. One is 
personal: there is a marked difference between living 
in society and living in someone's imagination or 
theories. The transsexual subject needs to present her 
or his gendered identity as coherent and whole. Another 
lies with the genre itself, which supplies what Prosser 
calls "narrative coherence" (Second Skins 116). Prosser 
argues: "Before critiquing transsexual autobiographies 
for conforming to a specific gendered plot, for writing 
narratives in which gendered meanings are `unilinear, ' 
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we need to grasp the ways in which the genre of 
autobiography is conformist and unilinear" (115). 
Prosser's point is important, but there is also a 
need to look more carefully for instances in 
transsexual autobiographies where the conformity of 
those gendered plots wavers or breaks down. A large 
part of Renee Richards's life is constructed in terms 
of an habitual fluctuation between her male persona and 
her female one. Her attempts to maintain her identity 
as a man whilst also giving expression to her 
identification as a woman only seem to emphasise the 
possibilities that must be forfeited if either state is 
to be rendered endurable. The distinction that Jan 
Morris presents between her life as a man and her life 
as a woman is clearer, yet she specifies a period when 
she identifies as neither male nor female: "Thirty-five 
years as a male, I thought, ten in between, and the 
rest of my life as me" (138). The choice of the word 
"me", rather than "a woman" or "female" for her current 
identity, suggests an awareness of the inconsistent 
relation between her self-identification and gender 
that perhaps other parts of the autobiography, with 
their depiction of stereotypical feminine traits, tend 
to smooth over. At another point in the narrative 
Morris admits that there are problems in reconciling 
those "years as a male" with her current life: 
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It is hard for me now to remember what 
everyday life was like as a man-unequivocally 
as a man, I mean, before my change began at 
all. Sometimes, though, by a conscious effort 
I try to recapture the sensation, and realize 
the contrast in my condition now. (141) 
In general terms this comment reflects the difficulties 
that are a common experience for most people looking 
back to previous stages in their lives: what did it 
feel like to be a child, a young adult, a twenty- 
something? Renee Richards says of her childhood, "it is 
like remembering what happened to a little boy I knew 
very well, perhaps a nephew" (5). The sense of 
detachment she describes could equally be claimed by 
non-transsexual people, but for both Morris and 
Richards the comments also represent experiences that 
are specific to transsexual subjects who have lived 
both as men and women. In this respect, such comments 
may not be simply attempts to deny the past; they may 
represent attempts to articulate genuinely felt 
experiences. 
Whilst Stone sees the female status of transsexual 
women like Morris as being presented as unambiguous, 
Morris herself describes what she perceives to be her 
"continuing ambiguity": "I have lived the life of a 
man, I live now the life of a woman, and one day 
perhaps I shall transcend both-if not in person, then 
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perhaps in art, if not here, then somewhere else" 
(157). There is an important choice of words again here 
in terms of Morris's self-identification. She does not 
claim to have been a man or a woman, but instead states 
that she has "lived the life" of both. In this 
statement, there is once more a sense of some core 
self, a "me", that is distinct from the "man" and 
"woman" that have been the embodiment of that identity. 
Morris's reference to art as a medium through 
which the constraints of gender might be surmounted is 
productive. It articulates a desire to transcend a 
binary opposition that in corporeal and, for much of 
her autobiography, narrative terms Morris maintains. It 
also recognises an association between self-definition 
and creativity which has been identified, earlier in 
this chapter, as an inspiring and informing force in 
Woolf's writing of Orlando. This connection has further 
resonance in view of an explicit reference to Orlando 
at the start of Conundrum. As Morris contemplates what 
might have happened had she revealed her "self- 
discovery beneath the piano" to her family, she 
concludes that they might not have been shocked, adding 
parenthetically "(Virginia Woolf's androgynous Orlando 
was already in the house)" (12). This intertextual link 
might suggest that for Morris, at least, Orlando (and 
Orlando) provides a model for the ideal existence: the 
"fantasy of perfection" and "ultimate transsexual 
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vision" proposed in my opening comments. In a typical 
flourish of hyperbole, Morris describes her whole life 
as "one long protest against the separation of fact 
from fantasy", explaining that for her, "fantasy was 
fact, just as mind was body, or imagination truth" 
(110) . 
Orlando exists in a literary realm where anything 
can happen; in everyday life, gender must be embodied 
in certain ways if it is to signify, and it cannot 
simply be changed as though it were a mere costume. In 
narrating the story of that life, transsexual subjects 
can also enter a sphere where boundaries between what 
are conventionally recognised as fact and fantasy can 
be tested. In life-writing, Stephen Whittle argues, 
"the very binary structure of the complacent world in 
which gender was invented" (210) can be challenged. In 
transsexual autobiographies such as Morris's Conundrum 
that challenge appears to be masked by the acceptable 
face of convention; but in Woolf's Orlando, too, the 
more culturally determined aspects of "becoming a 
woman" are also in evidence. 
A woman of substance 
Stone may be right when she suggests that in the 
portrayal of their transition from male to female, the 
transsexual women she discusses appear to be 
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"adventurers" who pass "directly from one pole of 
sexual experience to the other" (289). On the other 
hand, as Claudine Griggs explains and as Stone herself 
acknowledges, there are obvious reasons why this aspect 
of the transition must be undertaken in a clear and 
unmistakable way: 
A transsexual cannot gradually transfigure 
life from man to woman or woman to man, 
because s/he cannot be perceived as anything 
between male and female. During transitional 
stages, for example, a man may be viewed as a 
man acting like a woman or trying to be a 
woman, until at some precise moment, almost as 
a surprise to the individual undergoing the 
reassignment, he becomes a woman to those 
around him. If one is not clearly identified 
as male or female, that, itself, is 
conspicuous. (S/he 1) 
As discussed earlier, in terms of one's public 
identity, for the majority of people it is not possible 
to be truly gender ambiguous. 8 There is in Western 
society a social imperative, informed and enforced by 
cultural and legal practices, to be either a man or a 
woman. To be anything other is to be outside the 
regulatory matrix of sex and gender and thus 
8 At a personal level, it must be equally debatable whether it is 
possible to be truly "gender unambiguous". In this context, gender 
dysphoria can be seen as a human, rather than medical, condition. 
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marginalised and dispossessed. A fluidity of identity 
may be practised by some; Bornstein, for example, 
constructs her self-expression with Orlando-like 
panache using "accessories" to, as she puts it, "shift 
from one phase of my life to the next" (4). However, 
this approach to identity is a not a common one for 
individuals who identify specifically as transsexual, 
rather than transgender. 
For Griggs, non-expression of her female identity 
meant "non-existence" and it was this that, in her 
words, finally "drove me to a sex change" (S/he 53). In 
itself, she accepts, surgery will not make her "a full- 
term woman" (134). What it will enable her to do is "to 
display gender acceptably to society and myself" (53). 
Christine Jorgensen demonstrates a similar attitude. 
She accepts that whilst she was "never an absolute 
male", she will also "never be an absolute female", 
although she argues that in all human beings "there are 
no absolutes" (207). Whilst there is an element of 
indeterminacy in the physical and biological make-up of 
individual people, however, in social and legal terms 
it is absolutes that matter. Jorgensen recounts how her 
highly public profile (she chose to enter the 
entertainment business following her transition) turned 
the issue of her "true" identity into a matter of 
national concern. One newspaper article, quoted in her 
275 
autobiography, claims that "an early, responsible 
determination of the true status of George-Christine is 
urgently needed" (211). A letter from a hotel booking 
agent, which finds its way into the newspaper columns, 
includes the following condition for her employment: 
Before I let Christine Jorgensen mingle with 
women I want proof that she's a she! .. I 
won't give them a man dressed in woman's 
clothing. I bought a "she. " If the party can 
prove that she's a woman, I'm willing to pay 
her $25,000 for two weeks. (225) 
Jorgensen meets further problems in Boston where, she 
tells us, "[t]he action of the officials was to bar me 
from performing until I had proven myself a female" 
(246). Only a satisfactory physical examination would 
enable this ban to be lifted. 
By contrast with transsexual subjects, Orlando has 
been biologically male and female during the course of 
his and her lives. In that incredible moment of 
transformation Orlando literally goes from being an 
unambiguous man to an unambiguous woman. This is an 
obvious and significant difference. As Jan Morris 
argues: "Nobody in the history of human kind has 
changed from a true man to a true woman, if we class a 
man or a woman purely by physical concepts. 
Hermaphrodites may have shifted the balance of their 
ambiguity, but nobody has been born with one complete 
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body and died with the other" (100). In offering us the 
proviso "if we class a man or a woman purely by 
physical concepts", Morris identifies the main thing 
that distinguishes a transsexual subject's truth about 
her or himself from the truth that society might seek 
to impose. 
Whilst varying interpretations of facts affect the 
outcome of all life-writing, this has a specific impact 
in transgender narratives where physical concepts of 
sex and gender-women don't have penises and men do-are 
patently contradicted. In Orlando Woolf is doing 
something different: it is the physical evidence of 
Orlando's transformation that informs the narrator's 
observation that he is now a woman. It is, we are told, 
the only aspect of Orlando that has changed and yet, in 
spite of all the evidence to the contrary, it is the 
determining factor in defining her female status. Woolf 
might not contradict the fact that if you have a female 
body you are automatically assigned a feminine gender, 
but by exposing her protagonist to this life-altering 
experience she certainly questions that conjunction of 
anatomy and destiny. In itself this effect is 
unremarkable; Susan Gilbert and Sandra Gubar note that 
many female modernists seek to disentangle identity 
from biology (326-27). It is, once again, the manner in 
which Woolf questions that link which makes Orlando so 
relevant to transsexual autobiography. 
277 
In Woolf's version of events, as my opening 
comments observe, Orlando's bodily transformation is 
performed in a moment. In the transsexual 
autobiographies that are being discussed, the 
transition to the "chosen" gender also has a point of 
culmination in the text-a moment when the writer feels 
that she finally becomes the woman she is-and this 
point is frequently marked by the physical embodiment 
of that gender. The route to that point of realisation 
could not be more different. There are one or two hints 
along the way that there is an element of ambiguity 
surrounding Orlando's gender. In the opening line of 
the text doubt is implied: "He-for there could be no 
doubt of his sex, though the fashion of the time did 
something to disguise it" (13). Bowlby argues that the 
note of hesitation in this initial introduction to 
Orlando troubles "that fundamental paradigm according 
to which `we' make sense of other people" ("Orlando's 
Vacillation" 44). It is this "fundamental paradigm" 
that is so profoundly disturbed by transsexual 
subjects. Orlando's total composure following the 
transformation, and the preparations that have already 
been made for her departure suggest, as the narrator 
notes, a curious degree of foreknowledge. Orlando, we 
are told, on waking to find that he was now a young 
woman "showed no ... signs of perturbation" and 
"[a]ll her actions were deliberate in the extreme, and 
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might indeed have been thought to show tokens of 
premeditation" (134). This apparent preparedness for 
her new life is seemingly confirmed by the presence of 
a gypsy waiting in the courtyard outside Orlando's room 
with a donkey for her immediate departure from 
Constantinople (135). 
Notwithstanding these hints of precognition, 
Orlando's transformation is still presented as 
something that happens to him with very little or no 
consciousness of its approach prior to the event. This 
cannot be compared with the intense awareness of the 
need for hormonal and, in most cases, surgical 
reconstruction described in transsexual 
autobiographies. Even in those instances where 
transsexual women have spent significant parts of their 
lives living successfully as men, that existence is 
always troubled by the woman that they feel themselves 
to be. Orlando's life as a man is primarily free of 
such complications, and the difficulties she 
experiences as a woman perhaps say more about the 
limitations that Woolf finds with the conventional 
female role, and her wish to promote a model of 
androgyny in which "in each of us two powers preside, 
one male, one female" ("A Room" 93), than anything that 
might be found in a transsexual autiobiography. 
279 
Despite these unquestionable and important 
distinctions, in both Orlando and the transsexual 
autobiographies being discussed, although the 
transition is marked in the text by a physical change, 
that newly acquired identity has a more complex and 
ambiguous private dimension. What Orlando and a 
transsexual woman share in this respect is that, 
regardless of self-definition, they have both been 
socially conditioned as males. Life as a woman will, 
therefore, in some of its details create comparable 
experiences. If Morris's Conundrum is placed alongside 
Orlando at this point these corresponding features 
become evident. In both texts the absolute nature of 
the transformation from male to female is recorded in 
terms of bodily change. Orlando's female form displayed 
in "complete nakedness" forces the narrator to confess 
that he is now "a woman" (132). For Morris, it is the 
surgical reconstruction of her male body that denotes 
the start of her wider existence as a woman. Morris 
employs the imagery of myth and fable to present her 
trip to Casablanca: 
The experience I was to have there ... 
struck me then as it strikes me now as 
romantic to a degree. It really was like a 
visit to a wizard. I saw myself, as I walked 
that evening through those garish streets, as 
a figure of fairy tale, about to be 
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transformed. Duck into swan? Scullion into 
bridge? More magical than any such 
transformation, I answered myself: man into 
woman. (128-29) 
Whilst she believes that she had been a "woman all 
along" (101), in transforming her external reality to 
match her inner one Morris sees herself as about to 
enter the public arena for the first time as a fully- 
fledged woman. The manner in which she envisions her 
new life demonstrates an approach to gender that is 
heavily influenced by essentialist notions of what it 
is to be female: 
I was about to change my form and apparency-my 
status too, perhaps my place among my peers, 
my attitudes no doubt, the reactions I would 
evoke, my reputation, my manner of life, my 
prospects, my emotions, possibly my abilities. 
I was about to adapt my body from a male 
conformation to a female, and I would shift my 
public role altogether, from the role of a man 
to the role of a woman. (101) 
It is this kind of approach to transsexual womanhood, 
with its apparently wholesale adoption of all things 
conventionally female, that Stone questions. Whilst 
accepting the legitimacy of Stone's concerns, my 
interest lies in the parallels between Morris's self- 
representation as a post-operative transsexual woman 
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and Woolf's representation of Orlando's new life as a 
woman. 
Morris's depiction of her female identity presents 
gender as "natural", but there are also references to 
the role of social conditioning in that appearance of 
naturalness. Morris is aware of "the effects of custom 
and environment" in the formation of gender identity 
and also the way that it "soon all came to feel only 
natural" (141). A page later, she blurs the distinction 
between gender seeming to be and actually being natural 
when she explains: "there were inner changes in me, 
too, more subtle, more important. Some were simply the 
psychological effects of fulfilment, but some sprang 
from the end of maleness, and were more truly the 
symptoms of womanhood" (142). 
The essentialising of gender that is found in 
Morris's representation of the truth of becoming a 
woman is important. To claim the existence of an 
inherently female identity which is independent of 
bodily difference allows her to construct her 
experience of gender in a way that is meaningful to 
herself and others. A far more extreme notion of the 
naturalising effects of "womanhood" is evident in the 
transgender narrative Man into Woman: An Authentic 
Record of a Change of Sex, edited by Niels Hoyer. Man 
Into Woman is the part autobiographical, part 
biographical account of Einer Wegener/Lili Elbe's 
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sexual reassignment surgery in the early 1930s. 9 The 
transformative effects of Elbe's lower body surgery 
include the "fact" that both her voice and handwriting 
assume a "female" quality following the removal of her 
male genitals. Man into Woman offers material evidence 
of the "inner reality" of Elbe's female identity. The 
exaggerated nature of that account can be understood 
given the historical and social context of the book. At 
a time when a specific transsexual identity had not 
been recognised and notions of sexual and gender 
inversion were still prevalent, it was one way to 
present an experience of gender difference in a form 
that was both comprehensible and socially acceptable. 
Sandy Stone's critique of the narrative accepts that it 
was necessary for Wegener/Elbe to be presented, both by 
herself and Hoyer, as a heterosexual man prior to 
surgery and a heterosexual woman following it with an 
unequivocal line being drawn between those two lives 
(288) 
. 
In the Introduction to Man into Woman, the 
sexologist Norman Haire offers a defence of the book's 
more far-fetched elements. Haire acknowledges the gap 
that exists between the facts of Elbe's story and the 
way in which those facts have been interpreted and 
explains: 
9 Elbe's story is also the inspiration for a novel, The Danish 
Girl by David Ebershoff. 
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To the reader unfamiliar with the unhappy 
byways of sexual pathology, the story told in 
this book must seem incredibly fantastic. 
Incredible as it may seem, it is true. Or, 
rather, the facts are true, though I think 
there is room for differences of opinion about 
the interpretation of the facts. (v) 
Haire seems to want us to accept that the events 
described in Man Into Woman actually took place: Lili 
Elbe's handwriting really did alter following 
castration; her voice did become that of a soprano. It 
is how or why these changes took place, according to 
Haire, that is open to interpretation, not whether or 
not they happened. 
In Orlando a similar stance towards the facts of 
Orlando's transformation is adopted. The narrator 
assures us that "Orlando had become a woman-there is no 
denying it" (133). Alternative interpretations of that 
change of sex are recognised as possible, but are left 
to others to pursue. The manner in which Orlando's 
perceptions of her development as a woman is 
represented, however, distances Woolf's novel from this 
contemporanous transgender narrative. 
At one point in the text Orlando is allowed to 
reflect on the need for her to be "obedient, chaste, 
scented, and exquisitely apparelled" (150). She decides 
that since these qualities are not supplied by natural 
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sources, she must resign herself to the fact that they 
can only be attained "by the most tedious discipline" 
(150). Several pages later, Orlando discovers that 
something undetermined has given her "a push towards 
the female sex, for she was speaking more as a woman 
speaks than as a man, yet with a sort of content after 
all .. ." (153). Further on, the narrator at first 
advances the theory that clothes "change our view of 
the world and the world's view of us" (179), then 
supersedes that comment with the personally held belief 
that "[c]lothes are but a symbol of something hid deep 
beneath. It was a change in Orlando herself that 
dictated her choice of a woman's dress and of a woman's 
sex" (180-81). 
These narrative tensions can be seen as productive 
in that they allow the text to take up contrary 
viewpoints on questions of identity and gender. Hence, 
whilst there is a degree of essentialism suggested in 
the process by which Orlando "becomes a woman", at the 
same time, a space is opened up for that construction 
of femininity to be examined. This critical distance is 
often seen to be missing from transsexual narratives, 
where to question the social position, difficulties and 
contradictions of a particular gender identity might 
not be in the writer's interests. Even Woolf's 
androgynous fantasy, though, has its limits: when 
Orlando looks like a woman she mostly behaves like a 
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woman, when she looks like a man she mostly behaves 
like a man. Nonetheless, Woolf's narration of Orlando's 
life story and Morris's narration of her own represent, 
in different ways, creative acts of resistance. 
Imagined identifications 
In Vita and Virginia: The Work and Friendship of V. 
Sackville-West and Virginia Woolf Suzanne Raitt 
remarks: "Telling other people's stories-writing 
biographies-is an engagement with the limits of the 
self. Story-telling alleviates frustration, apparently 
extending the boundaries of who we are, and of who we 
might be" (146). Narrative as an imaginative means to 
re-fashion gender has already been suggested in 
relation to Woolf's life-writing, and in particular to 
Orlando, but what might Woolf's decision to locate a 
fantasy of gender in a pseudo-biographical frame 
suggest? In its bringing together of diametrically 
opposed genres, Orlando conducts a parodic 
demonstration of a movement in biographical writing of 
the period away from the material reality of a person's 
life as a way of defining them. Woolf had noted this 
shift in literary style and taste in "The New 
Biography", first published in October 1927: 
Truth of fact and truth of fiction are 
incompatible; yet he [the biographer] is now 
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more that ever urged to combine them. For it 
would seem that the life which is increasingly 
real to us is the fictitious life; it dwells 
in the personality rather than in the act. 
(55) 
The fantastical elements of Orlando's personal history- 
changing from a man to a woman, living for over three 
hundred years-take Woolf's idea of the "truth of 
fiction" to absurd extremes. A comment from Jan Morris, 
alread quoted, provides an interesting comparison here. 
For Morris "fantasy was fact ... just as mind was 
body, or imagination truth" (110). This apparent 
collapsing of binarisms can be detected in Woolf's 
observation that it is the "fictitious life" which is 
perceived to be most "real" about the life that is 
being narrated. That revised concept of reality seems 
to have especial significance for writers like Morris 
whose life story might be seen as a testament to the 
triumph of fiction or, to use Morris's word, fantasy 
over fact. 
Whatever word is used to represent the inner life- 
fiction, fantasy, imagination-fairly obvious concerns 
arise when it is applied to transsexual autobiography. 
Traditionally, sex changes have a prominent place in 
classical mythology: Hermaphroditus, in Ovid's 
Metamorphoses, who becomes "a single form, possessed of 
a dual nature, which could not be called male or 
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female, but seemed to be at once both and neither" 
(104); Tiresius (or Teiresias), the Theban prophet, who 
is transformed into a woman as punishment for killing a 
female serpent. In discussions of transsexual 
autobiography, it is more difficult to speak about 
fantasy in relation to the self-identification that is 
offered. Semantically, the word often evokes explicitly 
sexual associations and many of the synonyms listed in 
the Chambers Thesaurus-delusion, hallucination, whimsy- 
have distinctly negative implications. 
So what exactly does Morris mean by "fantasy" 
here, and how does her collapsing of known binaries- 
fact/fantasy, mind/body, imagination/truth-fare when 
subjected to the conventional demands of autobiography? 
She is clearly not wishing to suggest that her 
identification as a woman is imaginary; that is false 
or made up. She presumably is not meaning fantasy (or 
phantasy) in the Freudian sense either; Morris does not 
appear to be intimating that her transsexual identity 
is the result of fantasies fuelled by the unconscious. 
What Morris draws attention to in the statement 
"fantasy was fact" is the inversion of known truths 
that must take place in order for her identification as 
a woman to be accepted. In this topsy-turvy world it is 
Morris's fantasised identity which is presented as the 
real one, while her given identity is no more than an 
illusion. 
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In Orlando fantasy enables a privileging of a 
particular concept of identity over traditional polar 
models of sex and gender. That fantasised identity- 
trans-sex, trans-gender and trans-historical-provides 
the framework through which the events of Orlando's 
life are read. Where fantasy happens to collide with 
material reality, in the legal dispute over Orlando's 
status for example, (curled) lip-service is paid to the 
need for a socially recognised and endorsed identity. 
Meanwhile, Orlando's multiple lives, or more 
specifically the story of those existences, continue to 
evade attempts to define and thereby limit her. In 
describing Orlando's numerous costume changes the 
narrator explains: "She had, it seems, no difficulty in 
sustaining the different parts, for her sex changed far 
more frequently than those who have worn only one set 
of clothing can conceive" (211). By means of these 
magical and infinite transformations Orlando passes 
with equal success as a man and as a woman, and thus a 
fantasised identity, in which "sex" is no more than an 
outfit to be swapped at will, constantly undermines the 
given identity with its insistence on one unified sex 
and gender. 
The frequent sex changes to which Woolf's narrator 
alludes have strategic importance in negotiating 
barriers to individual fulfilment created by fixed 
notions of identity. Having crossed genders 
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anatomically and so allowed new or previously forbidden 
possibilities both in social and erotic terms, Orlando 
is quickly made aware of the foreclosure of certain 
acts and experiences that her status as "woman" enacts. 
On board ship, shortly after the transformation, 
Orlando reflects ruefully on the impracticalities of 
the female clothing that she must wear, realising that 
she would have to "trust to the protection of a blue- 
jacket" (148) if the ship capsized. Such irritations 
are accentuated by recent memories of the freedom and 
comfort of male attire. Erotically and emotionally, 
Orlando's feelings for a former lover, Sasha, the 
beautiful Russian Princess, are intensified by the 
transition. Part of the allure of Orlando's libidinous 
history is that she knows what it is like to have loved 
a woman as a man and that past experience, we are told, 
only serves to heighten her present response: "though 
she herself was a woman, it was still a woman she 
loved; and if the consciousness of being of the same 
sex had any effect at all, it was to quicken and deepen 
those feelings which she had had as a man" (154). 
Woolf's intention is surely unmistakable. Having 
enabled her protagonist to experience life as a 
heterosexual man prior to becoming a woman, Woolf has 
cleverly legitimised what, in all but name, amounts to 
Orlando's same-sex desire for women. In disassociating 
sexuality from gender in this way, Woolf is able to 
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present lesbian desire in a manner that is covert, yet 
easily read. Thus she is able to explore same-sex 
eroticism-Orlando's, Vita's, her own-without the threat 
of censure. At a narrative level it is recognised that 
these instincts cannot be pursued whilst Orlando is a 
woman. In order to access those desires and 
identifications which Orlando's sex, whether that be 
male or female, would deny, other modes of gender- 
crossing must be employed. 
Hence, whilst the change of anatomical sex is 
given a central and especially theatrical position in 
the text, Orlando and the characters with whom she is 
most intimately involved repeatedly transgress 
conventional sex and gender divisions. As Rachel Bowlby 
observes: 
Orlando's switch of sex from man to woman is 
only the most blatant instance among the 
novel's many comparable cases of sexual 
indeterminacy-as with the peculiar Archduke 
who reveals herself a disguised Archduchess, 
or with Orlando and her eventual husband 
identifying one another cross-sexually. These 
are highlighted throughout in relation to what 
seems to be indicated as some basic 
arbitrariness about any assignment of one or 
other sex to someone. ("Orlando: An 
Introduction" 165) 
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Woolf is certainly concerned to question the efficacy 
of a binary model of gender constructions, and her 
playful and imaginative inversion of its rules seems 
designed to expose the basic frailties of its 
structure. Once again there is a sense in which Woolf's 
personal frustrations at the limitations and 
constraints imposed by gender are exercised (and 
exorcised) through this process. 
Amongst the various modes of gender crossing 
presented in the text, the notion of drag is central to 
the preservation of Orlando's fluid identity. The 
facility to fluctuate between the sexes, undetected, 
enables Orlando to escape the constraints of a 
conventional existence which, as Woolf puts it, allows 
the wearing of "only one set of clothing" (211). The 
following extract attempts to recreate that perpetual 
motion, both in its depiction of a series of seamless 
costume changes and its extended syntax: 
So then one may sketch her spending her 
morning in a China robe of ambiguous gender 
among her books; then receiving a client or 
two ... 
in the same garment; then she would 
take a turn in the garden and clip the nut 
trees-for which knee-breeches were convenient; 
then she would change into a flowered taffeta 
which best suited a drive to Richmond and a 
proposal of marriage from some great nobleman; 
292 
and so back again to town, where she would don 
a snuff-coloured gown like a lawyer's and 
visit the courts to hear how her cases were 
doing 
.... 
(211-212) 
The "sexual indeterminacy" referred to by Bowlby is 
clearly suggested in this passage. For Orlando, Woolf 
seems to be saying, there is no one "true" gender since 
she can pass as a man or a woman with equal ease. 
Woolf's representation of gender-crossing suggests a 
link to Judith Butler's definition of drag in her essay 
"Imitation and Gender Insubordination": 
Drag is not the putting on of a gender that 
belongs properly to some other group, i. e. an 
act of expropriation or appropriation that 
assumes that gender is the rightful property 
of sex, that "masculine" belongs to "male" and 
"feminine" belongs to "female. " There is no 
"proper" gender, a gender proper to one sex 
rather than another, which is in some sense 
that sex's cultural property. (21) 
There is something of this effect at work in those 
sections of the narrative where readers are encouraged 
to think of Orlando not as a woman masquerading as a 
man, but as Orlando masquerading sometimes as a man, 
sometimes as a woman, and at other times as a mixture 
of the two. 
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In this area of the text, an unexpected parallel 
emerges between Orlando and Renee Richards's Second 
Serve. There is no immediately obvious comparison to be 
made between Orlando's experience and that of Richards. 
Whilst Orlando's gender-crossing is optional, Richards 
finds herself forced to lead a dual existence prior to 
surgery and even, for a time, after it and much of her 
autobiography relates the difficulties of managing the 
lives of two "personalities". One has an official 
status in the world: the eminent eye surgeon, tennis 
player and heterosexual man, Dr Richard Raskind; the 
other, Renee Richards, enjoys only a private existence 
as a heterosexual woman who, at various points in her 
travels, is forced to pose as a divorcee recovering 
from a recent abortion and even as her own (Dr Richard 
Raskind's) wife. For Orlando, we are told, living as a 
man and a woman "reaped a twofold harvest ... the 
pleasures of life were increased and its experiences 
multiplied" (211). For Richards, whilst the tensions 
involved in leading a double life at times produce a 
certain frisson, the pressure of having to maintain a 
male identity publicly also lead frequently to self- 
harm of her male genitals and recurring thoughts of 
suicide. 
Yet the playful exuberance characterising those 
sections of Orlando's narrative where sex and gender 
roles may be switched at will is replaced by a 
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distinctly mournful tone as the character finds herself 
forced to conform to historically dictated cultural 
changes. A new century and fashion-the arrival of the 
Victorian period and the crinoline-bring a noticeable 
shift of mood both in the oppressive atmosphere of the 
prose (and the cold, damp weather it describes) and in 
Orlando's state of mind. The increasing demands on 
Orlando to adhere to a strictly coded feminine role 
result in feelings of despair and loss. In the 
following extract, her melancholic disposition is 
reflected in a description of the impractical and 
imprisoning clothes that she must now adopt: 
So she stood mournfully at the drawing-room 
window ... dragged down by the weight of the 
crinoline which she had submissively adopted. 
It was heavier and more drab than any dress 
she had yet worn. None had ever so impeded her 
movements. No longer could she stride through 
the garden with her dogs, or run lightly to 
the high mound and fling herself beneath the 
oak tree. Her skirts collected damp leaves and 
straw. The plumed hat tossed on the breeze. 
The thin shoes were quickly soaked and mud- 
caked. Her muscles had lost their pliancy. 
(233-34) 
Butler's writing on melancholia and gender 
identification in Gender Trouble offers a useful 
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approach to this aspect of both Woolf's and Renee 
Richards's accounts of gender. Drawing upon Freud's 
theory of melancholia, Butler describes how the 
enactment of a socially prescribed single gendered 
identity necessarily involves a melancholic response to 
the prescribed loss of the same-sexed object: 
As a set of sanctions and taboos, the ego 
ideal regulates and determines masculine and 
feminine identification. Because 
identifications substitute for object 
relations, and identifications are the 
consequence of loss, gender identification is 
a kind of melancholia in which the sex of the 
prohibited object is internalized as a 
prohibition. This prohibition sanctions and 
regulates discrete gendered identity and the 
law of heterosexual desire. (63) 
In Richards's transsexual narrative her attempt to 
maintain her male identity whilst also giving 
expression to her female identification only seems to 
emphasise the possibilities that must be forfeited if 
either state is to be rendered endurable. Using 
Butler's psychoanalytic formula, Richards's melancholia 
can be seen to arise not from her belief that she is a 
woman in a male body, but from the constant psychic and 
social imperatives to occupy a singular gendered and 
eroticised position. Richards's unwillingness to 
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surrender her male role and have the clinical treatment 
that would enable her to live openly as a woman 
supports this reading of a more likely cause of her 
distress. According to this interpretation, when 
Richards assaults her penis it is the male cultural 
authority that it represents, and the "discrete 
gendered identity" such power upholds, against which 
she is raging. 
In Woolf's fantasised account of gender no such 
angst is immediately evident. Following Orlando's 
transformation, a single gendered identity is shrugged 
off and for a period of the narrative there is no 
identification or desire which Orlando cannot access. 
In Butler's terms, the exuberance that Orlando is said 
to experience at this time can be understood as the 
flipside to Richards's melancholia in that it arises 
out of the character's ability to elude the social and 
psychic demands to which Richards is subjected. But 
this phase of Orlando's life is short-lived and a 
melancholia that, at first, the text does not admit 
forces its way into the narrative. Woolf's choice of 
the nineteenth century to induce Orlando's melancholic 
mood is a nice detail. As a century historically 
associated with a greater insistence on singular 
identities, it is apt that this period should announce 
a foreclosure of those pleasures that a dual existence 
had formerly enabled. It is also appropriate that Woolf 
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links Orlando's change of mood to costume, since it is 
clothes that have previously been the means to her 
freedom. Orlando's only chance to regain some of her 
former liberty now lies in marriage and, once she has 
secured a suitable partner, a successful career in 
writing. In another pleasing narrative touch, Woolf 
rescues Orlando from the confines of her gender in 
precisely the way she has realised her own escape- 
through social and economic independence, and 
creativity. 
When Orlando meets her future husband, 
Shelmerdine, another type of gender crossing is 
experienced. On the morning following their first 
meeting (and engagement to marry) Orlando declares her 
passionate love for Shelmerdine: 
No sooner had the words left her mouth than an 
awful suspicion rushed into both their minds 
simultaneously. 
"You're a woman, Shel! " she cried. 
"You're a man, Orlando! " he cried. 
Never was there such a scene of protestation 
and demonstration as then took place since 
the world began. (240) 
Shortly after this scene, Orlando is reduced to 
sentimental tears by Shelmerdine's account of his 
adventures at sea. The tears, which Orlando notes were 
"of a finer flavour than any she had cried before", are 
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quickly followed by the realisation that she has 
finally become a "real" woman (241). 
The style and tone of the prose used to describe 
these events have a typical irreverence. The close 
proximity in the narrative of the moment of cross- 
sexual identification and Orlando's entry into genuine 
womanhood, however, invites further comment. If there 
is a relation between these two occurrences, it is 
perhaps to be found in a psychic dimension. Butler's 
theory on the melancholia of gender is again relevant. 
Following the punitive curtailment of Orlando's gender- 
crossing that the arrival of the nineteenth century 
enacts, the character becomes a victim to moods of 
dejection and self-doubt. Here, the reinforcement of a 
single and stable gender identity within a heterosexual 
matrix of desire can be seen to have evoked a 
melancholic response. In Butler's discussion of loss 
and melancholia as intrinsic elements in the formation 
of identifications, she observes "the stricter and more 
stable the gender affinity, the less resolved the 
original loss, so that rigid gender boundaries 
inevitably work to conceal the loss of an original love 
that, unacknowledged, fails to be resolved" (Gender 
Trouble 63). 
Orlando's attempts to transcend the boundaries 
that would deny her access to, and so resolution of, 
that original loss must take a range of forms. However, 
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the goal-in psychoanalytic terms the "primal wish for 
union" (Pacteau 82)-remains the same. That desire for 
union in this section of the story is given actual 
expression in Orlando's compulsion to find a life 
partner. Woolf cleverly draws together the narrative 
and symbolic levels of the story as the successful 
outcome of Orlando's search for a soul-mate becomes a 
direct means to achieving psychic union. When Orlando 
and Shelmerdine make their pronouncements both 
characters immediately refute such apparently absurd 
and personally threatening assertions. However, that 
reciprocal act of recognition and the loss it 
acknowledges represents a crucial affirmation of those 
identifications and desires which external forces would 
prohibit. Thus, behind the cover of conventional 
displays of gender and sexuality, a psychic drama is 
enacted in which alternative possibilities and 
pleasures are realised. 
Orlando's belief that she is at last a "real 
woman" is linked ostensibly to the formation of a 
heterosexual alliance: she has met a man who makes her 
feel like a "natural" woman. Butler's discussion of the 
processes by which heterosexuality naturalises itself 
draws upon an Aretha Franklin song with the title and 
repeated refrain "you make me feel like a natural 
woman". Butler observes: 
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Although Aretha appears to be all too glad to 
have her naturalness confirmed, she also seems 
fully and paradoxically mindful that that 
confirmation is never guaranteed, that the 
effect of naturalness is only achieved as a 
consequence of that moment of heterosexual 
recognition. ("Imitation" 27) 
There is a degree of this paradoxical self- 
consciousness in the way in which Orlando's experience 
of authentic (heterosexual) womanhood is represented. 
Whilst Orlando is shown to experience gratitude and 
pleasure towards the man apparently responsible for 
this development, the naturalness of that 
identification is severely questioned by the exchange 
that precedes it and, indeed, follows it several pages 
later: 
"Are you positive you aren't a man? " he would 
ask anxiously, and she would echo, 
"Can it be possible you're not a woman? " and 
then they must put it to the proof without 
more ado. For each was so surprised at the 
quickness of the other's sympathy, and it was 
to each such a revelation that a woman could 
be as tolerant and free-spoken as a man, and a 
man as strange and subtle as a woman, that 
they had to put the matter to the proof at 
once. (246) 
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In this superbly mock-serious account, masculinity and 
femininity are presented as fluid and interchangeable 
states whilst heterosexual desire emerges as the 
ultimate arbiter of normative gender roles. 
The implications of what has been discussed above 
are important to debates surrounding transsexual 
narratives. The unequivocal change of sex which Orlando 
undergoes represents a desire which could be termed 
"transsexual". In the context of other notions of 
gender-crossing considered here, that ability to change 
sex completely and without contradiction can be read as 
being as arbitrary and ultimately as inadequate as any 
original determination of sex would have been. Whilst 
at a practical level the usefulness of gender 
constructions is recognised as a convenient means of 
ordering society-the problems that arise in the absence 
of clearly defined roles is made evident in the legal 
actions surrounding Orlando's person and estate-in 
human terms those constructions are presented as 
insufficient and requiring a range of strategies to 
manage the problems they present. 
In the past, transsexual narratives have tended to 
neglect or completely avoid questions surrounding the 
adequacy of accepted gender categories. Increasingly, 
transsexual narratives and representations question the 
essentialism ascribed to that identity and some 
transgender critics and artists have allied themselves 
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with queer theorisations of gender. Yet whilst 
naturalising concepts of biological sex and gender form 
the basis of the identifications presented by 
Jorgensen, Morris, and Richards, all three life- 
narratives exhibit certain tensions around the idea of 
the "true gender" that is claimed. Morris's Conundrum 
reveals these contradictions most consciously. Towards 
the end of the book she talks of a "continuing 
ambiguity" (157), and in the epilogue to the 1997 
edition of Conundrum she directly links what she 
perceives to be a weakening of a "specifically tran 
-sexual urge" to "the slow overlapping of the genders" 
which has occurred since her own transition (160). The 
perpetual gender-crossings necessary to sustain 
Orlando's fluid identity are presented by some 
transgender theorists as desirable both in personal and 
political terms. Kate Bornstein conceptualises this 
approach to identity as a third space. She explains: 
"It's when we put gender into play, it's when we 
question the binary, it's when we break the rules and 
keep calling attention to the fact that the rules are 
breakable: that's when we create a Third Space" (140). 
When it comes to most transsexual identities the 
playful and imaginative notions of gender that both 
Woolf and Bornstein suggest seem inappropriate and 
improbable. Such consummate and boundless feats of 
transmogrification are not possible (even if they are 
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desirable). Even if the body is changed, as Griggs 
states in an apparently unconscious challenge to Woolf, 
it is "not an article of clothing" and therefore cannot 
be exchanged for "one that is genetically female" (S/he 
134) . 
The approximate relation between the gender 
identity achieved and its ideal was a concern of my 
previous chapter. Here, as in the Brooks and Cameron 
portraits, that slippage is enacted through the 
presence of certain dissonant effects both in Orlando 
and transsexual autobiographies. This aspect of the 
texts can be explored through the visual images and 
cues which serve to construct them as "true" stories, 
but at the same time severely test abiding concepts of 
truth. 
Real lives 
Rachel Bowlby observes: "Orlando is wearing its sources 
and inspiration on its sleeve: it is straightaway a 
tease to the conventions which ought to be keeping 
fiction and real lives officially separate" ("Orlando: 
An Introduction" 153). Autobiographies by transsexual 
women and men also challenge the recognised boundaries 
between "fiction" and "real lives". For some, this 
confrontation is expressed in the choice of title: Mark 
Rees's Dear Sir or Madam: The Autobiography of a 
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Female-to-Male Transsexual and Raymond Thompson's co- 
written What Took You So Long? A Girl's Journey to 
Manhood are more than a "tease to conventions", they 
are a clear provocation. Such titles would also seem to 
locate the books in the genres of myth or fantasy or 
science fiction, where such transformations are 
possible. Yet there are photographs of the author and 
other cues that designate them as true life-stories. 
This blurring of distinctions between so-called 
imagined and real identities probably has its most 
striking realisation in the selection of photographs 
that allow us to trace stages in the transition from 
one sex to the other. 
The photographs which appear in the original 
edition of Orlando have a corresponding effect. Talia 
Schaffer's essay "Posing Orlando" argues that the 
photographs enact a "counterdiscourse to the novel's 
text" (26) and as such constitute a vital component of 
any reading of the book. "No reading of Orlando", 
asserts Schaffer, "can be viable unless it interprets 
the illustrations, for Orlando gets its meaning from 
precisely the conflicted, complex relation between 
image and narrative" (27). There is a particular sense 
in which this idea might be applied equally to Renee 
Richards's Second Serve or Kate Bornstein's Gender 
Outlaw. The photographs that have been selected to 
represent Orlando and various other "characters" 
305 
alluded to in the text are a strange hotchpotch of 
forms and styles and, as Schaffer argues, they "indulge 
in artifice, satire, masquerade, and self- 
contradiction" in much the way that the text does (31). 
Some images, those featuring Vita Sackville-West and 
Woolf's niece, Angelica, seem designed deliberately to 
draw attention to their fictitious quality even though 
or perhaps because they feature, certainly in the case 
of Vita, clearly identifiable living subjects. In 
addition there are incongruities in the visual and 
textual signs. In the case of the photograph of 
Angelica, titled "The Russian Princess as a Child", 
Schaffer points to a "series of deliberate mistakes, 
misstatements, and misrepresentations" (34). Other 
images, which merely reproduce paintings, seem to have 
a more intrinsic authenticity in relation to the life- 
story which they supposedly corroborate. 10 However, as 
Schaffer identifies, they too are "ambiguously 
captioned" and in being "photographic interpretations 
of preexisting artistic interpretations" (40) achieve 
that appearance of veracity through imitation and 
artifice. 
10 My response to these photographs considers their relative 
authenticity as a biographical device. Schaffer's interpretation 
focuses on the way the photographs represent women and then. She 
argues that, in a strategic contradiction of the text, the 
photographs show women to be real because they are illustrated 
through "photographs of their living bodies", whilst men, who are 
depicted through "photographs of statues or paintings", are 
masquerading (40). 
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In developing her theme, Schaffer establishes a 
link between the interaction of text and visual image 
in Orlando and Judith Butler's theory of gender 
performativity. Schaffer explains: 
The text produces itself in the spaces between 
photographs, always trying to achieve the 
reality of those photographs. The text chases 
the photographs, just as gender performance 
chases the ideas of real gender. Furthermore, 
by appearing to repeat each other, text and 
photograph only emphasize their failure to 
reproduce each other exactly. (57) 
If this parallel is teased out, the photographs that 
Woolf uses in the book do not express an original or 
real identity which can be imitated by the text; 
neither are they parodic representations of an 
original. Instead the combined effect of the 
photographs appears, in Butler's terms, to parody "the 
very notion of an original" (Gender Trouble 138). If 
the photographs are offered as evidence of an authentic 
identity, it is the text that gives them that 
appearance of authenticity through its constant but 
ultimately fruitless attempt to represent what is, in 
fact, itself only a likeness for which there is no 
genuine article. Hence, photographs and text come 
together to orchestrate an identification which has no 
base in reality. "Never able to attain the authenticity 
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its own photographs seem to guarantee", Schaffer 
explains, "Orlando strives endlessly to reach the 
reality of gender, enjoying itself mightily in the 
impossible journey to reach the ever-receding goal" 
(58-9) 
. 
The interpretation that Schaffer presents projects 
Orlando into a theoretical space where, as Butler would 
have it, there is "no true or false, real or distorted 
acts of gender", but only a "regulatory fiction" 
(Gender Trouble 141). Schaffer's interrogation of a 
previously neglected area adopts a critical approach 
similar to my own in an earlier discussion of Woolf's 
representation of drag. Here, it provides a useful 
departure point for my enquiry. 
When we see Vita posing as Orlando we know that 
she both is and is not this character. At a fantasised 
level Vita is Orlando: Woolf wants us to be aware of 
the living inspiration for her imagined subject. Of 
course, in reality Vita cannot possibly be the shape- 
shifting, time-travelling Orlando, but the boundaries 
between the two identities-one "real" the other 
"fantasised"-are unsettled by these photographic 
images. Rachel Bowlby persuasively interprets the 
tension created by Vita's photographed presence in 
Orlando: 
There is Vita herself, in the photographs, on 
the dedication page, for all the world to see 
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and read: the fiction ties in to a real 
person. But the photographs show the "real" 
Vita posing, taking on parts from her own life 
and her ancestors', so that real life itself 
is shown to be made up of imaginary 
identifications. ("Orlando: An Introduction" 
153) 
These remarks must be taken in the context of an 
ambiguity that already inheres in photographic 
portraits, regardless of any changes in the gender 
identity of the subject. Bowlby observes that family 
album photographs are "both factual records-how it was, 
really, then-and also poses, self-consciously 
constructing an image, both at the time of taking and 
in the mode of preservation and display" (154). The 
idea of "posing" acquires a further level of meaning in 
discussions of texts where photographs show the subject 
as both male and female. 
Bowlby's analogy between "real life" and 
"imaginary identifications" can be applied to Renee 
Richards's autobiography. On the front and back covers 
of Second Serve are photographs of the author as 
Richard Raskind and Renee Richards. The photographs on 
the back are both of identity cards: one has been 
issued by the Armed Forces of the United States Naval 
Reserve in the name of Lieutenant Commander Richard H. 
Raskind; the other is proof of Renee Richards's 
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membership of the Women's Tennis Association. The 
explicitly gendered nature of this juxtaposition of 
"official" images might raise some searching questions 
in respect of Richards's identity, not least-How could 
this male naval officer actually be a woman? followed 
swiftly by-How could this woman tennis player ever have 
lived as a man? To borrow some of Schaffer's terms, can 
we talk about these self-representations without using 
the words artifice, masquerade and self-contradiction? 
If these photographs and the other "before, during and 
after" shots are viewed alongside the text of 
Richards's life-story a complex identification is 
presented that has no trace in the photographs that 
track her progress from a three year old boy to a man 
who successfully completes a medical degree and enters 
the US Navy. The photographs that complete this 
pictorial history chart a movement towards that 
identification which allows Richards to pass as the 
woman she feels she is. What seems to be illustrated by 
these later photographs is something which Emma Wilson, 
in her discussion of what she terms " [t] rans-sex 
identification", refers to as a transsexual person's 
compulsion to enact "a fiction of singular and unified 
gender identification" (53). What I want to consider is 
how the positioning of these visual self- 
representations alongside the written text constitutes 
a coming out process that both enacts that "fiction" 
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and blows its cover. In the same way that the 
photographs of Vita can be seen to challenge notions of 
the "real", the question might be asked-Do any of the 
photographs of Renee Richards show the "real" Renee? 
And to what extent can Bowlby's comments about 
Sackville-West, quoted above, be applied to the 
photographs of Richards? The photographs of Richard 
Raskind exist in a peculiar tension to the author in 
that they both are and are not the person who is 
narrating the story. But how far could it argued that 
Richards is in fact "posing" in all of these shots, not 
purely those in which she is represented as a man? 
Indeed, might it not be said that in these photographs 
Richards, like Sackville-West in Orlando, is "taking on 
parts from her own life" which is a life itself 
comprised of "imaginary identifications" (153). 
This is perhaps taking the transsexual narrative 
too far along the route to queer theory, epitomised by 
Butler's notion of a true gender identity as nothing 
more (or less) than a "regulatory fiction" (Gender 
Trouble 141). The images of Richard and Renee in Second 
Serve, of course, represent a "real person" in a way 
that the photographs of Vita in Orlando do not. The 
parallel cannot be stretched too far. Having read 
Richards's story it is clear that for her the 
photographs in which she poses as a woman are a more 
accurate expression of her identity. Conversely, it is 
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after the transformation that Orlando's gender mobility 
begins and it is this fluidity as opposed to a stable 
identification which allows her to experience life to 
the full. However, for Richards, as for other 
transsexual women, the transition from a male identity 
to a female one was never a straightforward, 
unambiguous process. Whilst the photographs and text in 
Second Serve may depict a desire for a "singular and 
unified gender identification", they also reveal a 
"real life" that is constructed through multiple poses 
and identifications. 
A comment from Suzanne Raitt, quoted earlier, 
makes the point that story-telling-whether it is 
telling someone else's story or our own- "alleviates 
frustration, apparently extending the boundaries of who 
we are, and of who we might be" (146) That word 
"apparently", in both its senses-that is, seeming to be 
and making clear-has particular significance if it is 
applied to transsexual autobiographies where an 
identity that disputes the boundaries of "who we have 
been told we are" is represented through the act of 
story-telling. 
In narrating the life-story of a character who 
anatomically changes sex, Woolf also challenges the 
prescriptive and limiting nature of conventional sex 
and gender identities. Bowiby calls Orlando "a serious 
fantasy which imagines what femininity (or, for that 
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matter, another masculinity) might be in quite 
different conditions-if anything was possible" 
("Orlando: An Introduction" 172). Transsexual 
autobiographies such as Conundrum and Second Serve are, 
in the specific ways discussed in this chapter, real- 
life enactments of that fantasy. The conditions are 
quite different from those in which Orlando was 
conceived. If not quite anything is possible, 
technological advances have certainly made it viable 
not only to imagine identifications that contradict 
those assigned at birth, but to give them meaningful 
embodiment too. Unlike Orlando, Morris and Richards 
tell their own stories. That agency is clearly a 
crucial part of constructing transsexual subject 
positions. Nevertheless, the stories which are told 
display extraordinary affinities. By creating a false 
biography around a real person and by presenting a 
fantasised identity as true and a given identity as 
constructed, Woolf confuses categories of genre and 
gender in a way that strikes at the core of normative 
values, both literary and social. That convergence of 
fantasy, life-writing and identity construction creates 
a literary paradigm that is evident in many of the 
transsexual autobiographies discussed in this chapter. 
More specifically, oveý seventy years after its 
publication, one of the pivotal questions that Orlando 
poses can be seen to lie at the very heart of those 
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narratives-a question that is best framed by Woolf 
herself when she asks in her other parodic life-writing 
narrative, Flush: A Biography, "But what is `oneself'? 
Is it the thing people see? Or is it the thing one is? " 
(46). As a postscript to this timeless conundrum it 
might be pertinent to enquire "Or is it the thing one 
writes? " 
My final chapter considers a text in which the 
relationship between writing and identity is explored 
at the level of language itself. 
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Chapter 4 
A poetics of difference: 
The Making of Americans and unreadable subjects 
The limits of my language mean the limits of 
my world. 
-Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus (5.6) 
it's the fault of the pronouns, there is no 
name for me, no pronoun for me, all the 
trouble comes from that, that, it's a kind of 
pronoun too, it isn't that either, I'm not 
that either ... 
-Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable (132) 
I mean, I mean and that is not what I mean, I 
mean that not any one is saying what they are 
meaning, I mean that I am feeling something, 
I mean that I mean something ... I mean, i 
mean, I know what I mean. 
- Gertrude Stein, The Making of Americans 
(782) 
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Where Hall's The Well of Loneliness and Brooks's 
portraits contradict the conventions of gender and 
Woolf's Orlando confounds both gendered and literary 
codes, experimental writing, as Marianne DeKoven 
observes, strikes at and transforms "the conventions of 
language itself" (xiii). A potential effect of such 
writing strategies may be to question the linguistic 
codes that organise modern identities. This final 
chapter moves away from narrative representations of 
gender transformations and focuses on a text which 
reshapes narrative itself. In making this transition a 
number of new, related questions are broached. These 
are: to what extent can experimentation with the 
conventions of language transgress the binarisms and 
hierarchies of identity? How might these linguistic 
practices be constructed as expressive of a transgender 
consciousness? Equally, how might they be read as 
fundamentally counter to the narrative construction of 
coherent, integrated transgender identities? 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
transgender subjects often write themselves into 
cultural discourse through the adoption of an 
unequivocally single sexed position. In this respect, 
conventional narratives such as autobiographies have a 
productive function. Jay Prosser describes the way in 
which a mirror scene in Jan Morris's autobiography, 
Conundrum, operates as a transitional point in both the 
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transsexual trajectory and the autobiographical 
narrative: 
For from this point on in the narrative, the 
"me" written about (James Morris) and the "I" 
that writes (Jan Morris)-so far separated by 
sex-are fused into a singly sexed 
autobiographical subject, an integral "I. " In 
joining the split gendered subject, 
autobiography transmits-in narrative-the 
integrating trajectory of transsexuality. 
(100) 
Despite the presence of disjunctive and ambivalent 
elements in Morris's narrative, the overall effect of 
her autobiography can appear to present transsexuality 
as the transition to a coherent and unified (because 
"singly sexed") subject position. But what of those 
transgender subjects who reject conventional gender 
distinctions? How can they adapt existing constructions 
to their purposes? How can they be spoken of or written 
about? How do they become legible? As Sandy Stone 
observes: "To attempt to occupy a place as speaking 
subject within the traditional gender frame is to 
become complicit in the discourse which one wishes to 
deconstruct" (295). 
The fictional and autobiographical transgender 
narratives I have discussed so far challenge customary 
notions of identity through sartorial and somatic 
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gender transformations. As such they rely upon 
established notions of meaning in their language use 
(as does my own critical writing). Even in Woolf's 
Orlando, although the narrator mocks grammatical rules- 
"His memory-but in future we must, for convention's 
sake, say `her' for `his', and `she' for `he'" (133)- 
and exposes the use of gendered pronouns as convention, 
ultimately the usefulness of such devices is accepted. 
Post-transformation, Orlando is referred to as "she" in 
the absence of a meaningful pronominal alternative. 
Some texts with transgender narrators and/or themes 
have adopted compound nouns ("he-she") and gender 
neutral pronouns ("per" and "hir"), 1 but such 
neologisms have no impact on dominant language use. 
In the literary text on which this chapter 
focuses, Gertrude Stein's The Making of Americans: 
Being a History of a Family's Progress (1925), 
conventional notions of identity are disrupted at a 
stylistic level and through the materiality of language 
itself. Stein's text, written between 1903-1911, is one 
of a number of experimental prose fictions by women 
around this time: Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Woolf, 
Djuna Barnes, H. D., and Natalie Barney are some of the 
key female modernists from the period to produce works 
1 See Leslie Feinberg's Stone Butch Blues and Transgender 
Warriors; and Marge Piercy's Woman on the Edge of Time. Use of the 
term "per" has also been advocated by Third Gender activist 
Christie Elan-Cane in the unpublished conference paper "A World 
Without Gender". 
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which experiment with form and remodel traditional 
narratives of identity. In Richardson's Pilgrimage, a 
cycle of thirteen novels beginning with Pointed Roofs 
(1915), and Woolf's To the Lighthouse (1927) and Mrs. 
Dalloway (1927) a narrative interiority reproduces the 
workings of the female protagonist's consciousness. 
This literary device derives from innovative notions of 
identity as the product of intrasubjective forces, or 
what David Trotter in "The Modernist Novel" calls a 
"difference-within" as opposed to a "difference- 
between" (90-1). The Waves (1931), perhaps Woolf's most 
experimental work, extends this technique to an 
exploration of the nature of selfhood through the 
disembodied articulations of its six characters. In 
Djuna Barnes's Ladies Almanack (1928) and Ryder (1929) 
the revisioning of myth and exuberant deployment of 
pastiche and parody combine to produce identity as 
multiple and derivative. H. D. 's Hermione (written in 
1927, but not published until 1981) and Barney's The 
One who is Legion (1930) highlight the frailties and 
perversities of binary constructions of identity, 
utilising and refashioning gender-inflected words in 
ways which interrupt narrative and semantic flow. The 
Making of Americans, both in terms of the dates of its 
composition and its textual qualities, emerges from 
this diverse body of texts as a pioneering and radical, 
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if somewhat flawed, break with literary and linguistic 
conventions. 
Individually, the writing practices deployed by 
these women writers and the gender "play" which their 
formal and narrative experimentation enables appear to 
reach towards alternative models of identity at 
linguistic and literary levels. Collectively, those 
practices might be seen to constitute a poetics of 
difference which, in terms of its specific revisionary 
effects, has potential significance for transgender 
representations. 
The transgressive possibilities of experimental 
writing, of course, have limits. DeKoven remarks: "it 
need not replace, or even threaten conventional 
writing. Making conscious the unconscious need not 
destroy the already-conscious; rather, the area of the 
conscious can be both enlarged and restored to 
wholeness" (23). Just as some modernist representations 
of gender transgression as dysfunctional or monstrous 
can have the effect of illustrating the "natural" and 
infinitely more desirable qualities of normative 
gender, so an incoherent, unreadable text may only 
confirm the "natural" authority of the Word. 2 The 
likelihood that challenges to normative models, whether 
they be models of identity or language, will be 
2 Shari Benstock discusses Stein's experimental writing in the 
context of a modernist preoccupation with linguistic meaning 
(Women 158-61). 
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counter-reformist is testament to the intransigence of 
existing structures of power. Catharine R. Stimpson, in 
her discussion of the subversive potential of 
experimental writing practices, argues: "to destabilize 
is not to eradicate; to dislodge is not to demolish" 
("Gertrude Stein" 11). Accepting these constraints, it 
is the potential to "dislodge" existing writing and 
reading practices and "destabilize" customary notions 
of meaning, and the extent to which these acts can 
impact on naturalising concepts of gender that are the 
primary concerns of this chapter. 
In The Making of Americans the text's stylistic 
and ideological self-contradictions represent its most 
obvious challenge to dominant norms: its juxtaposition 
of the grammatical with the ungrammatical; its 
presentation of the meaningless as meaningful; and what 
Stimpson, with reference to Stein's work more 
generally, describes as an opposition of shifting 
intensity between the "reconstitution of patriarchal 
ideas about gender binaries" and "the repudiation of 
those ideas" (10). In this last respect, similar 
tensions have been found in the other texts discussed 
in this thesis and have also been the source of some 
critics' attacks on transgender, and more specifically 
transsexual, identities. My discussion has previously 
addressed the contradictory effects of appropriating 
identifications and desires from within existing sex 
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and gender binaries. In this chapter the critical focus 
shifts to the more fundamental conflict of representing 
unconventional identities according to a conventional 
linguistic model. 
The stylistic eccentricities of The Making of 
Americans demonstrate the difficulties of reading a 
text which constantly subverts that model. In breaching 
grammatical conventions Stein's experimental writing 
may circumvent the delimiting practices of customary 
language use, but unfamiliar prose techniques create 
their own problems. How do we read texts which so 
resolutely resist interpretation? Indeed, to what 
extent does such writing escape the constraints of 
symbolic language use only to fall into a trap of 
illegibility? 
The loss of meaning is one of modernism's greatest 
preoccupations in the post-War world. It is given stark 
expression in T. S. Eliot's "The Waste Land", where a 
dislocated narrative voice articulates a state of 
profound disconnectedness in the lines: "I can 
connect/Nothing with nothing" (62). There is something 
of that unintelligibility in the verbal and syntactical 
vagaries of The Making of Americans. If Stein's readers 
can "connect nothing with nothing" her response might 
well be that they are not reading as she writes. A 
popular anecdote relates an exchange between Stein and 
a journalist during a lecture tour in 1934. In response 
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to the question, "Why don't you write the way you 
talk? " Stein is reported to have replied, "Why don't 
you read the way I write? " (Look at Me Now 9). For the 
purposes of this chapter, that changed sense of meaning 
will be read as a part of the text's critique of 
symbolic representations of identity. 
In the context of a study of transgender 
identities, the issue of legibility suggests a parallel 
question: how does one "read" a person who, in gendered 
terms, refuses to be read? The inscription of 
difference on the textual surfaces of Stein's 
experimental writing and on the "embodied texts" of 
some transgender subjects may offer significant areas 
of correspondence in terms of their incoherent effects. 
James R. Mellow describes The Making of Americans as "a 
work fixed permanently ... in a state of awkward 
transition" (122). Interestingly, this idea of Stein's 
text as in some way caught in a disjunctive, 
intermediate position recalls some of the texts and 
subjects of my other chapters: sexological theories of 
an "intermediate sex" and "transitional types"; the 
positioning of Radclyffe Hall's Stephen Gordon in "the 
no man's land of sex"; the dissonant elements of 
Romaine Brooks's and Loren Cameron's visual 
representations of masculinity; Jan Morris's awareness 
of her "continuing ambiguity"; Woolf's awareness of the 
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impediments to "becoming a woman" both for herself and 
her literary creation, Orlando. 
Sandy Stone proposes that transsexuals be 
constituted as a genre: "a set of embodied texts whose 
potential for productive disruption of structured 
sexualities and spectra of desire has yet to be 
explored" (296). Increasingly, the subjects of 
transgender representations display and, in particular 
instances, consciously emphasise incongruities in their 
sexed and/or gendered identities. In The Making of 
Americans a transfigured and divergent grammar has a 
similarly disruptive impact in its production of gaps 
in conventional meaning. 
These shared practices are hardly surprising. The 
tensions and ambiguities of gender, given palpable 
expression in transgender narratives and through 
transsexual bodies, are the contradictory effects of 
the language which produces it. Hence, in so far as 
experimental writing reveals stresses and frailties in 
language and its relationship to meaning, it 
demonstrates related qualities in gender. When cultural 
or linguistic rules are broken the subject becomes hard 
to read. The resulting sense of disorder will lead some 
people to question the validity and constraints of 
those rules, whilst for others it will only reaffirm 
their "natural" logic. 
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A fundamental paradox of my discussion of The 
Making of Americans is that although by comparison with 
my other selected texts it could be seen to have the 
most radical transformative capabilities, it also 
offers the most resistance to interpretation at 
anything more than a stylistic level. In "The Word-Play 
of Gertrude Stein" Laura Riding Jackson argues that 
Stein's works "did not provide prototypes of 
constructive revolutionary innovation in linguistic 
practice" but were instead "early products of a 
pathological condition" which has pervaded modern 
writing, thinking and speaking. As such, Jackson 
observes, Stein's writing practice illustrates how 
language can be "dehumanized by the ignoring of the 
standards of rational coherence that are, in 
intellectual actuality, inseparable from it" (242). In 
other words, although Stein's experimental writing 
radically reconstructs language use, the resulting 
confusion illustrates both the enduring bond between 
word and meaning and the impossibility of effecting an 
intelligible transformation of language. Where 
transgender subjects position themselves outside "the 
standards of rational coherence" through radical 
reconstructions of identity, similarly reinstating 
effects can result. 
The banal, frequently absurd qualities of the 
writing which characterise The Making of Americans as a 
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whole could be attributed to an experimental project 
that defeats its own purposes. To an extent this view 
is valid. The Making of Americans is somewhat of a 
literary "white elephant" and a close reading of its 
nine hundred and twenty-five pages can be a mind- 
numbing and frustrating experience. For some readers 
and critics the apparent deficiencies of the writing 
will be traced purely to the perversities or failings 
of the author. A more productive approach to Stein's 
text (and by extension other "unreadable" texts) is 
possible but it is a project, like Stein's, fraught 
with ambiguities: a potential "mare's nest" of an 
investigation. For in attempting to interpret the 
"unreadable", I am, according to DeKoven, defeating 
"experimental writing (since it has no Meaning, no 
unitary coherence)" (xv); and in constructing a reading 
which, in spirit only, is experimental I am vulnerable 
to the logic of my own argument. 
On the other hand, although there are 
eccentricities in the writing of The Making of 
Americans, there is seemingly a method in the 
grammatical and verbal rhythms and patterns, and a kind 
of meaning in the irregularities of the prose. Richard 
Bridgman's Gertrude Stein in Pieces, argues that for 
Stein "True confusion was superior to false order" 
(71). My reading of The Making of Americans would 
suggest that in much of the "confusion" that 
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characterises the text there is still a kind of 
"order". 
This different type of meaning might be read in 
the context of French feminist theories of language 
which oppose a (feminine) semiotic order to a 
(masculine) symbolic one. Such theories have been used 
to construct Stein's experimental writing as "feminine" 
or antipatriarchal. DeKoven argues that Stein's writing 
is "already deconstructed" in that it "is the 
indeterminate, anti-patriarchal (anti-logocentric, 
anti-phallogocentric, presymbolic, pluridimensional) 
writing which ... Julia Kristeva proposes as an 
antidote to patriarchy" (xvii). The link to Kristeva is 
made more explicitly by Lisa Ruddick in Reading 
Gertrude Stein: Body, Text, Gnosis. In her discussion 
of The Making of Americans Ruddick states: "Stein 
foreshadows Kristeva; she not only performs the 
modernist irruption of drive in language (as other 
modernists do) but also reflects on it, in quasi- 
theoretical moments like the section on loving 
repeating" (12 7) . 
Although the disordered effects of Stein's writing 
in The Making of Americans might be read as a 
disruption of the symbolic by repressed, pre-Oedipal 
drives, there is something in the deployment of those 
effects which exceeds this interpretation. The 
capricious grammatical and verbal impulses do not fit 
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so neatly into any one theoretical frame. Equally, the 
narrator's "quasi-theoretical" stance suggests an 
ironic distance from the text and a self-parodying 
quality which appears to consciously highlight the 
potential reductiveness of such readings. Alison Tate's 
comparison of Kristeva's and Stein's analysis of 
language, also finds a difference of emphasis in their 
writing. Tate suggests that Stein "seems much more 
conscious of the meaningfulness of the textual, 
discursive, interactional features of different 
discourses" (340). She finds this greater awareness 
translated into a textual playfulness: "rather than 
accepting the inherited ('written') force of formal 
features of language within particular genres and 
discourses", Stein "seems to tease and play with them, 
testing out the extent to which their presence can 
guarantee the effects that are traditionally promised" 
(340) . 
This verbal and grammatical playfulness is typical 
of large sections of The Making of Americans. In the 
course of Stein's epic presentation of "a history of a 
family's progress" (the book's sub-title), any 
semblance of conventional writing or linear narrative 
gives way to modernist and postmodernist "anti- 
narrative" effects. Textual codes and conventions are 
exposed in a perfunctory manner. An increasingly self- 
referential narrator signals her position as both 
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subject of and in the writing through interjections, in 
the form of gossipy colloquialisms such as "as I was 
saying", digressions into self-analysis and, at times, 
what appear to be moments of existential angst. A 
series of "mood swings" towards the end of the text 
includes the following outburst: 
I am in desolation and my eyes are large with 
needing weeping and I have a flush from 
feverish feeling and I am not knowing what 
way each one is experiencing in being living 
.I tell you I cannot bear it this 
thing that I cannot be realising experiencing 
in each one being living . (729) 
New reading practices must be adopted if the text's 
abstruse surfaces, tortuous grammar, and obsessive and 
intrusive self-referential commentary are to be 
successfully negotiated. An openness to the repetitive 
and often monotonous rhythms and patterns in the 
writing is vital to the processing of a text in which 
any enduring mimetic sense derived from individual 
words is limited. Charles Bernstein observes in a more 
general discussion of Stein's experimental texts: 
the meaning is no longer to be found in what 
the words represent, or stand for, but in 
their texture: the repetition, juxtaposition 
and structure of phrases, sentences, and 
paragraphs. One might say the words refer 
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only to themselves, that there is no 
disjunction between what the prose refers to 
and the prose itself. (58) 
In The Making of Americans a semblance of conventional 
meaning exists in the words, but the overriding force 
of the text derives from its material rather than 
symbolic effects. More specifically, my analysis will 
demonstrate ways in which the material workings of the 
prose can be seen to critique and dismantle the text's 
own narrative attempts to represent identity. The 
degree of self-reflexivity evident in this process 
distinguishes The Making of Americans from the other 
literary and visual texts discussed in this thesis. 
In light of the narrator's stated aim-to identify 
every type of "men and women" that is "being living"- 
the marked prosaicness of the recycled vocabulary and 
ideas can serve as a parodic illustration of the limits 
of representational language use. According to this 
reading, this aspect of the text describes and enacts 
in hyperbolic fashion the impossibility of meaningfully 
categorising human identity according to "types". In 
the course of that process a number of themes related 
to identity are subjected to the same deconstructive 
strategies. These themes, which include issues of 
authenticity, subjectivity, and the gendering of 
language, are recognisable from previous chapters and 
once again demonstrate shared concerns of some 
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modernist women's texts and transgender representation 
and theory. An interplay between the themes, the 
practices of writing and reading, and the text's 
materiality lies at the centre of my reading of The 
Making of Americans. 
To contextualise that reading, I will examine the 
relationship between Stein's sartorial and somatic 
self-fashioning and her writing, and provide some 
discussion of publishing issues surrounding The Making 
of Americans. 
Stein's material wor (1) d 
Stein's works and life have been subjected to a range 
of critical approaches from a number of structuralist 
and poststructuralist positions. The troubling 
intersections of Stein's "bourgeois", "masculinist" and 
"heterosexist" lifestyle and views, her same-sex 
relationships and the encoding of lesbian desire in 
much of her work are some of the main tensions that 
critical studies highlight. Shari Benstock argues that 
although Stein "was unconventional in her choice of 
sexual partner, in her dress, and in her writings .. 
the coincidence of these oddities did not constitute a 
subversive feminism" (Women 176-77). Hence, although 
Stein "evaded gender categories in her choice of 
dress", as Benstock sees it, in her life and writing 
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she stayed "within the socially constructed dichotomies 
that distinguish the masculine from the feminine" 
(178). Benstock evaluates the unconventional traits of 
Stein's life and works according to a fairly rigid 
model of feminism. As such, her reading of Stein fails 
to address a subversiveness that is not so readily 
defined . 
As Benstock suggests, Stein's physical appearance 
often eludes gender distinctions: she does not adopt 
the look of the "masculine woman", but neither does she 
conform to the image of the feminine "other". 
Photographs from the period demonstrate the individual 
and often eccentric style of Stein's sartorial tastes 
and seem to reflect her self-representation as "artist" 
and "genius", rather than suggesting any specifically 
gendered identification. Stimpson presents this as 
Stein's strategic reworking of the myth of the artist 
as "a genderless worker, as voice/eye/ear in time 
present who lives to work, without hope of an immediate 
audience" ("Gertrude Stein" 4-5). Although there are 
elements of this figure clearly present in the narrator 
of The Making of Americans, Stein's identification with 
what she saw as the exclusively male preserve of 
"genius" works against that non-gendered construction 
of the artist. 
In her life and writing there is certainly 
evidence of Stein's reproduction of gender specific 
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roles and language. Stein may not have adopted a 
masculine image, but her long-term relationship with 
Alice Toklas was in many respects consistent with 
prevailing heterosexual models of same-sex desire. 
Stein's use of the word "wives" in writing or speaking 
of her partners is just one example of an apparent 
heterosexual role-playing. Yet Stein's use of the term 
"wife" has a certain perverse quality in its 
appropriation of the language of the socially regulated 
institution of marriage for a socially inadmissible 
relationship. The potential dissidence of that act 
becomes more apparent in the context of Stein's highly 
playful approach to language which allows for a 
satirical or parodic element that just would not exist 
if, say, Radclyffe Hall's Stephen Gordon (or Hall 
herself) used the same term. Although Stein's 
unconventionality might not amount to a "subversive 
feminism", the principles of self-invention evident in 
her life and the parodic effects of her writing 
practices suggest a parallel with queer theorisations 
of gender acts, especially drag. 
If, as Judith Butler argues in Gender Trouble, the 
replication of "heterosexual constructs in non- 
heterosexual frames" highlights "the utterly 
constructed status of the so-called heterosexual 
original" (31), then Stein's transgressive deployment 
of grammar may have a similar potential in relation to 
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narrative constructions of identity. Randa Dubnick's 
essay "The Structure of Obscurity: Gertrude Stein, 
Language and Cubism" comments on how Stein's writing 
"constantly refers to conventional grammatical syntax, 
but only in a playful negation of its every rule" (40). 
Stein's positioning of grammatical constructs in a 
predominantly non-grammatical frame produces that 
"playful negation" of rules. In the case of The Making 
of Americans the practice of creating an illusion of 
"meaning" in the midst of grammatical disconnectedness 
results in a text which was initially unpublishable 
and, for many people, unreadable. In terms of Butler's 
argument, this potential absence of audience is crucial 
since the subversive content of parodic "performance" 
depends on "a context and reception in which subversive 
confusions can be fostered" (Gender Trouble 139). 
Stein's struggles to be published, prior to the 
success of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas in 
1933, are one of the main concerns of Bridget Elliott 
and Jo-Anne Wallace's chapter on Stein in their book 
Women Artists and Writers: Modernist (Im)positionings. 
In the context of that troubled publication history, 
Laura Riding Jackson's comment that Stein "found a 
public to which she could make the queer presentation 
sound, if not natural, at least proper to the time" 
(243) seems misleading. Not only was Stein unable to 
find a "public" for her eccentric output but, in 
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inception, much of her writing might be deemed to be 
"before its time". The untimely aspect of her work is 
perceived by Stein as the main reason for her failure 
to publish. 
In "A Transatlantic Interview 1946" Stein 
contrasts the fundamental "newness and difference" of 
her writing with the work of James Joyce, whom she 
describes as leaning "toward the past" (512). In 
"Composition as Explanation" (1926), an essay which 
Stein first presented as a lecture at Cambridge and 
Oxford Universities, she reflects on the fickle nature 
of conventional literary tastes. She describes how a 
new composition which is rejected by one generation for 
its "difference" will be valorised by the next for its 
"classic" qualities. Stein attributes these conflicting 
responses to a "compulsion for likeness" that will 
condemn and approve a text with equal force: "For a 
very long time everybody refuses and then almost 
without a pause almost everybody accepts" (23). Stein 
blames human apathy for this aversion to anything 
unfamiliar: "If every one were not so indolent they 
would realize that beauty is beauty even when it is 
irritating and stimulating not only when it is accepted 
and classic" (23). These pronouncements might be given 
a wider significance in terms of their insights into 
the prescriptive and reactionary practices of dominant 
orders. More specifically, they identify and challenge 
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those forces which, as Stein sees it, have caused the 
value of her own work to be overlooked. 
Critical and biographical evidence supports the 
view that Stein's writing was being rejected by 
publishers because of its radical qualities. Ulla E. 
Dydo, the editor of A Stein Reader: Gertrude Stein, 
explains that although Stein submitted all her work for 
publication "most of it was returned because it did not 
represent a familiar world and could not be read in 
familiar ways" (3). Of The Making of Americans Dydo 
remarks: "Completed in 1911, the book that Stein always 
called her main work suffered rejection after rejection 
by publishers and did not appear until fourteen years 
later" (17). There were some minor breakthroughs: 
Elliott and Wallace describe how Stein's publications 
prior to 1933 were through small literary presses and 
the publishing house set up by Stein and Toklas in 
1929. More generally, publishers' responses to 
submissions of work refer to it as "peculiar" and 
"curious" and generally express the view that such 
writing would not be taken seriously by the public 
(Dydo 96-7) . 
An interesting counter-view to this "official" 
response can be divined from letters to Stein from 
friends and contemporaries who had read parts of the 
manuscript of The Making of Americans prior to its 
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publication. 3 Although the views expressed in personal 
correspondence cannot necessarily be taken to represent 
serious critical opinion, there are some revealing 
insights. Alice Ullman, a friend of Stein's, comments 
in a letter dated 30 November 1910: "it's the biggest 
conception imaginable but, dear girl, you are making 
for `lonesomeness'! Of course it's going to be the 
finest thing there is to gain, that lonesomeness. And 
you'll have with you the few" (51). Ullman's 
observations on the book's "greatness" and yet its 
limited popular appeal anticipate the problem that 
Stein was to face in terms of public responses to her 
work. In equating literary worth with obscurity it also 
echoes the kind of elitist principles that were to 
underpin much "Modernist" thinking. 
A letter from Mabel Dodge, written in Spring 1911, 
is particularly instructive in its judgement of the 
significance of The Making of Americans and in its 
comments on stein's style: 
To name a thing is practically to create it & 
this is what your work is-real creation. It 
is almost frightening to come up against 
reality in language in this way .... And 
your palette is such a simple one-the primary 
colors in word painting & you express every 
3 For my discussion of these letters all of the references are to 
The Flowers of Friendship: Letters Written to Gertrude Stein, 
edited by Donald Gallup. 
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shade known & unknown with them. It is as new 
& strange & big as the post-impressionists in 
their way &, I am perfectly convinced, it is 
the forerunner of a whole epoch of new form & 
expression. It is very morally constructive 
for I feel it will alter reality as we have 
known it, & help us to get at Truth instead 
of away from it as "literature" so sadly 
often does. 
Dodge concludes: "One cannot read you & still go on 
cherishing the consistent illusions one has built up 
about oneself & others" (52). The view that Stein's 
writing practices present a different version of 
"reality", and one that is specifically challenging to 
established concepts of identity, supports this 
chapter's central argument. It also relates to my 
discussion in the previous chapter of representations 
of personal "truth" in Woolf's Orlando and transgender 
life-narratives. The analogy with fine art has 
resonances that go beyond this chapter's parameters 
too; the reference to the "simple" palette and yet 
range and subtlety of expression recalls my commentary 
on Brooks's largely monochromatic but richly textured 
paintings. The mention of "primary colors" and 
description of Stein's "word painting" as "new & 
strange" set her work distinctly apart from the realist 
portraiture of her contemporary. The parallel drawn 
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between Stein's writing and post-impressionism is 
interesting; Stein was greatly influenced by artists, 
especially Picasso, and some critical accounts of her 
work liken her style to Cubism. 4 
Early in 1923, Carl Van Vechten, a writer of 
critical articles and fiction and the editor of Stein's 
posthumously published work, sent the first three 
volumes of the manuscript of The Making of Americans to 
his publishers, Alfred Knopf. Van Vechten wrote to 
Stein in April of that year: "my feeling is that you 
have done a very big thing, probably as big as, perhaps 
bigger than James Joyce, Marcel Proust, or Dorothy 
Richardson". But he expressed concern about the expense 
of publishing such a long book and the problems there 
might be with sales: "I mean, to the average reader, 
the book will probably be work". Van Vechten adds a 
conciliatory note: "I think even the average reader 
will enjoy it, however, once he begins to get the 
rhythm, that is so important", and concludes: "To me, 
now, it is a little like the Book of Genesis. There is 
something Biblical about you, Gertrude" (154). As will 
be seen in my analysis of The Making of Americans, van 
Vechten's comments on Stein's rhythm recognise one of 
the text's key sources of meaning and his references to 
the Bible identify one of its many borrowed styles or 
4 See Dubnick's "The Structure of Obscurity: Gertrude Stein, 
Language and Cubism". 
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"voices". 
Van Vechten wrote again to Stein in October 
informing her that Knopf was inviting subscriptions for 
the book and, if there were sufficient orders, planned 
to publish it as a three or four volume collection. The 
whole set, which was to include portraits of stein and 
the author's signature, was likely to cost $25 (158). 
In January 1924, Ernest Hemingway suggested to 
Ford Madox Ford that he serialise The making of 
Americans in his periodical Transatlantic Review. In 
February, Hemingway wrote to Stein informing her that 
Ford had agreed and that James Joyce was to be 
published in the same number (159). Also that year 
Stein took the three volumes away from Knopf and sent 
them to another publisher, Liveright; but it was 
through Robert McAlmon's Contact Publishing Company 
that the full manuscript was finally published in book 
form in 1925. The Contact Editions series had already 
published McAlmon's Village and Hemingway's Three 
Stories & Ten Poems. McAlmon had written to Stein 
sometime in 1924 about the "zip of intelligence, and 
whoop of personality power" evident in The Making of 
Americans but not recognised in the review articles of 
its serialisation in Transatlantic Review (162). 
Following the announcements of publication Van Vechten 
declared in a letter to Stein dated 18 April 1925: "It 
seems to me that with the dawning of another year all 
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the world will know of your glory! " (172). Such talk of 
greatness was embarrassingly premature, however, as 
McAlmon's acrimonious communication to Stein in Spring 
1926 bluntly reveals. McAlmon, who clearly regretted 
his decision to publish the book, states: "It has been 
on the market for six months and there is no evidence 
that it will sell". The letter concludes with a threat 
to "pulp" all remaining copies a year after the 
publication (190). Edith Sitwell's attempts to persuade 
Virginia and Leonard Woolf to publish The Making of 
Americans in England through the Hogarth Press in 1925 
had also proved unsuccessful (184-85). 
In view of Stein's publishing difficulties, it 
seems ironic that the narrator of The Making of 
Americans voices concerns about finding an "audience" 
for her writing. At the start of one chapter she 
dramatically announces: "I am writing for myself and 
strangers" (289). By this point in the text the 
narrator can be seen to have become a victim of the 
reductiveness of her own processes. The need to re- 
establish her agency produces a self-assertion which 
can have a somewhat false and desperate quality. There 
also appears to be a self-conscious anticipation of 
reader response in the narrator's admission that 
"repeating" (one of the dominant stylistic features of 
the text) can be "irritating" and "dulling" (302). 
Perhaps the narrator's fear of "artistic" failure is 
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most directly expressed in the following confession to 
the reader: 
Bear it in your mind my reader, but truly I 
never feel it that there ever can be for me 
any such creature, no it is this scribbled 
and dirty and lined paper that is really to 
be to me always my receiver, -but anyhow 
reader, bear it in your mind-will there be 
for me ever any such a creature, -what I have 
said always before to you, that this that I 
write down a little each day here on my 
scraps of paper for you .... (33) 
On the one hand, this is the "artist" figure referred 
to by Stimpson: the worker who has no "hope of an 
immediate audience" ("Gertrude Stein" 4). On the other 
hand, the apparent false modesty of this passage may in 
fact mask authorial insecurities and signal a real 
personal and professional need for public acceptance. 
Elliott and Wallace's discussion of Stein's desire for 
a popular readership observes that "her status as a 
writer and a self-proclaimed genius was seemingly not 
secure unless it was validated by the major publishing 
houses and mass circulation periodicals" (98). This 
evident wish for populist approval sits strangely 
alongside her self-representation as "genius" and 
provides another instance of Stein's personal and 
professional inconsistencies. Stein's own situation can 
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be viewed in the wider context of an ambivalent 
relation between a modernist aesthetic and the 
operations of a mass culture which, as Lawrence Rainey 
argues in Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites 
and Public Culture, generated "a tacit but pervasive 
consensus that the market is the sole arbiter and 
guarantor of value" (171). Stein's personal ambivalence 
on matters of literary value and audience does not 
remain constant. In Everybody's Autobiography, 
published in 1937, Stein's views on "publicity" seem to 
have been substantially revised. In a scene in which 
she is speaking to Hollywood stars at a dinner party, 
Stein expresses the opinion that "the biggest publicity 
comes from the realest poetry and the realest poetry 
has a small audience not a big one" (292). 
In The Making of Americans the overt presence of 
narrative and sexed and gendered conventions suggests a 
complicated relationship between the experimental aims 
of this project and its continuing dependence on 
traditional modes of signification. My reading of 
Stein's text begins by considering some of the 
potential effects and implications of its "anti- 
narrative" practices. 
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"And so now we begin" 
Lisa Ruddick states that The Making of Americans 
"begins as a bourgeois narrative but ends as an avant- 
garde experiment, unique in its time" (5). To apply 
notions of origin and closure to a text which so 
perversely and thoroughly resists such principles seems 
somehow inept. Numerically, there is a first and last 
page in the book and there is some sense of movement in 
the writing between those pages. Over the long period 
of its composition there were certain shifts in 
authorial purpose and style. It was Stein's initial 
intention to present a fictionalised account of the 
personal and familial histories of various branches of 
the Stein family, including her own. This strongly 
autobiographical focus was then displaced by a more 
general interest in character types and in what Ulla 
Dydo calls "'the nature of human being itself" (17-18). 
Although those changes can be loosely identified within 
the different sections of the text, to attempt to label 
them as "bourgeois" or "avant-garde" would seem to 
impose conventions falsely. 
The following extract, taken from the early, more 
orthodox section of the book, evinces a syntactically 
complex but linguistically familiar style: 
The wide and glowing meadows of low oaks, the 
clean clear tingling autumn air, the blaze of 
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color in the bits of woods, the freedom and 
the rush of rapid motion on the open road, 
the joy of living in a vital world, the 
ecstacy [sic] of loving and of love, the 
intensity of feeling in the ardent young, it 
surely was not so that Julia Dehning could 
win the sober reason that should judge of 
men. (27) 
But even in these more conventional sections of the 
text there is generally an artificial quality to the 
writing which sets it apart from a realistic "bourgeois 
narrative" model. A pronounced self-consciousness of 
language and tone pervades the text so that it has the 
feel of parodying the styles of writing it imitates. 
Here, consecutive one-sentence paragraphs adopt a 
diction and sentence structure reminiscent of the 
patterns and rhythms of the Bible: 
One was very strong to bear them and 
then always she was very strong to lead them. 
One was strong to bear them and then 
always she was strong to suffer with them. 
(4) 
The writing is haunted by traces of narratives both 
ancient and modern: religious, mythical, and oral 
influences inhabit a text which can also mimic the 
didactic tones of a nineteenth-century novel. The 
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narrator's description of George Dehning solicits the 
reader's tolerance for any failings in the character: 
remember, George was only fourteen just then, 
that time with a boy when he never can have 
much sense in him, for it nearly always is 
then with boys that the meekest of them are 
reckless dare-devil heedless unreflecting 
fellows, and so reader do not make too much 
for him of any present weakness in him. (17 ) 
Through this allusiveness, conducted in an apparently 
knowing and calculated fashion, Stein's writing 
foregrounds and critiques some of its literary and 
discursive "antecedents". In seeming partly to 
construct itself on the foundations of these 
traditional styles and genres, The Making of Americans 
might be seen to disclose the materiality and 
contingency of all narratives, including its own. There 
is a sense here in which the language does not "simply 
refer to materiality", but additionally reveals itself 
as "the very condition under which materiality may be 
said to appear" (Butler, Bodies 31). The implications 
of this performative aspect of language for my reading 
of The Makinq of Americans will be explored in more 
detail later. 
The presence of a distinct narrative voice in 
direct addresses to the reader in the passage quoted 
above is a prime example of how the text adopts and 
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subverts formal devices. In the following coyly worded 
advice certain narrative codes are evoked; at the same 
time, readers are gently cautioned against 
unquestioning adherence to such codes: 
And so those who read much in story books 
surely now can tell what to expect of her, 
and yet, please reader, remember that this is 
perhaps not the whole of our story either .. 
. for I am not ready yet to take away the 
character from our Julia, for truly she may 
work out as the story books would have her or 
we may find all different kinds of things for 
her ... (15) 
This passage also hints at what should already be 
becoming evident: the text's imperviousness to 
customary reading practices. Notions of linearity, 
evoked here by a first person narrator and a reference 
to "story books", are undermined at a narrative and 
stylistic level. 
Any horizontal progression in the "story" is 
increasingly resisted and by the final chapter, 
"History of a Family's Progress", abandoned altogether. 
Consequently, even in the early stages of the book, 
readers can feel as if they are freewheeling in space 
as the writer "hasten [s] slowly forwards" (33). This 
oxymoronic phrase reflects the ironies and 
contradictions which characterise the text; it also 
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describes the experience of encountering a syntax and 
diction which simultaneously creates a sense of 
frenetic activity and inertia. 
For the greater part of the text, any sense of 
development is derived incrementally through a process 
of accretion and minor alterations in the otherwise 
limited vocabulary and phrasing. The materiality of 
much of the language use in The Making of Americans 
creates a textual surface that is hard to navigate. 
Changing temporal markers imply linear movement: "Now 
there will be descriptions of every kind of way every 
one can be a kind of men and women" (289) becomes 
"There will then be soon much description of every way 
one can think of men and women" (290) and a little 
later reappears as "Sometime there will be here every 
way there can be of seeing kinds of men and women" 
(290) [emphases added]. Where Aristotelian conventions 
are invoked in the frequent use of "beginning" in 
relation to "middle" and "ending", such devices are 
adopted only to be set aside or circumvented by 
paradoxical statements such as: "he begins then at the 
beginning of the ending of his middle living to repeat 
more and more the whole of him" (142). 
Notions of closure are also contradicted by the 
heavy recycling of a limited range of words and phrases 
within and between paragraphs, and the continuous 
present of much of the prose. New vocabulary is 
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introduced onto what is predominantly a severely 
limited palette (and palate), but we are warned: "To be 
using a new word in my writing is to me a very 
difficult thing" (539), and in the final chapter the 
language is pared right back to a core of largely 
abstract words. Breaks are also provided by a gradual 
shift of focus from one character or character type to 
another: accounts of named characters merge; 
descriptions of specific categories of people collapse 
into delineations of numerous sub-types. Such 
occurrences are experienced more as fluctuations in 
frequency than tangible, "real" changes. They act as 
buoys, keeping us from drifting off the pages 
altogether, and they produce a sense of direction in 
what can otherwise seem like a rudderless text. 
A vague feeling of interconnectedness is 
engineered by the recycling of names (of people and 
places) and "types". In the "Martha Hersland" chapter, 
a semblance of order appears in the form of nine pages 
of conventional writing. The account of the developing 
relationship between Martha's husband, Phillip Redfern, 
and his work colleague, Miss Dounor, is an unremarkable 
piece of writing, but this reversion to traditional 
narrative can be a temporary source of relief. The 
mediocre but "known" is often preferable to an 
"unreadable" text, however potentially innovative. it 
may also fuel hopes of a more permanent return to 
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"meaning". Ultimately, such trails are false and 
readers can be left frustrated in their attempts to 
manage a narrative which refuses to be controlled. 
One of the more constant elements of the text, 
already alluded to, is a narrative and textual 
preoccupation with "repeating". A kind of narratorial 
amnesia is at work in the writing, so that although 
paragraphs may bear earlier and subsequent traces, 
recycled words and ideas are frequently offered as if 
for the first time in what can pose as a continuous 
citation of the present. 
Such textual repetitions have a number of 
interesting effects, including the production of puns. 
Jo-Anna Isaak's essay "The Revolutionary Power of a 
Woman's Laughter" describes how puns operate in Stein's 
work: 
the pun by calling attention to itself as 
language causes a break in the production of 
meaning and brings into question the 
narratively depicted world, revealing the 
contingencies and lacunae in the depths of 
representation. (45) 
The Making of Americans seems particularly illustrative 
of Isaak's point. Here puns centre primarily around 
variations on themes of "being" and "living", most 
typically in the phrase "being living", but also in the 
form of "being in living", "being being" and "living 
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the living". A narratorial verbosity contributes 
further to the potential wordplay, and frequently 
produces the effects of a riddle or tongue twister, as 
in: "He was living a living not any other one in the 
Hersland family living was living when the Hersland 
family was living the Hersland family living" (827). In 
another example identity is figured as a confused and 
ultimately destructive relationship between the 
subject-represented here by the gender neutral sign 
"one"-and the states of "being" and "living": 
This one when this one is not being kept in 
living being by others being what this one is 
certain this one is being in living, by 
others being certain that this one is in 
living what this one is certain any one like 
this one is in living, loses the grasp really 
on what is what this one is certain any one 
like this one is in daily living. (645) 
In this instance attempts to represent identity through 
a superfluity of words results in a loss of meaning as 
the "one" who is the subject of the sentence and the 
writing itself lose their "grasp" on reality, 
colloquially figured as "what is what". 
The punning effects evident in the above examples 
derive from multiple meanings present in the interplay 
between "being" and "living" as present participles and 
gerunds. Freud's introduction to Jokes and Their 
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Relation to the Unconscious cites one critical 
definition of a joke as "a contrast or contradiction 
between the meaning and the meaninglessness of the 
words" (42). Something of this effect is evident in 
Stein's playful use of language. In Freud's terms, 
Stein's form of wordplay might be understood as a 
higher form of verbal joke in that, unlike other puns, 
its meaning depends on "identically the same word" 
rather than "some vague similarity" (80). The 
ungrammatical, tautological quality of the various 
permutations might also be understood to represent what 
Freud calls a "[p]leasure in nonsense" (174). Freud 
explicitly associates the pleasurable effects of 
nonsensical language with a period of childhood which 
is not subject to the "compulsion of logic and reality" 
(176). In this regard an unexpected intertextual link 
emerges. In The Well of Loneliness Radclyffe Hall's 
depiction of Stephen's childhood includes a period that 
is similarly indifferent to the restrictions of reason; 
a time when, as Stephen articulates it: "'I'm happy 
just being myself, " (37). The adult Stephen's nostalgia 
for her childhood can be understood partly as a longing 
for an ambiguity that is no longer permissible. Stein's 
transgression of linguistic rules can be seen to create 
tensions that have a similar source: verbal play, like 
gender play, belongs to a phase of childhood 
development that is free from the demands for 
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signification. As such, although "pleasure in nonsense" 
can be practised in adult life,, it can imitate but 
never recapture that pre-rational spontaneity. Stein's 
evocation of the material pleasures of words may 
implicitly question the rules that demand personal and 
linguistic intelligibility. At the same time, the 
premeditated nature of that playfulness demonstrates 
the internal paradox of such an approach, for it is 
only from a coherent subject position that such 
challenges can be made. 
There is an element of Bakhtinian carnivalesque in 
this aspect of Stein's writing too. In The Politics and 
Poetics of Transgression, Peter Stallybrass and Allon 
White describe punning as a form of grammatica jocosa, 
whereby "grammatical order is transgressed to reveal 
erotic and obscene or merely materially satisfying 
counter-meaning" (10-11). It is in this last respect of 
disclosing "counter-meaning" that the transgressive 
potential of Stein's writing, particularly in relation 
to models of identity, can be found. In textual terms, 
the phrase "being living" brings a feeling of open- 
endedness and fluidity to its representation of 
existence; grammatically, the redundant participle, 
"being", appears to weaken the signification of the 
gerund, "living", and interrupts the semantic flow. 
There is a sense of Stein's writing being caught in the 
process of transforming itself; or, to recall an 
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earlier critical comment, it appears to be "fixed 
permanently ... in a state of awkward transition" 
(Mellow 122). The construction "being living" also 
draws attention to the ambiguities of language through 
its additional implications of "being" as a passive, 
inner state and "living" as an active, external 
experience. In previous chapters such distinctions have 
been seen to be a recurring theme of transgender 
narratives, particularly those structured around 
essentialist concepts of identity. In my reading of 
Stein's text, whilst the complex nature of identity is 
suggested through the intricacies of its various 
constructions of "being" and "living", the difficulties 
of meaningfully representing that complexity are 
reproduced in the absurd and incoherent effects that 
such convolutions create. 
The juxtaposition of "sense" and "nonsense", 
"meaning" and "counter-meaning" in Stein's writing can 
lead readers to feel that if only they pay close enough 
attention a familiar order can be imposed. The pleasure 
and challenge of reading "nonsense" poetry can be seen 
to derive from a similar source: an awareness of sense 
but an inability to divine adequate meaning. Another 
shared consequence of nonsensical writing may be a 
questioning of meaning itself. In the introduction to 
The Chatto Book of Nonsense Poetry Hugh Haughton 
observes: "Just as failing to make sense is an absurdly 
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primary matter, it tends to raise primary matters in 
all their blank absurdity and make us question the 
order of the ordinary" (32). This is a potential effect 
of The Making of Americans where an awareness of 
"nonsense" may extend beyond Stein's perverse 
deployment of representational language and find its 
source in the words themselves. A parallel effect was 
suggested in my discussion of Brooks's and Cameron's 
portraits where the meanings of certain stock images 
are questioned by the particular ways in which they are 
re-presented. 
In the reading I have suggested, textual 
repetitions of "being" and "living" appear to make a 
nonsense of symbolic representations of identity. In 
addition, the concept and practice of repetition links 
the narrator and readers in a shared quest for 
"meaning". In the following passage the narrator's 
avowed search for "completed understanding" of human 
identity mirrors the reader's search for understanding 
of the text. For the narrator, the "repeating" in human 
beings is the key to understanding identity or, as 
Stein might put it, to knowing every kind of kind of 
men and women being living. For readers, it is the 
repeating in the writing itself that is the key to 
"reading" the text: 
Every one always is repeating the whole of 
them. Always, one having loving repeating to 
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getting completed understanding must have in 
them an open feeling, a sense for all the 
slightest variations in repeating, must never 
lose themselves so in the solid steadiness of 
all repeating that they do not hear the 
slightest variation. If they get deadened by 
the steady pounding of repeating they will 
not learn from each one even though each one 
always is repeating the whole of them they 
will not learn the completed history of them, 
they will not know the being really in them. 
(294) 
In this passage, "repeating" is something that 
represents the sameness that is in "every one"; but it 
is also the key to the difference that is in "each 
one". The distinction between sameness and difference 
is presented in absolute terms: "every one", "always", 
"all", "never"; the tone is one of commonsense logic; 
but the stylised grammar disturbs the sense of order 
and complicates that division. The confused syntax 
enacts what is in fact an unclear relation between 
sameness and difference; one that requires the narrator 
to be alert to minute variations in an otherwise 
unchanging pattern. The "steady pounding" of repeating 
that is reproduced in the rhythmic, verbal monotony of 
the writing suggests that the task of reading Stein's 
text must be approached with similar vigilance. It is 
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also perhaps another example of an underlying awareness 
of the "deadening" effect on readers (and writers) of 
language which conveys only limited meaning in any 
conventional sense. 
Symbolic notions of difference in The Making of 
Americans are rendered meaningless through a 
proliferation of increasingly nonsensical categories 
and types. At the same time, a material difference is 
produced by subtle variations in the verbal and 
syntactical sameness of the writing. The dynamic 
function of the spectator in reading that difference 
seems to be central to Stein's vision both in The 
Making of Americans and in some of her other prose 
texts. Stein's essay "Composition as Explanation", 
discussed earlier, opens with the statement: 
There is singularly nothing that makes a 
difference a difference in beginning and in 
the middle and in ending except that each 
generation has something different at which 
they are all looking. By this I mean so 
simply that anybody knows it that composition 
is the difference which makes each and all of 
them then different from other generations 
and this is what makes everything different 
otherwise they are all alike and everybody 
knows it because everybody says it. (21) 
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Stein's argument is a typical blend of artlessness and 
abstruseness. Again she talks in absolute terms: 
"nothing", "all", "everything", "everybody"; and the 
tone is one of professed candour: "By this I mean so 
simply". Again that surface clarity is belied by the 
awkwardness of the grammar. 
These stylistic tensions can be seen to mirror 
tensions in Stein's argument where a "difference" that 
is contingent and subjective is placed in an uneasy 
relationship to a compulsion for sameness: a "likeness" 
that "everybody knows" and "everybody says". In 
psychoanalytic terms these conflicting impulses might 
be understood as the contending desires of subject 
formation: the ego-driven desire to identify with and 
the libidinal desire to objectify. But the simplistic, 
child-like diction and tone adopted here and in The 
Making of Americans seems to evade knowingly the 
intellectual formulations of such "grown-up" theories 
of identity construction. My discussion of Woolf's 
Orlando identifies how the narrator's adoption of a 
juridical language and tone has the effect of mocking 
the legal institution's rigid and inadequate approach 
to matters of identity. In Stein's text such ironic 
effects are harder to discern, being much more a part 
of the fabric of the writing and seeming almost to 
operate at a subliminal level rather than overtly. 
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A performative aspect of language is evident in 
the textual repeatings which contribute to that 
materiality. Judith Butler defines the performative as 
"that discursive practice that enacts or produces that 
which it names" (Bodies 13). Beginnings are repeatedly 
cited in The Making of Americans: "And so now we 
begin", the narrator states in traditional story- 
telling style six pages into the text. Over forty pages 
on the narrator announces: "But now to make again a 
beginning" (48). Following that, the phrase "begin 
again" becomes a stylistic tic in the text's surface. 
Multiple beginnings are also enacted by the recycled 
words and ideas. An immediate, structural effect is to 
diminish any conventional sense of origin, and hence 
closure, in the narrative itself. That subversion of 
linear models of narrative is also extended to the 
text's representation of identity in its various 
"characters" and "types". Notions of "original" 
identities are contradicted by the strategic 
reprocessings of the text. As will become clear in the 
following section, such notions are also unsettled by 
other deconstructive practices. 
"Real being" 
Jo-Anna Isaak observes in her discussion of the anti- 
linear effects of Stein's writing: "to circumvent 
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closure it is also necessary to give up the idea of 
origin; the teleological assumptions of narrative are 
dismantled along with its ideological presuppositions" 
(47). In the account of the origins of American 
identity offered by the narrator of The Makinq of 
Americans, references to the "old" and the "new" worlds 
set up a binary opposition which unsettles the 
"ideological presuppositions" underpinning that whole 
process. This dichotomy can be usefully read alongside 
the original/copy distinction of poststructuralist 
discourses of gender. 
According to one reading of the text, the "real 
American" emerges from Stein's historical record as a 
national and cultural identity which has been 
manufactured out of the "old world" of Europe. In this 
light its origins are derivative. The narrator observes 
on the opening page: 
It has always seemed to me a rare privilege, 
this, of being an American, a real American, 
one whose tradition it has taken scarcely 
sixty years to create. We need only realise 
our parents, remember our grandparents and 
know ourselves and our history is complete. 
(3) 
There are ironic tensions operating in the first 
sentence of this passage. The claim for an authentic 
cultural identity implicit in the phrase "real 
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American" might be questioned by the idea that 
"tradition", in European terms, could have been created 
in "scarcely sixty years". If the essential 
rootlessness of this version of tradition infers the 
false origins of that "real" identity, it also 
questions notions of authenticity that arrive at that 
judgment. In the second sentence the process of making 
a "complete" history is reduced to three generations 
and predicated on the basis of "realising" and 
"remembering". Here it is traditional concepts of 
"history" that are disturbed, but it is not just the 
temporal dimensions that are distorted; the choice and 
tense of the verbs "realising" and "remembering" 
represent history as a product of performative and 
subjective forces. The idea of self-invention inferred 
from these revisions of tradition and history is 
culturally specific: if you have neither a tradition 
nor a history in global terms, then you must construct 
one for yourselves; but this representation of the 
American identity can be applied to other "new" 
identities: cultural, sexual and gendered. 
Elsewhere in the text, the manufacturing of 
identity is represented in relation to the "realising" 
of "others". The narrator describes the process by 
which the Hersland children came to "realise" the Wyman 
family: "they remembered them and reconstructed them 
and realised them and then reconstructed and realised 
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the foreign parents from a reconstruction from their 
reconstructed children" (261). The verbal replications 
of this sentence are matched by a narrative in which 
identity emerges as little more than a simulacrum: a 
copy of a copy. In the context of such contrivance 
traditional notions of origin are severely tested. 
The concept of the "old world" and the "new", 
depicted in the early part of the book, is intrinsic to 
the reader's "realising" of the making of American 
identity. The narrator states her intention in the 
opening paragraphs of the text: "The old people in a 
new world, the new people made out of the old, that is 
the story that I mean to tell, for that is what really 
is and what I really know" (3). In this formulation the 
usual binary division deconstructs itself as both the 
"new" and the "old" are seen to inhere in the other: 
the old exists in the new; the new is a product of the 
old. The second part of the sentence constructs the 
subject position from which the "story" will be told. 
The repetition of "really" suggests the existence of 
different kinds of truth and, in this respect, it 
recalls Woolf's reflections on the reality of selfhood 
which concluded my previous chapter: "But what is 
`oneself'? Is it the thing people see? Or is it the 
thing one is? " (Flush 46). Where the quote from Woolf's 
text represents reality as an opposition between 
objective and subjective perceptions, Stein's 
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narrator's version of reality has a more philosophical 
appearance in its seamless conjunction between the 
thing that (really) is and the thing that is (really) 
known. In terms of its reasoning, it seems to partly 
mirror Wittgenstein's proposition on the subject's 
relation to knowledge: "The subject does not belong to 
the world: rather, it is a limit of the world" (5.632). 
The childlike, self-conscious tone of the narrator's 
statement, or what Stein calls in a later piece a 
"complicated simplicity" of thought, 5 works against the 
logic of her argument whilst, at the same time, drawing 
attention to the subjective construction of that 
viewpoint. 
A more conventional representation of the relation 
between the "old world" and the "new" is provided by 
the account of the Hersland family's geographical 
relocation to America and the supplanting of an 
established identity by a transformed one. The elder 
David Hersland is reluctant to leave his home in the 
"old world" and Martha, his wife, has to return to 
collect him at several points in their journey. He 
feels that "there was no place anymore anywhere for 
Hersland, a place that really belonged to him" (38). 
There is a feminist or anti-patriarchal reading 
possible here. The new world (and new identity) to 
5 Stein uses this term in "A Transatlantic Interview 1946" (Scott, 
The Gender of Modernism 515-16). 
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which they are travelling seems to be associated with 
the female: Martha's optimism drives the couple to a 
land which, in linguistic terms, they already inhabit 
through their feminised family name "Hersland". David 
Hersland's nostalgia for the familiar territory of the 
"old" could parallel a reader's resistance to the "new" 
linguistic territory of the text. It could also 
represent allegiance to "tradition" and "custom" as a 
male impulse. 
In a different context, tradition and custom are 
represented as obsolete and anachronistic. An account 
of Julia Dehning's home in the "new world" observes: 
"the parlor was covered with modern sombre tapestry"; 
the chairs in one room are "as near to good colonial as 
modern imitation can effect"; in another they were 
"made after some old french [sic] fashion" and "covered 
with dull tapestry, copied without life from old 
designs" (31). Modern alternatives are little better. 
The carbon photographs which take the place of 
paintings in the house are "framed close, in dull and 
wooden frames", or "sadly framed in painted wooden 
frames" (31). The one sign of vitality in the house 
seems to be "the really burning logs" in the fire 
places (31), and even here a superfluous "really" is 
needed for authentication. In terms of their 
representational status, the various fixtures and 
fittings highlight an eclecticism in the American 
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identity (evident also in the Germanic influences of 
the name Dehning), which might also be applied to more 
general notions of identity. The furnishings are copies 
of styles and fashions that are themselves long dead. 
Photographs are as much an imitation of life as the 
paintings which they have replaced. In this setting, 
the "copy" is not only favoured over the "original", 
but is recast as part of a new national and cultural 
identity. But in terms of the language and tone of this 
passage, that borrowing of styles has a desensitising 
effect and the identity it produces is inimical to 
life. 
At another point early in the text, the new 
world's requirement for conformity is expressed more 
explicitly: 
We are all the same all through us, we never 
have it to be free inside us. No brother 
singulars, it is sad here for us, there is no 
place in an adolescent world for anything 
eccentric like us, machine making does not 
turn out queer things like us, they can never 
make a world to let us be free each one 
inside us. (47) 
The narrator's address to "brother singulars" is 
perhaps a reflection of Stein's artistic identification 
with her male peers. A biographically inflected reading 
might surmise that highly elitist principles are at 
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work here and that Stein's valorisation of the 
"eccentric" would, in practice, apply only to a small, 
hand-picked group of "brothers" (headed by herself and 
Picasso). 6 More generally, given current associations 
in gender discourses of "queer" with diversity and 
fluidity, its appearance in a discourse on human 
"types" may have a particular resonance for 
transgender, lesbian and gay readers. Stein's use of 
the word to describe eccentric, non-normative 
identities is especially notable in this passage. Prior 
to this declamation, "singularity" has been equated 
with the "real" and the "vital" and has been associated 
with "an older world accustomed to take all manner of 
strange forms into its bosom" (21). Here similar ideas 
are expressed and developed. The new or "adolescent 
world" with its emphasis on industry and mechanisation 
is seen as hostile to the existence of those people who 
are "singular" or "queer". This is an interesting 
inversion of "the old" and "the new" in that it 
contradicts customary views of progress. A world in 
which identities are churned out as if by machine 
imposes an order that might be more readily equated 
with the past. 
In these terms, the late-nineteenth-century's 
categorisation of "deviant" identities has been a force 
6 Elliott and Wallace discuss Stein's self-representation as "male 
genius" (90-102). 
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for repression, rather than liberation. Interestingly, 
Stein had read and discussed Otto Weininger's largely 
philosophical study of sexual difference, Sex and 
Character (1903). In this misogynist and anti-Semitic 
book, Weininger proposes that human sexual nature is 
widely variant and fundamentally "bisexual". Weininger 
states in the opening chapter of Volume 1, "Sexual 
differentiation, in fact, is never complete" (5). He 
explains: 
Living beings cannot be described bluntly as 
of one sex or the other. The real world from 
the point of view of sex may be regarded as 
swaying between two points, no actual 
individual being at either point, but 
somewhere between the two. (9) 
Although Weininger recognises a sexual ambivalence in 
all human beings, he also holds that society's aim 
should be the production of "ideal" types of men and 
women and insists that: "Such types not only can be 
constructed, but must be constructed" (7) .' 
Mellow's discussion of The Making of Americans 
suggests that Stein's "odd characterological system 
seems to have been partly inspired by" Weininger's text 
(120). The narrator's inventory of infinite human 
"types" in The Making of Americans certainly suggests 
similarities of methodology. Stein may also have been 
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influenced by Weininger's writing about the "ego of the 
genius" in her construction of the narrative voice of 
the text. The following passage from the Volume 2 of 
Sex and Character has echoes in Stein's narrator's 
self-representation as an omniscient and instinctual 
subject: 
For the genius the ego is the all, lives as 
the all; the genius sees nature and all 
existences as whole; the relations of things 
flash on him intuitively; he has not to build 
bridges of stones between them. And so the 
genius cannot be an empirical psychologist 
slowly collecting details and linking them by 
associations .... 
(169) 
Despite these suggestions of Stein's interest in 
Weininger any ideological parallels between the works 
are not immediately evident. In Stein's text, the 
heterogeneity that Weininger would have socially 
modified exceeds the boundaries of linguistic 
expression. Richard Bridgman's comment, already quoted, 
that for Stein "[t]rue confusion was superior to false 
order" (71) might be applied here: Weininger's ideal 
can be seen as the setting up of a "false order", 
whereas Stein's project upholds a "true confusion" of 
identity. Reflecting on her writing of The Making of 
Joseph Bristow provides a useful account of Weininger's work and 
influence (Sexuality 37-44). 
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Americans Stein explains that in her attempts to "put 
down every type of human being that could be on earth" 
she wanted "each one to have the same value" ("A 
Transatlantic" 503). 
Stein's narrator's musings on matters of identity 
include a survey of the relationship between an 
essential self and a lived identity. In typically 
pedantic fashion, the narrator lists all the possible 
outcomes that such a relationship will produce, so that 
while "[s]ome know of themselves in their dressing, in 
their daily living in everything what they are and what 
they are wanting from every one, from any one", there 
will also be some who "know what they are wanting but 
they do not have it in them in their daily living, in 
their dressing to show it to any one" (644). A further 
opposition is made between those who "cannot see the 
thing they are in daily living and dressing nor what 
they want to be in daily living and in dressing" and 
those who "see what they want to be in daily living and 
in dressing and then they are a little less than that 
thing so that they will not be queer to any one" (644). 
Finally, in the narrator's ultimate pronouncement we 
are told that: "Some have really the feeling of 
inventing themselves in daily living and in dressing, 
some are really doing this thing, some are feeling 
themselves doing this thing" (644). In each of these 
statements an individual's sense of "being" (who they 
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are, what they want to be) is compared to their actual 
"living" (how they express that "self" in daily life 
and in their choice of clothes). 
The grammatical and semantic ambiguities in that 
conjunction of "being" and "living" have already been 
addressed in an earlier discussion of the text's puns. 
In this instance, certain ideological tensions between 
the two elements are more evident. The references to 
"daily living" and "dressing" foreground the cultural 
imperatives that mould identities into acceptable 
expressions. Although this is figured generally as a 
repressive force, there are also some people for whom 
life-style and clothing are the means to a highly 
conscious self-fashioning or "the feeling of inventing 
themselves" (644). 
In the examples discussed above, the narrator 
presents her argument in explicitly non-gendered terms: 
a neutrality is suggested by the consistent use of 
"some", "they" and "themselves". In other instances, 
gendered pronouns are avoided through the use of "one". 
This has been identified as a feature of Stein's 
writing generally; Bridgman describes Stein's tendency 
to use pronouns that "lacked distinct referents and if 
possible, gender" (57). 
In The Making of Americans, as with other elements 
of this text, the representation of gender is ambiguous 
and seemingly inconsistent. What this apparent 
370 
ambivalence could suggest about the nature of gender, 
and how that knowledge might impact on notions of 
"original" or "authentic" identities are questions that 
need to be examined in more detail. 
"Every kind of men and women" 
Conventional gender roles and differences are 
constantly evoked in the text. We are told that the 
narrator prefers to "tell it" in a woman because "it is 
clearer in her" (205); women have "less in them a 
unification" (226); and the "two kinds" in men "works 
out differently a little in them" (170). One female 
character is described as "a fair heavy woman, well- 
looking and firmly compacted" (13); another as a "sweet 
little gentle mother woman" (43). Male characters are 
discussed more in terms of their roles as husbands and 
fathers and their work. Women find husbands "to control 
them"; men go into business (59). A political point 
seems to be made in Phillip Redfern's childhood 
"realisation" of the false claims made for women: "He 
often said that he had often puzzled over the fact that 
he must give up his chair to and be careful of little 
girls while at the same time he was taught that the 
little girl was quite as strong as he and quite as able 
to use liberty and to perfect action" (429). Elsewhere, 
the seemingly self-evident statement that "David was a 
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boy when he was a young one" is followed by the 
observation: "That was a natural thing" (845). More 
generally, the signifiers "men" and "women" provide the 
foundational poles for the narrator's classification of 
human types and gendered pronouns appear to be used 
unequivocally throughout the text. 
Although all of these examples reinforce 
essentialist notions of gender, there are numerous 
instances where those distinctions seem to be 
neutralised or disrupted. When the narrator informs us 
that David "was a boy" this may just be another example 
of the facile and self-evident nature of much of the 
commentary. On the other hand, by invoking the norm 
attention is drawn to the prescriptive (and 
patriarchal) effects of gender and gendered language. 
According to the sex and gender system in which Western 
society operates, we should already know that anyone 
called "David" is male and will have therefore begun 
life as a boy. At one level, to articulate that axiom 
purely reinstates its "natural" authority; but stating 
that which does not need to be said also highlights the 
extent to which our experiences of identity are already 
determined by basic cultural dictums. In the sentences 
that follow these observations the grammatical and 
"natural" order of the narrator's initial statement 
begins to give way to self-contradiction and confusion: 
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He was a boy then, he was not a boy to 
himself then, he was a boy to himself then, 
he was one being existing to himself then, he 
was one not being existing to himself then. 
He was a boy to very many knowing him then. 
He was not a boy to some knowing him then. 
(845) 
These semantic disturbances further undermine any 
initial semblance of meaning as the narrator's argument 
becomes trapped in the reductive cycle of its own very 
limited terms. In typically hyperbolic fashion, the 
nonsensical effects of this passage may draw attention 
to the highly subjective nature of an existence which 
is the product of conflicting internal and external 
perceptions. 
In respect of the text's categorisation of human 
types, a similarly paradoxical effect is generated. 
Hence, although we are informed that there are "two 
kinds" of men and women, somewhat paradoxically we are 
to hear of "all the kinds of the two kinds of them" 
that exist. The narrator's apparent compulsion to offer 
endless permutations from a list of metaphysical traits 
produces ever more seemingly fatuous observations. The 
following passage is a typical example: 
There are then two kinds of women, there are 
those who have in them resisting and 
attacking, and a bottom weakness in them, 
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women with independent dependence in them, 
women who are strong in attacking, women who 
sometimes have not bottom weakness in them, 
some who have in them bottom weakness in them 
and this inside is a strength in them ... 
(169) 
As is evident from this extract, although men and women 
are sorted into "two kinds", this duality is constantly 
contradicted by the narrator's own processes as her 
apparent awareness of the heterogeneity of human 
identity strives to express itself meaningfully. In 
other instances there are references to "minutest" and 
"subtle" variations and "mixing" in the composition of 
individuals. Ultimately, attempts to express that 
diversity in terms of absolutes always return to the 
same platitudes on the same theme: "There are many 
kinds of women then and many kinds of men" (166), and 
later: "there are many kinds, many very many kinds" 
(300). The narrator's confident prediction that "more 
and more it is surer that this kind of describing leads 
to complete understanding of men and women" (283) must 
surely be taken as ironic given the increasing 
obscurity generated by the output of that process. It 
will be an irony not lost on readers to whom the 
abstruseness of Stein's use of representational 
language has been only too painfully demonstrated. 
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The narrator's frequent recourse to such reductive 
commonplaces can render the referents "men" and "women" 
cliched and seemingly worn-out through overuse. Each 
time the phrase "men and women" appears in the prose 
its ideological status becomes less stable as a 
perpetual tide of recycled words and phrases laps 
around it. As "natural" or constructed origins the 
words "men" and "women" can seem inadequate and empty 
ciphers, unable to contain a diversity and variety 
which is neither biologically nor culturally 
determined. 
Similarly, in Stein's use of gendered pronouns 
there are frequent instances where the polarising 
effects of these textual signs are upset. Monique 
Wittig's essay "The Mark of Gender" states that 
personal pronouns are "the pathways and the means of 
entrance into language" (65). Here, that cultural power 
is strategically defused. For example, although the 
identical phrasing of "the kind he is each one, the 
kind she is each one" (299) achieves a balance between 
its opposing elements, the contrived nature of its 
diction draws attention to the artificiality of that 
equilibrium. By extension, such formulations may 
question not only binary constructions which privilege 
one term over the other, but the value of the binary 
model as a structuring principle. A non-gendered 
construct-the binary of the "independent dependent" and 
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the "dependent independent" (179) into which all men 
and women are divided-is shown to be similarly 
reductive. Weakened by both its palindromic form and by 
the perpetual abstraction of the sub-types which it 
institutes, it is a construct that cancels out its own 
oppositions. 
Revisionary effects in relation to gender binaries 
can also be read in the text's production of fictional 
names. The family names "Hersland", discussed earlier, 
and "Hissen" invite a number of playful readings. Both 
the Herslands and the Hissens, we are told, descend 
from two of the "four good foreign women" (43) with 
whom the history of "a family and its progress" begins. 
That reference to "foreign" antecedents is evident in 
the Germanic influences of the names, and is a reminder 
of the newness and derivativeness of the American 
identity. The gendered pronouns of each name, "hers" 
and "his", evokes a polarity based on possession. The 
nominal roots of the names-the "land" that is Hers and 
the "son" (from the Scandinavian "sen") that is His- 
sets up an interesting dichotomy. "Land" as a non- 
gendered phenomenon offers the hope of geographical and 
personal autonomy; "son" as a gendered, genealogical 
construct evokes and, in this instance, sustains the 
hierarchies and binaries of the patriarchal family 
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unit. 8 In the case of Fanny Hissen, the internal 
tension evident in the juxtaposition of a female first 
name and a male family name is linguistically resolved 
when she marries a Hersland. A more prosaic reading 
might argue that, by marrying, Fanny is simply 
exchanging one man's family name for another's. In the 
context of the gender crossing that I am suggesting the 
place where Fanny becomes a Hersland, the town of 
Bridgepoint, acquires additional meaning-9 The elder 
David Hersland experiences a loss of identity, already 
foretold by his feminised surname, when on leaving the 
"old world" for a new one he feels that "there was no 
place anymore anywhere for Hersland, a place that 
really belonged to him" (38). Other opportunities for 
verbal and gender play are provided by names with the 
common root "man": Wyman (another member of the quartet 
of families), with its recurring pun on: "Why man? "; 
and the comic pairing of Rachel Sherman with Adolph 
Herman. 
Despite this perhaps overstated potential for 
verbal play, the writing constantly resorts to the 
gendered terms of its original premise: "there are many 
kinds of men and many kinds of women". A similar 
8 The opposition I propose here invites a reference to Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman's Herland, written in 1915. Gilman's novel depicts 
the transformative effects of an all-female utopia on the lives 
and views of three male explorers. 
9 Stein also locates her characters' stories in Bridgepoint in 
Three Lives. According to Mellow, Bridgepoint was the fictional 
name she had chosen for Baltimore (116). 
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tension has been observed elsewhere in Stein's work by 
Catharine Stimpson who describes Stein's poetry as: 
a series of propositions about the 
possibilities of transposing gender, about 
the possibilities of breaking up its orders, 
codes, and poses. However, her poetry also 
demonstrates the difficulties of such 
fundamental, capacious alterations. For Stein 
often transposes gender in another, less 
leaping sense. She merely moves gender's 
orders, codes and poses from one point to 
another. She rearranges them. (2) 
The tensions Stimpson identifies in Stein's attempts to 
transgress the rules of gender have been evident in the 
other texts discussed in this thesis and can be seen as 
a common feature of many transgender representations. 
Jay Prosser argues that "transsexual and transgendered 
narratives alike produce not the revelation of the 
fictionality of gender categories but the sobering 
realization of their ongoing foundational power" 
(Second Skins 11). Where Prosser's statement appears to 
oppose gender's constructedness to its intransigence, i 
would argue that transgender narratives frequently 
demonstrate both of these aspects of gender. It is this 
paradoxical conjunction which Stimpson finds at work in 
Stein's writing. 
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The reductive nature of the narrator's attempts to 
categorise "men and women" in The Making of Americans 
is apparent. Its gendered terms are recycled rather 
than revised and the further the narrator moves away 
from these familiar gendered co-ordinates, the more 
meaning breaks down. At the same time, the cultural 
markers that designate that axis have little more than 
nominal value. In her essay "Poetry and Grammar", 
written in 1934, Stein observes: "A noun is a name of 
anything, why after a thing is named write about it. A 
name is adequate or it is not. If it is adequate then 
why go on calling it, if it is not then calling it by 
its name does no good" (125). In respect of the 
narrator's characterisation of identity in The Making 
of Americans, the repetitive use of "men" and "women" 
may only serve to demonstrate the inadequacy of these 
gendered nouns to represent all its possible 
manifestations. 
What is suggested by this continuing dependence on 
gender categories is that although the narrator's 
deconstructive strategies may disclose an instability 
in the binarisms around which identity is structured, 
they cannot in themselves release identity from what 
Roland Barthes refers to as "the binary prison" (Roland 
Barthes 133). In The Epistemology of the Closet, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick responds to Barthes's utopian vision 
of a post-deconstructive world in which "meaning and 
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sex become the objects of free play" (Barthes, Roland 
Barthes 133). Sedgwick argues that an awareness of the 
"irresolvable instability" of binarisms only reveals 
them as "sites that are peculiarly charged with lasting 
potentials for powerful manipulation" (10). In 
addition, Sedgwick asserts a view already discussed in 
this chapter; that is, to deconstruct something is not 
the same thing as to disable it (10). 10 
The dismantling of gender binaries in The Making 
of Americans can be seen to disclose their foundational 
role in the production of identities. Hence, however 
many grammatical rules are broken and whatever play 
language is subjected to, the narrator's attempts to 
represent identity can neither effectively employ those 
organising binaries, nor evade or transcend them. But 
if gender emerges as an effect of representation, what 
of the supposedly gender-neutral "I" of the narrative 
voice? 
"Always I begin again" 
In The Making of Americans there is something about its 
dismantling of the "idea of origin" that is distinctly 
queer. In this light, the failure to produce a 
coherent, cohesive narrative of an integrated, linear 
10 Hugh Stevens also discusses Sedgwick's critique of Barthes in 
Henry James and Sexuality (15-16). 
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narrative of identity might be attributed not only to 
the eccentricities of Stein's writing but to the 
illusory foundations of all such narratives. That 
subversion of notions of origin and authority includes 
a narrator whose originating presence in the text is 
far from the stable, unified identity it usually 
denotes and whose agency is clearly questionable. 
For ease of expression I have chosen to refer to 
the narrator as "she", but there is no clearly gendered 
"voice" in the text. Although biographical evidence of 
a personal investment in this "history" and 
preoccupations with issues of authorship would suggest 
a clear identification between Stein and her narrator, 
there is an ambiguity surrounding any gendered element 
of this link. The narrator's confession that she 
prefers to "tell it" in a woman "because it is clearer 
in her" (205) might indicate an empathy based on 
universalising notions of sexual difference, although 
it could equally be the essentialising view of a male 
commentator. The narrator's address to "brother 
singulars" is more explicit in its expression of a male 
identification and, as discussed earlier, has a 
biographical explanation. The phrase also has a 
figurative quality which weakens that effect. Elsewhere 
in the text there is a conspicuous absence of clues as 
to this aspect of the narrator's identity. 
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At various points in the text, in typically 
modernist fashion, the "I" whose sensations and 
perceptions construct the text literally exposes that 
role in the process of production. The narrator's more 
usual interventions have been noted: the chatty "as I 
was saying", the didactic and confessional addresses to 
readers; but the "Martha Hersland" chapter introduces a 
significant shift of focus. In a sustained passage of 
highly self-reflective utterances (in six paragraphs 
there are twenty-seven uses of "I"), the narrator 
becomes the subject of her own cognitive and linguistic 
processes in what Ulla Dydo calls, a "scrutiny of 
herself in relation to her ongoing perceptions and 
formulations-the writer in the act of writing" (21). 
The initial sentence of the chapter, "I am writing 
for myself and strangers" (289), is typical of the 
repeated beginnings and constant deferrals of the 
writing. At the end of the previous chapter we had been 
promised "a beginning of a description of the being and 
the living in Martha Hersland", with the closing words: 
"To begin then" (285). A change of subject-matter is no 
surprise, but the nature of the digression is 
unexpected. The narrator continues: 
I want readers so strangers must do it. 
Mostly no one knowing me can like it that I 
love it that every one is of a kind of men 
and women, that always I am looking and 
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comparing and classifying of them, always I 
am seeing their repeating. Always more and 
more I love repeating, it may be irritating 
to hear from them but always more and more I 
love it of them. More and more I love it of 
them, the being in them, the mixing in them, 
the repeating in them, the deciding the kind 
of them every one is who has human being. 
(289) 
In this passage, a material relationship between the 
syntactical rhythms and verbal duplications of the text 
and the narrator's subject position is disclosed and 
analysed. The narrator, initially a self-appointed 
medium for the characterisation of American identities, 
is now exposed to that same process. This may serve a 
specific purpose in terms of the text's lack of 
trajectory. Prior to this point the increasingly 
unstable nature of the narrator's discourse has 
signalled a diminishing agency: her project is taking 
its toll; she admits to feelings of loneliness and 
fears of failure; she is becoming tired and dispirited; 
and her "voice" displays an increasing loss of 
direction and purpose. Here, the repeated citation of 
"I" might be read as the narrator's (and author's) 
attempt to reassert control over the text through 
revealing herself as the new object of inquiry. There 
is also, at this point, a sense in which the narrator's 
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subject position is materialising through the insistent 
"I", rather than having some prior, independent 
existence. According to this reading, the "I" becomes 
the organising cipher of a subject in the process of 
being written. 
Queer theories of gender as performative 
implicitly contradict the idea of a "voluntarist 
subject" able to oppose "regulatory norms". Judith 
Butler argues: 
"I" deploy the grammar that governs the genre 
of the philosophical conclusion, but note 
that it is the grammar itself that deploys 
and enables this "I, " even as the "I" that 
insists itself here repeats, redeploys, and 
contests the philosophical grammar by 
which it is both enabled and restricted. 
(Gender Trouble 146) 
In this statement, "I" is presented not as a linguistic 
device wielded by a controlling subject, but a founding 
dynamic of the subjectivity it produces and contains. 
Hence, although we may experience ourselves as stable, 
unified beings, that particular sense of identity is 
contingent and illusory. Butler pursues her theme in 
Bodies That Matter where she locates agency in a queer 
refiguration of subjectivity: 
The process of ... what we might call 
materialization will be a kind of 
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citationality, the acquisition of being 
through the citing of power, a citing that 
establishes an originary complicity with 
power in the formation of the "I. " (15) 
Here Butler draws on Derrida's reworking of 
performativity to present subject formation, and 
therefore agency, as derivative: "a reiterative or 
rearticulatory practice, immanent in power, and not a 
relation of external opposition to power" (15). 
When Stein's first person narrative voice is read 
in this theoretical frame a number of interesting 
questions arise concerning the narrator's identity. How 
does such wilfully perverse prose affect ideas of 
"natural" authority evoked by the first person pronoun? 
How far does the "I" of the text designate an 
"authentic" subject position? And to what extent can 
the narrator's overstated pose as "the original wise 
one" (708) be said to parody ideas of what Judith 
Butler terms "an originating will" (Bodies 13)? 
Where Butler links subject formation and 
citational practices, in Stein's text we seem to be 
witnessing the process in reverse. Towards the end of 
The Making of Americans, where the narrator is at her 
most stridently self-referential and least coherent, a 
disintegrating subject position coincides with an 
almost total breakdown in symbolic language use. The 
following frenzied "outburst" appears to describe and 
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enact a crisis of personal and linguistic 
signification: 
I mean, I mean and that is not what I mean, I 
mean that not any one is saying what they are 
meaning, I mean that I am feeling something, 
I mean that I mean something and I mean that 
not any one is thinking, is feeling, is 
saying, is certain of that thing, I mean that 
not any one can be saying, thinking, feeling, 
not any one can be certain of that thing, I 
mean I am not certain of that thing, I am not 
ever saying, thinking, feeling, being certain 
of this thing, I mean, I mean, I know what I 
mean. (782) 
Within the irrational syntactical movements of this 
sentence the semantic nuances are quite dizzying. The 
"I" strives for but fails to achieve "meaning" as both 
identity and intelligible communication can be seen to 
literally break down. This fracturing of "meaning" at a 
textual level evokes certain disjunctions between the 
"I" writing and the "I" that is written of; between 
having meaning and producing meaning. In its 
performative aspect, the narrator's "I mean" revises 
Cartesian logic: "I" signifies therefore I exist. In 
the context of such disordered and irrational 
utterances that enactment of subjectivity is fatally 
undermined. Gaps between meaning and being are 
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highlighted further by the tautologous nature of the 
statement "I mean"-to adopt the universal "I" is to 
"mean". In this instance, the false authority of that 
"voice" is illuminated by the narrator's incoherence 
both as a subject and as a speaker. In the passage 
quoted above the "I" can no longer signify by itself 
and must be shored up by false "means" (in both senses 
of the word). It is as if, at this stage, the breakdown 
of meaning that has pervaded every other aspect of 
symbolic language use in the text has finally turned on 
the gatekeeper itself. 
There is perhaps an unusual degree of narrative 
progression in the fact that by the final chapter the 
"I" is no longer present as a distinct identity, having 
apparently been subsumed by the abstractions and 
repetitions of the text. Teleologically, the ultimate 
dissolution of the narrator's subject position has a 
pleasing logic: where conventional "meaning" is 
dislodged subjectivity is destabilised and may 
eventually become "unreadable". In other words, 
identity cannot meaningfully exist outside language if 
it is language which produces identity. 
A similar link between language and subjectivity 
is articulated by Wittgenstein in the first epigraph to 
this chapter: "The limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world" (5.6). This proposition is 
frequently employed in discussions of language and it 
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has become somewhat of a cliche. Nevertheless, 
Wittgenstein's ideas on the relationship between 
language and the "reality" it purports to represent 
still retain their intellectual force and cultural 
relevance. 
David Silverman and Brian Torode find opposing 
references in Wittgenstein's concept of the "limits of 
language". They explain: "On one side, it seeks to 
dispense with language in order to make space for some 
extra-linguistic reality. On the other side, it brings 
to the fore the impossible ideal of a language which 
`tells it like it is'" (40). The central paradox that 
Silverman and Torode identify might also be applied to 
Stein's experimental project. 
In many respects The Making of Americans can be 
seen as a greatly protracted discourse on the limits of 
language, specifically in its relation to matters of 
identity. It is also a patent demonstration of those 
limits and for that reason is, itself, highly 
constrained. I have argued that the textual rhythms and 
verbal patterns perform what might be referred to as an 
"extra-linguistic reality", but I have also 
acknowledged that such versions of reality have 
significant problems of accessibility. At a narrative 
level, attempts to "tell it like it is" have been seen 
to lead to linguistic abstraction and the dissolution 
of the narrator. Yet, as stated earlier, a kind of 
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meaning can be derived from the text's formal and 
narrative "failings". From the textual perversities may 
come a new awareness of the contradictions of symbolic 
language: it may be a system capable of evolution and 
change, but behind that suggestion of fluidity is a 
rationale that no amount of experimentation can break; 
it is undeniably repressive and yet essential, in both 
senses of the word, to human existence; it imposes an 
order but that order is false. If The Making of 
Americans is an attempt to produce a serious 
alternative to that symbolic order, then it does not 
work. If it is evaluated for its critical function it 
has productive effects, particularly in its exploration 
of the relationship between representation and 
identity. 
Issues of language use have been an abiding 
concern of this thesis. Representation is a vexed and 
vexing matter for transgender subjects. It is also a 
troubling issue for the reader or critic (transgender 
or non-transgender) who speaks or writes about subjects 
who in gendered terms, and therefore cultural terms, 
cannot be defined or, more importantly, refuse 
conventional definitions. If the narrative construction 
of subjectivity, both written and visual, has been a 
recurring theme of this thesis a central question 
remains unanswered. To what extent can transgender 
subjects truly (re)write what Woolf calls "the thing 
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one is" in a language that constructs and constantly 
reinforces a single subject position? The texts 
discussed in previous chapters-The Well of Loneliness, 
Orlando and Brooks's and Cameron's portraits-have been 
shown to produce multiple, dislocating linguistic or 
spectatorial effects. In each case, to varying degrees, 
the reading of those effects is dependent upon and can 
only be expressed in terms of conventional language: 
subjects can only be read and written about 
meaningfully in a language structured around male and 
female subject positions. 
What is evident from those other chapters, then, 
is the extent to which language enforces and polices 
polar subject positions. In each of the previous 
contexts in which transgender consciousness has been 
explored-science and medicine, the visual arts, the 
law, and life-writing-language has been shown to oppose 
and proscribe deviations from those recognised gender 
distinctions. Collectively, the various literary and 
visual texts that have been analysed demonstrate the 
inadequacies and limitations of a dual sex and gender 
system, but they also evince the necessity and, in some 
instances, usefulness of its binary codes. In this 
respect, The Making of Americans can be distinguished 
for its metanarrative tendencies: in its self-reflexive 
interrogation of linguistic and sexed and gendered 
rules, it can be set apart from and positioned in 
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critical relation to the other primary texts in this 
thesis. 
On matters of identity, the narrative and anti- 
narrative strategies of The Making of Americans render 
ideas of familiar, "readable" subjects absurd and 
artificial. If there is any clear meaning to emerge 
from my reading of the text, it might be that it is 
subjectivity itself that is illegible, rather than 
particular non-normative identities; but that may 
perhaps impose more linguistic coherence than is 
warranted on this doggedly "meaningless" text. 
Nevertheless, the transgressive strategic procedures 
and particularly the self-conscious textuality of The 
Making of Americans can be seen to produce a work which 
describes and, to an extent, performs the shared 
foundational qualities of narrative and identity. In 
this respect, Stein's experimental text perhaps 
expresses most profoundly, if most obliquely, some of 
the central paradoxes which have characterised this 
study. 
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CONCLUSION 
Two sexes are not the necessary, natural 
consequence of corporeal difference. Nor, for 
that matter, is one sex. 
-Walter Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender 
from the Greeks to Freud (243) 
In the introduction to Volume 1 of Sex and Character 
(1903), Otto Weininger poses a question about identity 
which has a particular relevance to my study. Weininger 
initially asserts the view that the assignment of sex 
to human beings on the basis of "one character only" is 
"illogical" (2); two pages later he remarks: "Are we 
then to make nothing of sexual differences? That would 
imply, almost, that we could not distinguish between 
men and women" (4). In posing this question Weininger 
touches on psychic and cultural nerves, for what could 
be more fundamentally threatening to the construction 
of personal and social identities than the blurring of 
so-called natural differences? 
A text which illustrates the literal consequences 
of that threat of denaturalisation is Herculine Barbin: 
Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth- 
Century French Hermaphrodite (1980). Michel Foucault's 
introduction to Herculine Barbin begins with the 
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question, "[d] o we truly need a true sex? " (vii). The 
memoirs themselves record the discovery of Alexina's 
"true sex" when s/he becomes ill and is examined by a 
doctor. ' The co-existence of male and female sexual 
organs in an undeveloped state leads to the medical, 
and therefore legal, view that the subject's original 
designation as "female" is a mistake which must be 
rectified. But if the subject of these memoirs is not 
wholly female in biological terms, neither is s/he 
wholly male. Such anatomical variations are possible- 
intersexual subjects, who are born with ambiguous 
sexual organs, constitute a rare but significant 
section of the population. What is unclear in the case 
of Alexina is the extent to which h/er erotic behaviour 
influences the medical decision that s/he is male. 2 
Alexina's confessions to a priest and a doctor about 
h/er "condition" prior to the medical examination are 
alluded to but not described. H/er intimate friendships 
with females cause comment and some consternation for 
others, but they do not in themselves attract 
punishment or outright condemnation within the female 
communities in which they occur. 
1 Although the subject's birth name is Adelaide Herculine s/he 
adopts the names Alexina and, less frequently, Camille, in the 
memoirs. 
2 Butler uses the contraction "h/er" for her critique of Herculine 
Barbin (Gender Trouble 93-106). This term seems especially apt for 
a discussion of an ambivalently sexed subject, as it implicitly 
questions the binary terms which continue to operate in the more 
usual "his/her" or "her/his". 
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There may be a political point to be made about 
how Alexina's environment influences responses to the 
anomalous elements of h/er identity. It is male 
representatives of patriarchal institutions who decide 
that Alexina's ambiguously sexed and gendered identity 
must be reshaped into a "normal", unequivocal one. 
Alongside the memoirs, Foucault brings together a range 
of primary sources which illustrate the ways in which a 
narrative of Alexina as "male" is constructed and 
legitimised by others. Official documents 
authenticating this particular change of sex include 
Alexina's Birth Certificate, which has been amended to 
register h/er male identity and which alters h/er birth 
name from Adelaide Herculine to Abel (150-51). 
It might also be argued that Foucault's 
representation of Alexina's story conducts its own 
reshaping of that narrative. Judith Butler refers to 
Foucault's reading of Alexina's narrative as a 
"romanticized appropriation and refusal of her text" 
(Gender Trouble 94). In his introduction, Foucault 
describes a change in attitudes towards and treatment 
of the "hermaphrodite" since the Middle Ages in terms 
of a movement towards one coherent (male or female) 
sexual identity. He explains: 
Biological theories of sexuality, juridical 
conceptions of the individual, forms of 
administrative control in modern nations, led 
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little by little to rejecting the idea of a 
mixture of the two sexes in a single body, 
and consequently to limiting the free choice 
of indeterminate individuals. (Herculine 
viii) 
Prior to this demand for greater distinctions between 
male and female identities, Foucault suggests, 
"hermaphrodites" enjoyed a degree of flexibility in 
choosing the sex to which they wished to belong. 
Foucault claims that, at the time of marriage, 
"hermaphrodites were free to decide for themselves if 
they wished to go on being of the sex which had been 
assigned to them, or if they preferred the other" 
(viii). Walter Laqueur adopts a less optimistic view of 
the treatment of indeterminately sexed subjects during 
the same period. Laqueur describes Foucault's claim as 
"perhaps utopian", arguing that "gender choice was by 
no means so open to individual discretion, and one was 
not free to change in midstream" (124). 
Foucault's description of Alexina's life prior to 
the discovery of h/er "true sex" seems to rely quite 
heavily upon the utopian elements of his historical 
account of the hermaphrodite. The phrase Foucault 
applies to Alexina's existence prior to the 
redesignation of h/er sex-"the happy limbo of a non- 
identity" (xiii)-evokes parallels to Radclyffe Hall's 
Stephen Gordon, who recalls a childhood when she was 
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"happy just being myself" (The Well 37). As mentioned 
earlier, Alexina's story, unlike Stephen's, suggests a 
willingness within the female communities in which s/he 
grows up to accept her "difference". According to 
Foucault's reading, when Alexina is required to assume 
a male identity it is at the expense of an identity 
which, although it is designated as female, affords a 
significant degree of non-gendered freedom. However, as 
Butler argues, the "irresolvable ambivalence" of 
Alexina's sexed identity, and the pleasures and desires 
which it brings, does not evade or precede the 
imposition of a "juridical discourse on univocal sex" 
(Gender Trouble 99). Alexina's ambivalence is the 
product of the law which "requires conformity to its 
own notion of `nature' and gains its legitimacy through 
the binary and asymmetrical naturalization of bodies" 
(Gender Trouble 106). 
The "change" of Alexina's identity from female to 
male creates a highly unusual position. Alexina's 
memoirs include the observation, "I, who am called a 
man, have been granted the intimate, deep understanding 
of all the facets, all the secrets, of a woman's 
character" (107). This again distinguishes between 
Alexina's and Stephen Gordon's narratives: the 
depiction of Stephen's relationships with female 
characters emphasises her position of otherness; 
Alexina's position in the all-female communities to 
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which s/he is sent is one of belonging despite h/er 
sense of being physically different. Alexina's life- 
narrative is also distinct from the transgender 
autobiographies discussed in Chapter 3, in that it does 
not record a transition towards a sex that Alexina 
already knew s/he was. According to Foucault, Alexina 
wrote the memoirs "once her new identity had been 
discovered and established" (xiii). Alexina, like 
Stephen Gordon, does not know the meaning of h/er 
difference and the "truth" must be discovered by 
external sources. There is no sense of agency in this 
revelation; Alexina is told that s/he is "male". From 
the position of this changed status, Alexina makes 
retrospective sense of some of the ambiguities of h/er 
life as a girl and young woman. 
Foucault's analysis of that narrative includes a 
footnoted comment on Alexina's adoption of masculine 
and feminine adjectives to describe the different 
stages of h/er life: 
this systematization ... does not seem to 
describe a consciousness of being a woman 
becoming a consciousness of being a man; 
rather, it is an ironic reminder of 
grammatical, medical, and juridical 
categories that language must utilize but 
that the content of the narrative 
contradicts. (xiii-xiv) 
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Despite the thematic echoes produced by Foucault's 
observation, Alexina's life is not the androgynous 
ideal represented by Woolf's Orlando who can 
"vacillate" between the sexes, knowing "the secrets" 
and sharing "the weaknesses" of both (Orlando 152). The 
unwanted imposition of a singular identity is, it 
seems, untenable and Alexina commits suicide shortly 
after writing the memoirs. As such, h/er story 
demonstrates what Butler calls in a different, but 
related, discussion the "cruel and fatal social 
constraints on denaturalization" (Bodies 133). 
The material evidence of Alexina's narrative, 
which dates from the 1860s, provides an interesting 
counterpoint to D. H. Lawrence's dogmatic account of 
sexual difference presented in Fantasia of the 
Unconscious in 1923. Lawrence states: 
A child is born sexed. A child is either male 
or female; in the whole of its psyche and 
physique is either male or female. Every 
single living cell is either male or female, 
and will remain either male or female as long 
as life lasts. And every single cell in every 
male child is male, and every cell in every 
female child is female. The talk about a 
third sex, or about the indeterminate sex, is 
just to pervert the issue. (96) 
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Lawrence's view itself seems perverse (or defensive) in 
the context of the fictional and non-fictional 
representations of sex and gender changes discussed in 
this thesis. However, this unequivocally worded 
resistance to developing discourses of sex articulates 
a view that is a recurrent theme of my study: that is, 
the cultural and psychic requirement for sex and gender 
binary distinctions to be upheld according to abiding 
notions of "truth" and "nature". 
A text which, at least partly, consciously 
attempts to counter those imperatives is Irene Clyde's 
Beatrice the Sixteenth (1909). The ambiguities 
surrounding the authorship of this obscure novel-Irene 
Clyde is the pseudonym of Thomas Baty, the founder of 
the journal Urania-are discussed in my introduction. 
Clyde's novel loosely constructs its utopian vision on 
the premise that sexed and gendered distinctions are 
artificial and undesirable. The novel poses as the 
autobiographical narrative of "Mary Hatherley, M. B., 
Explorer and Geographer" (1). The narrator's 
credentials signal the novel's radical intentions from 
the outset: for a woman to be a doctor, explorer and 
geographer at the start of the twentieth century would 
have been a rare phenomenon. The gender transgression 
and culture-crossing implicit in this aspect of Mary's 
characterisation are matched by the desert setting in 
which she is located when the novel begins. Such 
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"exotic" settings evoke Western cultural fantasies of 
the East as a place of liminality and gender fluidity. 3 
In circumstances which seem to anticipate Woolf's 
Orlando, Mary awakens from a state of unconsciousness 
(induced by a hefty blow from a camel's foot) to find 
that she has undergone some form of change. Where for 
Orlando the change is visible and unmistakable, for 
Clyde's protagonist the nature of the transformation is 
less tangible. The location is familiar-Mary had been 
travelling through a desert in the Middle East when she 
had been knocked "senseless"-but the place names and 
the native language have changed. It is only later, 
when she consults an astrologer, that Mary discovers 
that her accident has propelled her into a different 
"plane of existence" (149) .4 
Mary is rescued by a group of mysteriously clad 
people who are described as "clean-shaved, fair, 
smiling people-all in kilted brown robes with a broad 
yellow stripe across the front" (2). She is escorted 
back to their kingdom-a place called Armeria ruled over 
by Queen Beatrice the Sixteenth. Mary realises that the 
language used by the Armerians is a mixture of Latin 
and Greek with which she is familiar, and soon finds 
3 See Marjorie Garber's "The Chic of Araby: Transvestism, 
Transsexualism and the Erotics of Cultural Appropriation" for a 
discussion of this cultural association of the East with gender- 
crossing. 
4 This notion of a genderless utopia as, in effect, a state of 
mind might be pursued alongside Marge Piercy's representation of a 
utopian future world in Woman on the Edge of Time. 
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herself able to communicate with them. She is 
increasingly drawn to Ilex, one of the leading figures 
in the kingdom of Armeria, who is described as a 
"graceful figure" (9) but to whom initially no sex or 
gender are assigned. Although Mary's claims to be from 
a place called "Britain" meet with some scepticism, she 
is gradually accepted by the people of Armeria and, 
having won the confidence of the queen, she assists 
them in their conflict with the neighbouring kingdom, 
Uras. The story ends with Mary and Ilex being united 
through a form of marriage ceremony and Mary sending 
her manuscript, by a means only vaguely described, to a 
friend in Scotland who, through "Miss Clyde", arranges 
for its publications. 
Beatrice the Sixteenth is, as this synopsis 
suggests, a highly implausible tale which combines a 
rather turgid prose style with an idealised vision of 
what is ultimately an all-female world. At the start of 
the novel there is some attempt to present Armeria as a 
gender-free utopia. The setting, as I observed earlier, 
is suggestive of liminality. It seems that this is a 
place where individuals are released from the usual 
constraints of naturalised notions of sex and gender 
relations. The narrator's sense of identity is 
disturbed by her contact with its inhabitants; not only 
does she wonder "'[w]here was I? ", but also 11[w]ho was 
I? " (25). Her conversations with Ilex and Brytas, 
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particularly those concerning language, aim to depict a 
people oblivious to the usual conventions of sex and 
gender. But the need to represent this meaningfully for 
the reader requires that the characters, including the 
Armerians, continue to distinguish between men and 
women. When Mary asks whether the "Parisön" who is 
mentioned is a "lady", explaining that she thought it 
might be a man's name, Ilex responds: "`So it is. Where 
is the difference? " (77). Yet when Mary questions them 
about their use of terms to distinguish between male 
and female she learns that they only have words to mean 
"person". 
The first clue that this might be a female 
community, rather than a genderless one, occurs when 
Mary asks: "'How do you distinguish ... between the 
people who-who fight and wear whiskers and 
moustaches? '" At this point, Mary realises that "none 
of them did wear them" (77). Her question about whether 
any division is made between the people of Armeria is 
understood only in terms of the distinction between 
free people and slaves. Mary explains that she means 
"I[t]wo complementary divisions, each finding its 
perfection in the other'" (78), to which Ilex replies, 
""[f]or my part, I cannot see how perfection is to be 
attained, except in one's own spirit'" (78). As a 
heavy-handed postscript to this exchange, Mary 
concludes that, "there was no second declension in the 
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language, and, consequently, no distinctively masculine 
adjectives. ... So there was really no means of 
making or inferring any distinction of the kind" (79). 
Although this section of Beatrice the Sixteenth 
recognises the relationship between language and 
identity, the author's handling of the issue seems 
awkward and overstated, especially when viewed 
alongside the subtle effects of Stein's The Making of 
Americans. However, whilst Clyde's novel has none of 
the subtle knowingness and innovation of Stein's text, 
the inconsistencies evident in its use of gendered 
language demonstrate some of the same intrinsic 
problems of representation. 
The vision of a world without gender which Clyde 
seems to be wanting to suggest is undermined by its 
variable language use. At first the narrative adopts 
terms such as "personage", "figure", and "subject" to 
refer to the people Mary meets. Gender neutral names 
and carefully constructed sentences avoid the need for 
gendered pronouns: "Brytas began to play again, and 
kept us quiet, until, in the abrupt way which was 
usual, the music stopped, which we took as a signal to 
seek our own apartments" (59). But such devices give 
the writing a formal and rather detached feel and are 
virtually abandoned after about eighty pages. At the 
same time gendered nouns and pronouns continue to be 
employed in a conventional manner including references 
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to an "oldish man" (3 7) and a "beautiful girl" (61). 
During a visit to Ilex's house, in the first indication 
of Ilex's sex, Mary notes that, " [e]vidently my friend 
was mistress here! " (84). Ilex's account of the family 
members and friends gathered at the house uses gendered 
pronouns, enabling the author to indicate the existence 
of same-sex relationships (88). From this point 
onwards, although occasional reminders are posted of 
the presumed sexual ambivalence of the inhabitants 
through the phrases "him or her" and "she (or it might 
be he)", no consistent effort is made to maintain the 
initial vision. 
The all-female world which provides the more 
dominant image of the novel is a strange affair. An 
old-fashioned view of "ladies" who call each other 
"dear" persists alongside the text's more radical 
representation of women as rulers, government 
officials, doctors, and soldiers. Similarly, although 
intimate relationships between the female inhabitants 
are described, they are presented as sexless and, at 
times, are heavily sentimentalised. The Armerian 
practice of purchasing infants from a nearby 
"barbarian" (presumably because heterosexual) community 
inadvertently constructs same-sex relationships as 
sterile and incapable of independent existence. 
Far from being the ideal state it sets out to be, 
this world is riddled with its own divisions and 
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conflicts. Hierarchical and binary distinctions are the 
foundational poles of this alternative existence- 
Armeria/Uras, free people/slaves, civilised/barbarians- 
whilst in its practices of "conjux" (which means "a 
joined person") the Western conventions of monogamy and 
marriage are upheld. 
Yet if Irene Clyde's novel loses sight of or 
significantly revises its original aims, there is still 
something quite remarkable about this text, however 
obscure and however flawed it is in literary terms. 
Part of its fascination must derive from the questions 
surrounding the author Thomas Baty, who pursues his 
fantasy through the pseudonym "Irene Clyde". But viewed 
alongside other discourses of sex and gender from the 
period, both fictional and non-fictional, Beatrice the 
Sixteenth provides further evidence of the radical 
responses which established notions of identity were 
provoking in the opening decades of the twentieth 
century. 
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